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NO. 01-339

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
SEP 26 2001
CLERK

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

♦

TERRY L. STEWART, DIRECTOR,
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT DOUGLAS SMITH,

Respondent.

♦

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals For the Ninth Circuit

♦

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I

(A) DOES THE REQUIREMENT OF AKE V. OKLAHOMA, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), THAT A STATE PROCEDURAL RULE BE INDEPENDENT OF FEDERAL LAW TO CONSTITUTE AN ADEQUATE AND INDEPENDENT STATE GROUND, APPLY IN HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS UNDER 28 U.S.C. §2254?

(B) IS THERE A CONFLICT IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS ON THIS ISSUE?

(C) DOES THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING THAT A DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A POST-CONVICTION CLAIM IS OF "SUFFICIENT CONSTITUTIONAL MAGNITUDE" IS NOT INDEPENDENT OF FEDERAL LAW UNDER AKE V. OKLAHOMA, SUPRA, CONFLICT WITH THE LAW OF THE SIXTH, SEVENTH AND TENTH CIRCUITS?

II

(A) DID THE NINTH CIRCUIT MISINTERPRET RULE 32.2(a)(3) AND ARIZONA LAW IN FINDING THAT APPLICATION OF THE RULE REQUIRES A DETERMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL MAGNITUDE OF A POST-CONVICTION CLAIM?

(B) DID THE NINTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY HOLD THAT THE ARIZONA COURTS DID NOT CLEARLY AND EXPLICITLY RELY ON A PROCEDURAL RULE IN DENYING RESPONDENT'S INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIM, AND THAT THERE WAS THEREFORE NO INDEPENDENT STATE GROUND FOR THE DENIAL OF THE CLAIM?

(C) DID THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERR IN REFUSING TO CERTIFY A QUESTION OF ARIZONA STATE LAW TO THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT?

III

HAS THE COMMON LAW PROCEDURAL DEFAULT RULE OF WAINWRIGHT V. SYKES, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) BEEN SUPERSEDED, IN ARIZONA CASES, BY 28 U.S.C. § 2264, UNDER WHICH PETITIONER IS PLAINLY ENTITLED TO FEDERAL CONSIDERATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS BECAUSE ARIZONA DID NOT AFFORD HIM THE POSTCONVICTION REPRESENTATION IT HAS OBLIGATED ITSELF TO PROVIDE IN ORDER TO "OPT IN" TO CHAPTER 154 OF THE AEDPA?

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Respondent respectfully prays that Petitioner's Petition For Writ Of Certiorari to review the judgment below be denied.

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OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court Of Appeals appears at Appendix A to the Brief in Opposition and is reported at Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2001).

The Order of the United States District Court of Arizona denying the Supplemental Petition appears at Appendix B to the Brief In Opposition and is unpublished. Smith v. Lewis, (No. CIV 87-234 TUC RMB filed October 31, 1996.)

The Decision of the United States District Court of Arizona denying the Amended Petition appears at Appendix C to the Brief in Opposition and is unpublished. Smith v. Lewis (filed September 5, 1996.)

♦

JURISDICTION

The date on which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the case was March 6, 2001.

A Petition For Rehearing and Suggestion For Rehearing En Banc filed by Petitioner was denied by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on May 15, 2001, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix D.

The jurisdiction of this Court is under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. Rule 32.2(a)(3) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure:

Rule 32.2. Preclusion of remedy

a. Preclusion. A defendant shall be precluded from relief under this rule based upon any ground:

* * *

(3) That has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding.

Ariz. R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3).

2. Comment to Rule 32.2 (a)(3) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure:

The pre-1992 version of Rule 32.2(a)(3) indicated that a defendant must "knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently" not raise an issue at trial, on appeal, or in a previous collateral proceeding before the issue was precluded. See, Faye v. Noya, (sic) 372 U.S. 392 (1963). While that is the correct standard of waiver for some constitutional rights, it is not the correct standard for other trial errors. Accordingly, some issues not raised at trial, on appeal, or in a previous collateral proceeding may be deemed waived without considering the defendant's personal knowledge, unless such knowledge is specifically required to waive the constitutional right involved. If an asserted claim is of sufficient constitutional magnitude, the state must show that the defendant "knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently" waived the claim. For most claims of trial error, the state may simply show that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous collateral proceeding, and that would be sufficient to show that the defendant has waived the claim. If defense counsel's failure to raise an issue at trial, on appeal or in a previous collateral proceedings (sic) is so egregious as to result in prejudice as that term has been constitutionally defined, such failure may be raised by means of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3), cmt.

♦

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On March 30, 1982, a Pima County, Arizona jury found Respondent and his codefendant, Joseph Lambright, guilty of the offenses of kidnapping, sexual assault and first degree murder of Sandra Owen on March 11, 1980. (Apps. E and F.) On May 27, 1982, the trial court sentenced Respondent to death on the murder conviction. (App. E.) Lambright was also sentenced to death. (App. F.) In companion decisions dated September 23, 1983, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentences of both defendants. (Apps. E and F.)

On April 20, 1984, Respondent filed his first Petition For Post-Conviction Relief under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Rule 32 Petition") in state court. (App. C at C-3.) The first Rule 32 Petition was denied on April 17, 1985, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Id.)

On April 14, 1987, Respondent filed a Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2254 in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona in Tucson, Arizona. (Id.) Because the Petition continued a number of unexhausted claims on December 14, 1988, the District Court dismissed the Petition without prejudice so that Respondent could exhaust his unexhausted claims in state court. (Id.)

On December 8, 1989, Respondent filed his second Rule 32 Petition. (Id.) On August 8, 1991, the trial court denied the second Rule 32 Petition, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Id.) On January 3, 1994, Respondent filed an Amended Petition in District Court which included the claims raised in the second Rule 32 Petition. (Id.)

In all of the foregoing proceedings, Respondent was represented by attorneys of the Office of the Pima County Public Defender in Tucson, Arizona. (App. A at A-4.)[1] In September of 1994, Respondent wrote a letter to Judge Richard M. Bilby, the judge presiding over Respondent's federal habeas proceedings, and told him that he wished to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to his trial and sentencing counsel, but that his present counsel, John Palumbo, had told him that he could not raise such a claim because trial counsel was a member of his Office. (Id. at A-4, A-5.) Respondent requested in the letter that Judge Bilby appoint an attorney to "work with" Palumbo and represent him on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel against his trial counsel. (Id. at A-5.) Judge Bilby granted Respondent's request and appointed undersigned counsel S. Jonathan Young, a private attorney, to represent Respondent on his ineffectiveness claims. (Id.)

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[1] Thomas Hippert represented Respondent at trial and sentencing. Lawrence Fleicshman represented Respondent on direct appeal and the first Rule 32 Petition. John Palumbo represented Respondent on his second Rule 32 Petition and on his initial and Amended Habeas Petitions. (App. B at 1-2.)

On June 9, 1995, undersigned counsel Young filed a third Rule 32 Petition raising numerous claims and allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel by the Public Defender's Office, including a claim that Respondent's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during his sentencing proceedings. (Id.) The Petition contained an affidavit by John Palumbo that the Pima County Public Defender had a policy that prohibited its attorneys from alleging ineffectiveness of other attorneys in the office. (App. A at A-5.) The trial court denied the third Rule 32 Petition, however, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (A at A-5; App. G; App H.)

On August 23, 1996, undersigned counsel Young filed a Supplemental Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus and Supporting Memorandum raising Respondent's ineffectiveness claims. (App. A at A-5; App. B)

In an Amended Memorandum Opinion And Order dated September 5, 1996, the District Court denied the Amended Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus and Respondent's non-ineffectiveness claims. (App. C.) In an Order dated October 30, 1996, the District Court denied the Supplemental Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus and Respondent's ineffectiveness of counsel claims on the ground that those claims were procedurally defaulted. (App. B.)

On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court granted relief on one of Respondent's trial claims (dual jury issue), but the court granted Petitioner's Motion For Rehearing En Banc and reversed that ruling. See, Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181 9th Cir. 1999). The court then remanded the case to the original panel for consideration of Respondent's remaining trial and sentencing claims. Id. In Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191 (2001), the court granted relief on Respondent's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, holding that there was "no doubt" that Respondent had established a colorable claim on that issue, and that the state court had erred in denying Respondent's request for an evidentiary hearing on that issue. (App. A at A-11 to A-17.)[2] The court therefore ordered that the case be remanded

[2] The evidence of ineffective assistance relied upon by the Ninth Circuit was, *inter alia*, (i) counsel's failure to investigate, or present evidence of, Respondent's "miserable" childhood, mental disabilities and mental impairment at the time of the offense, (ii) his sole and inexplicable]" reliance on the immunity agreement obtained by the State's primary witness, and the "great loss" suffered by

to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing on the claim of ineffective assistance at sentencing. (Id. at A-17.)[3] In reaching the merits of Respondent's ineffectiveness at sentencing claim, the court held that the District Court had erred in finding that Respondent's claims were procedurally defaulted, because there was no independent state ground for the Arizona courts' denial of the claim. (Id. at A-7 to A-11.)[4]

Petitioner filed a timely Petition For Rehearing and Suggestion For Rehearing En Banc of the foregoing decision in Smith v. Stewart, and that Petition was denied by Order dated May 15, 2001. (App. D.) On August 13, 2001, Petitioner filed a timely Petition For Writ of Certiorari in this Court.

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REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

Respondent respectfully requests this Court to deny the Writ for the following reasons.

I

A

The Ninth Circuit Correctly Relied Upon the "Independent State Procedural Rule" Requirement Of Ake v. Oklahoma In The Habeas Proceedings In This Case.

Petitioner contends that the Ninth Circuit's reliance upon the "independent state procedural rule" requirement of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), to find that there was no procedural default of Respondent's claim was error, and conflicts with a decision of the Fourth Circuit which addressed the

the victim's family, as reasons not to impose death, and (iii) his "rambling" explanation of his own moral opposition to the death penalty. (App. A at -4, 11-17.) The court described counsel's performance in the sentencing proceedings as "woefully inadequate". (Id. at 13.)

[3] The court denied relief on all of Respondent's other claims in a separate unpublished opinion. See Lambright v. Stewart, 2001 WL 228668.

[4] In light of its holding that there was no independent state ground for the denial of the claim, the court stated that there was no need to address Respondent's argument that the policy of the Pima County Public Defender preventing its attorneys from attacking the competency of any other attorney in the office was an "external" and "objective factor" constituting cause and prejudice for the procedural default. (Id. at A-7, A-8, n.3.) The court stated, however, that the argument "appears to have merit", citing Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000.) (Id.)

issue of whether Ake, a direct review case, applies in habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C.§2254. (Pet. for Cert. at 7-15.) This contention is incorrect.

Petitioner's contention that Ake does not apply in habeas proceedings is based entirely on the following language in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), concerning Ake:

> **Ake was a direct review case. We have never applied its rule regarding independent state grounds in federal habeas. But even if Ake applies here, it does Coleman no good because the Virginia Supreme Court relied on an independent state procedural rule.**

504 U.S. at 741. This language is dicta on the issue of whether Ake applies to habeas proceedings, as this Court effectively held that it did not have to decide that issue given the Virginia procedural rule's independence of federal law. An examination of this Court's habeas decisions shows that the "independent state procedural rule" requirement of Ake does apply in habeas.

In Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72 (1977), this Court held that the doctrine of "adequate and independent state ground" applies in habeas proceedings, and allowed a federal court to refuse to review a constitutional claim because the state court had declined to rule on the claim due to the petitioner's failure to comply with a state procedural rule, and the state court ruling was therefore not "independent" federal law. 433 U.S. at 81-87. This Court held that:

> **We therefore conclude that Florida procedure did, consistently with the United States Constitution, require that respondents' confession be challenged at trial or not at all, and thus his failure to timely object to its admission amounted to an independent and adequate state procedural ground which would have prevented direct review here. See, Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 433, 85 S.Ct. 5644, 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965).**

Id. at 86-87, emphasis added. This Court's reliance on Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S., 433 (1965), a direct review case, to hold in Sykes that the adequate and independent state ground doctrine applies in habeas cases, is an early indication that this Court intended the doctrine to have equal and coextensive application in direct review and habeas cases.

In County Court Of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979), this Court relied upon Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, and recognized the existence of the adequate and independent state ground doctrine in habeas proceedings, but reached a different result than Sykes. This Court held that New York's contemporaneous objection rule was not an independent state ground for the denial of the

petitioner's claim because, unlike Sykes, it had not been shown that New York law required a contemporaneous objection to this type of instructional error, or that the state court had relied on any such state procedural rule in denying the claim. Id, at 147-154. In so applying the independent state ground doctrine, this Court stated that:

> **Our conclusion that it was proper for the federal courts to address respondents' claim is confirmed by the policies informing the "adequate state ground" exception to habeas corpus jurisdiction. The purpose of that exception is to accord appropriate respect to the sovereignty of the States in our federal system. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 US, at 88, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 97 S.Ct. 2497. But if neither the state legislature nor the constitutional claim is barred by some state procedural rule, a federal court implies no disrespect for the State by entertaining the claim.**

Id. at 154, footnote omitted, emphasis added. In holding that the adequate and independent state ground doctrine applies throughout "our federal system", this Court again indicated that the doctrine applies equally and coextensively in direct review and habeas cases.

It was in Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989), however, that this Court first specifically held that a direct review case relating to the independent state ground doctrine applied equally and coextensively to a habeas case. In Harris, this Court held that the "plain statement" rule established in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), and Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), both direct review cases, applied equally to habeas cases. 489 U.S. at 257-266, In Long, this Court held that when it is presented with a federal constitutional issue on direct review, it will find jurisdiction to review the claim:

> **in the absence of a plain statement that the decision below rested on an adequate and independent state ground.**

463 U.S. at 1043. This Court also held that when faced with an ambiguous state court decision, it will presume that no adequate and independent state ground was relied on, and will review the federal claim. Id. at 1042.[5] In Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, this Court held, relying on Long, that in determining

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[5] This Court summarized the plain statement rule in Long as follows:

> **In determining, as we must, whether we have jurisdiction to review a case that is alleged to rest on adequate and independent state grounds, we merely assume that there are no such grounds when it is not clear from the opinion itself that the state court relied upon an adequate and independent state ground**

whether jurisdiction exists on direct review:

> **[...W]e will not assume that a state-court decision rests on adequate and independent state grounds when the "state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion." Michigan v. Long, 463 US 1032, 1040-1041[.] "If the state court decision clearly and expressly indicates that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate and independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision." Id., at 1041[.]**

472 U.S. at 327.

In applying "plain statement" rule and presumption of no independent state ground of Long and Caldwell to habeas cases, Harris establishes that decisions of this Court relating to the adequate and independent state ground doctrine apply equally and coextensively to habeas cases. As stated in Harris:

> **Although Long and Caldwell arose on direct review, the principles underlying those decisions are not limited to direct review. Indeed, our opinion in Caldwell relied heavily upon our earlier application of the adequate and independent state ground doctrine to habeas review in Ulster County. See Caldwell, 472 US, at 327-328, 86 L Ed 2d 231, 105 S Ct 2633. Caldwell thus indicates that the problem of ambiguous state-court references to state law, which led to the adoption of the Long "plain statement" rule, is common to both direct and habeas review. Faced with a common problem, we adopt a common solution: a procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case "clearly and expressly" states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar. Caldwell, 472 US, at 327, 86 L Ed 2d 231, US, at 1041, 77 L Ed 2d 1201, 103 S Ct 3469.**

489 U.S. at 263, footnote omitted.

In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), this Court reaffirmed its decisions in Sykes, Ulster County and Harris, supra, and held that the adequate and independent state ground doctrine applies in habeas cases, as well as direct review cases. 501 U.S. at 729-730. In so holding, this Court discussed the question of whether the doctrine applied differently in habeas cases than it does in direct review cases. Id. at 730. This Court observed that one difference between direct review and habeas cases is that in the former case it is reviewing whether the judgment of the state court violated federal law, while in the latter

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> **and when it fairly appears that the state court rested its decision primarily on federal law.**
>
> Id., citation omitted.

case the federal courts are reviewing whether the custody of the defendant violated federal law. Id. This Court further observed, however, that:

> **Nonetheless, a state prisoner is in custody pursuant to a judgment. When a federal habeas court releases a prisoner held pursuant to a state court judgment that rests on an independent and adequate state ground, it renders ineffective the state rule just as completely as if this Court had reversed the state judgment on direct review. In such a case, the habeas court ignores the State's legitimate reasons for holding the prisoner.**

Id., emphasis in original, citation omitted. Based on this reasoning, this Court stated that Harris had correctly held that the "plain statement" rule and presumption of Long and Caldwell applied to habeas cases. Id. at 730-735. Moreover, this Court emphasized that the rule was to be applied equally and coextensively in all such cases:

> **It is unmistakably clear that Harris applies the same presumption in habeas that Long and Caldwell adopted in direct review cases in this Court. See Harris, 489 U.S., at 263, 109 S.Ct. ("Faced with a common problem we adopt a common solution"); see also id., at 264, 103 L Ed 2d 308, 109 S Ct 1038 ("Under our decision today, a state court need do nothing more to preclude habeas review than it must do to preclude direct review"). Indeed, the quoted passage purports to state the rule "on either direct or habeas review." Harris, being a federal habeas case, could not change the rule for direct review; the reference to both direct and habeas review makes plain that Harris applies precisely the same rule as Long.**

Id. at 736. Finally, however, the Court held that the presumption of "no independent state ground" did not apply in Coleman's case because it did not "fairly appear" from the state court decision that it rested primarily on federal law, or was interwoven with federal law. Id. at 735-740.[6] This Court thus held Coleman's claim to be procedurally defaulted and that Coleman had failed to show cause and prejudice for that default. Id. at 740-757.

The above decisions of this Court show that the adequate and independent state ground doctrine applies equally and coextensively in direct review and habeas cases, and that decisions in one area are fully applicable and relevant to the other area.[7] It must be concluded, therefore, that Ake v. Oklahoma,

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[6] Coleman failed to file a timely notice of appeal from his murder conviction and death sentence, and that was the sole basis for the state court's ruling denying Coleman's petition for appeal. Id. at 726-728.

[7] See e.g., Harris, supra, 489 U.S. at 257-266 and Coleman, supra, 501 U.S. at 737-740 (adopting and applying Long and Caldwell to habeas); Caldwell,

a direct review case concerning the independent state ground doctrine, is fully applicable and relevant to habeas cases, and that the Ninth Circuit therefore correctly relied upon and applied Ake to this case.

Consistently with the cases of this Court discussed above which hold that a state court's ruling on a constitutional claim must be independent of federal law to be an independent state ground, Ake holds that the state procedural rule relied upon by the state court in denying the claim must also be independent of federal law. Ake, supra, 470 U.S. at 74-75. Ake had contended in his capital sentencing proceedings that as an indigent he was entitled under the Due Process Clause to the expert assistance of a psychiatrist to counter the expert testimony of the State's psychiatrist that Ake was likely to be dangerous in the future. Id. at 70-74. The State heavily relied on that testimony to argue that Ake be sentenced to death, and the trial court imposed death. Id. at 73-74. On appeal, the court held that there was no constitutional error, and also held that the claim was waived on appeal under Oklahoma law because Ake had not repeated his request for an expert in his motion for new trial. Id. On direct review by this Court, the State argued that the Court of Appeals' finding of waiver was an independent state ground for the state court's decision. Id. at 74-75. This Court rejected that argument, however, because the state's waiver rule had an exception under Oklahoma case law for claims of "fundamental trial error," which included federal constitutional error. Id. This Court held that since Oklahoma's procedural rule required the state court to determine whether a federal constitutional error had occurred before it could apply the rule, it was not independent of federal law, and could not be used to establish an independent state ground for the denial of Ake's claim. Id. Accordingly, this Court held that Ake's claim was not subject to procedural default, and heard the merits of his claim and ruled in his favor. Id. at 74-87.

Ake is an essential component of the independent state ground doctrine. Without examination and consideration of the procedural rule that a state court relied upon in denying a federal claim, it is impossible to accurately determine whether the state's ruling on the federal claim was truly independent of federal law. This point is illustrated by Ake itself. This Court recognized that on its face, the state

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supra, 472 U.S. at 327 (relying on Ulster County); Sykes, supra, 433 U.S. at 86-87 (relying on Henry v. Mississippi); see also Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1994) (relying on Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991)).

court's ruling that Ake's federal claim was waived under Oklahoma law was an independent state ground for denying the claim as it was a "state-law ruling." 470 U.S. at 74. However, when this Court examined the Oklahoma procedural rule applicable to Ake, it was able to determine that the state court's ruling was not, and could not be, independent of federal law, because:

> **[B]efore applying the waiver doctrine to a constitutional question, the state court must rule, either explicitly or implicitly, on the merits of the constitutional question.**

470 U.S. at 75, emphasis added. Thus, this Court held that "[d]espite the court's state-law ruling", id. at 74, emphasis added, the ruling was not an independent state ground because the state court was required to decide a federal question to determine whether the procedural rule applied to Ake's claim. The essential holding of Ake was, therefore, that since the Oklahoma procedural rule in question was not independent of federal law, any ruling by the state court based on that rule could never be independent of federal law, and could not constitute an independent state ground.

Based upon the above decisions of this Court, a federal court must conduct a two-step analysis to determine if there is an independent state ground for a state court's decision denying a federal claim. First, the court must determine, as a threshold matter, whether the applicable state procedural rule is independent of federal law. Ake, supra. If it is not, then the analysis need go no further, as any state court decision based upon that rule could not be independent of federal law. Id. If the procedural rule is independent of federal law, however, then the court must complete the second step, and determine whether the state court's ruling is independent of federal law. Harris v. Reed, Michigan v. Long, Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra. If it is independent, then the independent state ground doctrine applies and the constitutional claim cannot be reviewed by the federal court. If the ruling is not independent, however, then the federal court may review the claim. Id. Consideration of both the state rule under Ake, as well as the state ruling under Harris, is necessary to a fair and accurate determination of whether an independent state ground exists. Adoption of Petitioner's position that Ake should not apply in habeas proceedings would significantly undermine that doctrine, and weaken the authority and ability of the federal courts to review federal questions in habeas. This Court has clearly indicated in the cases discussed above that the independent state ground doctrine must be applied equally and coextensively in

direct review and habeas cases, and that Ake, should therefore have full application and relevance in a habeas case for purposes of the independent state ground doctrine. This Court recognized this in Harris v. Reed, supra, when it cited and referred to Ake "[f]or a discussion on whether a state procedural default ruling is 'independent'[.]" 489 U.S. at 260-261, n.6. In addition, in the habeas case of O'Dell v. Thompson, 502 U.S. 995 (1991), three Justices, including two present Justices of this Court, cited Ake in dissenting from a denial of a petition for writ of certiorari, stating that:

> **The Virginia Supreme Court's dismissal of O'Dell's habeas petition should not deprive a federal habeas court of jurisdiction. Under Ake v. Oklahoma, the Virginia Supreme Court's rejection [of O'Dell's claim] may not be based on an independent state ground because Tharp v. Commonwealth requires the Virginia Supreme Court to consider whether a constitutional right was abridged before denying an extension of time for filing a petition for appeal.**

502 U.S. at 997-998, citation and footnote omitted. These statements further support the conclusion that Ake applies in habeas cases.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the requirement of Ake v. Oklahoma, that a state procedural rule be independent of federal law in order to constitute an independent state ground for denial of a constitutional claim, is fully applicable and relevant in habeas proceedings, and the Ninth Circuit properly and correctly relied on Ake in Respondent's habeas proceedings to find that the Arizona courts' denial of Respondent's ineffectiveness claim was not based upon an independent state ground.

B

There Is No Actual Conflict In The Circuits On The Issue Of Whether The "Independent State Procedural Rule" Requirement Of Ake Applies To Habeas.

Like the Ninth Circuit's decision in this case, the overwhelming number of Court of Appeals cases and District Court cases recognize that Ake applies to habeas cases as well as direct review cases.

The Second,[8] Eighth,[9] Ninth,[10] and Eleventh[11] Circuits have all cited and relied on Ake in habeas proceedings. In addition, District Court habeas cases from the Third Circuit have cited and relied on Ake.[12]

Petitioner contends, however, that the Fourth Circuit is in conflict with the Ninth Circuit's decision in this case applying Ake in habeas proceedings, and requests this Court to resolve the conflict. (Pet. for Cert. at 9-13.) Petitioner's contention is incorrect. The only Fourth Circuit case cited by Petitioner is O'Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214 (4th Cir. 1996). O'Dell involved the same Virginia notice of appeal rule at issue as in Coleman v. Thompson, supra, and the court stated that it agreed with the decision in Coleman that Ake "does not apply in the habeas context." O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1244. It also held, however, as Coleman did, that the Virginia notice of appeal rule was independent of federal law, and that the petitioner's claim was therefore based on a independent state ground. Id. O'Dell does not support Petitioner's position for several reasons. First, it incorrectly concludes that this Court held in Coleman that Ake does not apply to habeas. As stated previously, the Court only stated in Coleman that it had not previously applied Ake in habeas proceedings, and that assuming arguendo that Ake did apply in habeas, the Virginia notice of appeal rule was in fact independent of federal law, thereby establishing an independent state ground. Coleman, supra, 501 U.S. at 741. Thus, Coleman's statement

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[8] Bradley v. Meachum, 918 F.2d 338, 343 (2nd Cir. 1990); Roy v. Coxon, 907 F.2d 385, 390-391 (2nd Cir. 1990).

[9] Malone v. Vasquez, 138 F.3d 711, 717-718 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Olesen v. Class, 962 F.Supp. 1556, 1570 (D.C.S.D.).

[10] Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000); Bargas v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 1999); Harmon v. Ryan, 959 F.2d 1457, 1461 (9th Cir. 1991); see also, McLain v. Hill, 52 F.Supp.2d 1133, 1138-1139 (C.D.Cal. 1999); Karis v. Vasquez, 828 F.Supp. 1449, 1461, n.16 (E.D.Cal. 1993).

[11] Spivey v. Head, 207 F.3d 1263, 1283 (11th Cir. 2000); Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1517 (11th Cir. 1990).

[12] Banks v. Horn, 49 F.Supp.2d 400, 405-406 (M.D.Pa. 1999); Johnson v. Ellingsworth, 783 F.Supp. 215, 219-220 (D.Del. 1992).

Respondent was unable to find any cases from the First or Fifth Circuits helpful on this issue.

about Ake was dicta, and not a holding binding on the Fourth Circuit. Second, the Fourth Circuit's own "holding" in O'Dell that Ake does not apply in habeas is itself dicta, because the court held, as Coleman did, that Virginia's notice of appeal rule was independent of federal law, and did not need to reach the Ake question. Third, and most importantly, however, O'Dell's statement that Ake does not apply to habeas has not been followed by the Fourth Circuit in any subsequent decision, and all Fourth Circuit cases following O'Dell have ignored it and recognized that Ake applies in habeas cases.[13] It can hardly be argued by Petitioner that O'Dell is in conflict with the Ninth Circuit when O'Dell is not even followed in its own Circuit. O'Dell, therefore, is an aberration, and the other Fourth Circuit decisions cited above show that the Circuit does not follow O'Dell and does apply Ake in habeas cases.

Finally, Petitioner also contends that the Ninth Circuit's decision in this case also conflicts with cases of the Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits. (Pet. for Cert. at 9-15.) This alleged conflict, however, is not based on whether Ake v. Oklahoma applies to habeas proceedings, and Petitioner concedes, as it must, that the Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits, like the other Circuits mentioned previously, recognize the applicability of Ake to habeas cases. (Id. at 12.)[14] Petitioner contends, however, that these Circuits conflict with the Ninth Circuit's holding that a determination of whether a post-conviction claim in

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[13] Bacon v. Lee, 225 F.3d 470, 476 (4th Cir. 2000); Fisher v. Lee, 215 F.3d 438, 455 (4th Cir. 2000); Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 183 (4th Cir. 2000); Thomas v. Davis, 192 F.3d 445, 450 (4th Cir.1999); Yeatts v. Angelone 166 F.3d 255, 260 (4th Cir.1999); Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 853 (4th Cir. 1998); Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 159 (4th Cir. 1998); Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 366 (4th Cir. 1998); Boyd v. French, 147 F.3d 319, 331 (4th Cir. 1998); Williams v. French, 147 F.3d 203, 208-209 (4th Cir.1998); Gilbert v. Moore, 134 F.3d 642, 656 (4th Cir. 1998); Mu'Min v. Pruett, 125 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 1997); see also, Oken v. Nuth, 64 F.Supp.2d 488, 494 (D.Md. 1999).

[14] See Scott v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 854, 865-868 (6th Cir. 2000); White v. Schotten, 201 F.3d 743, 751-752 (6th Cir. 2000); Willis v. Aiken, 8 F.3d 556, 567 (7th Cir. 1993); (questioning applicability of Ake but still determining whether state rule was independent of federal law); Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 796-797 (10th Cir. 1998); Maes v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 979, 985 (10th Cir. 1995); Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1353 (10th Cir. 1996); Steele v. Young, 11 F.3d 1518, 1521-1522 (10th Cir. 1993); Andrews v. Deland, 943 F.2d 1162, 1188, n.40 (10th Cir. 1991); Gutierrez v. Moriarty, 922 F.2d 1464, 1468-1469 (10th Cir. 1991); Shafer v. Stratton, 906 F.2d 506, 509 (10th Cir. 1990); Brasier v Douglas, 815 F.2d 64, 65 (10th Cir. 1987); see also United States ex rel. Campos v. Peters, 827 F.Supp. 1359, 1362 (N.D.Ill. 1993).

Arizona is of "sufficient constitutional magnitude" under Rule 32.2(a)(3) is independent of federal law under Ake. This issue is discussed in the next subsection.

For the above reasons, the Petitioner's contention that there is a conflict in the Circuits on the issue of whether Ake applies to habeas cases is incorrect. Only one Fourth Circuit case, O'Dell v. Netherland, supra, has held that Ake does not apply to habeas cases. As stated above, however, that case has not been followed in the Fourth Circuit, and it therefore cannot fairly be said that O'Dell is the law of the Fourth Circuit. Thus, there is no real conflict in the Circuit Courts of Appeals on this issue, and the Petition should not be granted on this basis.

C

The Ninth Circuit Correctly Held That A Determination Of Whether A Post-Conviction Claim Is Of "Sufficient Constitutional Magnitude" Is Not Independent Of Federal Law, And That Holding Does Not Conflict With the Sixth, Seventh And Tenth Circuits.

The Ninth Circuit held that to determine whether a post-conviction claim is precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Arizona state courts must first determine whether the claim is of "sufficient constitutional magnitude". Smith, supra, 241 F.3d at 1196-1197. The court also held that this determination is not independent of federal law, and is therefore not an independent state ground under Ake v. Oklahoma. Id. Petitioner contends, however, that the Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with cases from the Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits. (Pet. for Cert. at 11-15.) Petitioner's contention is incorrect.

The Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuit cases cited by Petitioner are all clearly distinguishable from this case because the state procedural rules at issue in those cases did not require a determination of federal law by the state court in order to apply the state procedural rule.

In Scott v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000), the court considered whether an Ohio procedural rule requiring a contemporaneous objection to jury instructions at trial was independent of federal law under Ake. The petitioner argued that the rule was not independent, because under Ohio law the appellate court could overlook the rule for claims involving "plain error", which could include

constitutional error. 209 F.3d at 865-868. The court rejected this argument, however, because under Ohio law "plain error" review is discretionary, and only applies in "exceptional circumstances". Id. Since the state court decision did not give any indication that the court had exercised its discretion to review for plain error, and appeared to have decided the issue solely based on the procedural rule, the court held that the state court decision was independent of federal law under Ake. Id. Relying on Coleman v. Thompson, supra, the court stated that:

> **The Supreme Court...does not find the mere reservation of discretion to review for plain error in exceptional circumstances to constitute an application of federal law.**

209 F.3d at 868. Unlike the Ohio rule at issue in Scott, supra, Arizona's Rule 32.2(a)(3) is neither discretionary nor limited to "exceptional circumstances". Rather, it requires an Arizona court to consider the merits of every post-conviction claim presented and determine whether the claim is of "sufficient constitutional magnitude". Smith, 241 F.3d an at 1196-1197 n.6. If the claim is of "sufficient constitutional magnitude", it must be heard on the merits unless the State can prove the claim was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived. Id. If the claim is not of "sufficient constitutional magnitude", then the claim may be subject to waiver and preclusion, Id Like the "fundamental trial error" procedural rule in Ake, application of Rule 32.2(a)(3) depends upon an "antecedent ruling on federal law" and is not independent of federal law. Ake, supra, 470 U.S. at 75. Contrary to Petitioner's contention, therefore, Scott is not in conflict with the Ninth Circuit's decision in this case.

In Paprocki v. Foltz, 869 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1989), a case relied upon by the court in Scott v. Mitchell, supra, the court held that the petitioner's claim, that a self-defense instruction used in his trial was unconstitutional, was subject to procedural default as a result of his failure to object to the instruction at trial, as required by a Michigan procedural rule requiring contemporaneous objection. 869 F.2d at 284-285. The petitioner argued that the claim should not be defaulted, however, because the Michigan Court of Appeals, in denying the claim, reviewed the claim for "manifest injustice", and thereby addressed the merits of the claim and waived the procedural bar. Id. The court rejected this argument, however, holding that under Michigan law, the Court of Appeals' procedural rule on appeal for an unobjected-to claim:

> **was to enforce the procedural bar while reserving the right to excuse it if necessary to prevent manifest injustice.**

869 F.2d at 285, emphasis added. The court held that:

> **[...w]e do not believe that the state court's explanation of why the jury instructions resulted in no manifest injustice can fairly be said to have constituted a waiver of the procedural default.**

Id. Like Scott, supra, the procedural rule at issue in Paprocki did not require the Michigan Court of Appeals to review the merits of the petitioner's claim. Since the error was not objected to, the court could, in its discretion, review the merits of the claim for "manifest injustice". As the court held in Scott, supra, relying on Coleman, supra, the mere reservation of discretion to review for manifest injustice is not a determination of federal law under Ake, 209 F.3d at 868. In this case, however, and as held by the Ninth Circuit, Arizona courts are required to review a post-conviction claim for its "constitutional magnitude" in order to determine whether the claim is precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3). Thus, the Michigan procedural rule in Paprocki, supra, was independent of federal law under Ake, while Rule 32.2(a)(3) is not independent under Ake.

In Willis v. Aiken, 8 F.3d 556, 559-567 (7th Cir. 1993), the court held that the petitioner's claim that a jury instruction was unconstitutional was procedurally defaulted due to his failure to comply with an Indiana procedural rule requiring a contemporaneous objection at trial. Because there was no objection to the instruction, the Indiana appellate courts were permitted under Indiana law to review the claim only for "fundamental error." Id. at 560. On appeal, the court held that the instruction was not "fundamental error", citing only Indiana law. Id. The petitioner argued in federal habeas that the claim should not be held to be procedurally defaulted, because the state court's "fundamental error" review required a review for constitutional error, and that review was therefore not independent of federal law. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, however, because it found that Indiana law does not equate "fundamental error" with "federal constitutional error". Id. at 562-569. Rather, it found that Indiana law mandates review for "fundamental error" only when the denial of a fundamental right "gives rise to a question of fundamental error as defined by state law". Id. at 567, emphasis in original, quoting Gutierrez v. Moriarty, 922 F.2d 1464, 1469 (10th Cir. 1991). The court therefore concluded that the Indiana

appellate court's finding of "no fundamental error" was an independent state ground. Id. Thus, Willis is also distinguishable from this case, as the procedural rule at issue there was discretionary, and did not require a determination of federal law in order to apply the rule. As the Ninth Circuit held in this case, however, application of Rule 32.2(a)(3) requires a determination of the "constitutional magnitude" of a post-conviction claim, and is therefore not independent of federal law. .

Finally, in Gutierrez v. Moriarty, 922 F.2d 1464 (10th Cir. 1991), relied on in Willis v. Aiken, supra, the court held the petitioner's claim that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in federal district court on constitutional violations relating to preindictment and pretrial delay was procedurally defaulted due to the petitioner's failure to raise those issues in the state trial court. 922 F.2d at 1468-1472. The New Mexico Supreme Court had held on appeal that the petitioner failed to preserve the claims for appellate review by failing to both raise the issue and offer a "proper quantum of proof" in the trial court. Id. at 1468. In habeas proceedings, petitioner argued that New Mexico has an exception to its waiver rule for claims involving "fundamental error". Id. The petitioner argued that the New Mexico Supreme Court had in fact considered the merits of his claims under this exception, as it referred to "quantum of proof", a substantive issue, and had cited a New Mexico case in which the court had reviewed the merits of a defaulted claim. Id. Petitioner thus argued that New Mexico's "fundamental error" rule was analogous to the "fundamental trial error" rule in Ake v. Oklahoma, supra. Id. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, however, as it found from examining New Mexico case law that New Mexico "does not equate fundamental error with federal constitutional error." Id. at 1469. Instead, it found that under New Mexico law a ruling by a state appellate court simply denying a claim, as in petitioner's case, did not "necessarily" mean that the court found no federal constitutional error, and could also mean that the court (i) considered the merits of the claim and found no "fundamental error" as defined under state law, (ii) found a violation of a "fundamental right", which under New Mexico is a "federal constitutional right", but declined to exercise its discretion to review the claim on its merits or (iii) found the error to be "fundamental error" but harmless, and treat the claim as a "fundamental right" claim and subject it to waiver. Id. Thus, the court held that the denial of the claim did not necessarily require a

determination of the merits of a federal constitutional claim, and that New Mexico's procedural rules were, unlike the procedural rule in Ake, independent of federal law. Id. Thus the court held that the New Mexico procedural rule was an independent state ground for the decision and that petitioner's claim was procedurally defaulted. Id. Again, Gutierrez is distinguishable from this case because it involved a procedural rule which was discretionary and did not require a determination of federal law to apply the procedural rule.

For the above reasons, Petitioner's contention that the Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits are in conflict with the Ninth Circuit on the application of Ake v. Oklahoma is incorrect. The Ninth Circuit correctly applied Ake in this case and held that Rule 32.2(a)(3) requires Arizona courts to determine the merits of a post-conviction claim to determine whether it is a claim of "sufficient constitutional magnitude" and whether it is precluded under that rule. Smith, supra, 241 F.3d at 1196-1197. The Ninth Circuit also correctly held that Rule 32.2(a)(3) is not independent of federal law under Ake because a ruling under Rule 32.2(a)(3) "necessarily includes an evaluation of the constitutional stature of the claim" and "does not rest on an independent state ground". Id. at 1196-1197, n.6. As stated above, the Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuit cases relied upon by Petitioner are completely distinguishable from this case and Ake, because the state procedural rules in those cases were discretionary in nature, and did not make:

> **'Application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law, that is, on the determination of whether federal constitutional error has been committed'.**

Smith. Id. at 1196, quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 75.

For all of the above reasons, Respondent requests this Court to deny the writ as to Petitioner's first Question Presented For Review.

II

A

The Ninth Circuit Did Not Misinterpret Rule 32.2(a)(3) And Arizona Law In Finding That Application Of The Rule Requires A Determination Of the "Constitutional Magnitude" Of A Post-Conviction Claim.

The Ninth Circuit found, after an examination of Rule 32.2(a)(3), the Comment to that Rule, and case law relating to the Rule,[15] that an Arizona court is required to determine whether a post-conviction claim is of "sufficient constitutional magnitude" in order to determine whether the claim should be heard on the merits or precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3). Smith v. Stewart, supra, 241 F.3d at 1196-1197. The court explained the Rule as follows:

> **The Arizona Supreme Court's 1992 comment to Rule 32.2(a)(3) makes clear that the application of the amended procedural default rule requires a separate examination of a claim's constitutional magnitude. The comment provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f an asserted claim is of sufficient constitutional magnitude, the state must show that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived the claim. Ariz.R.Crim.Pro. 32.2(a)(3) comment (West 2000). Thus, since 1992, Arizona's procedural default rule applies in two circumstances: first, when a claim is of insufficient constitutional magnitude and was forfeited at trial, on appeal, or in any previous proceeding; second, when a claim is of sufficient constitutional magnitude and the State proves that the person seeking relief knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived it at trial, on appeal, or in any previous proceeding. In both cases, the state court must consider the nature of the claim before finding that the petitioner procedurally defaulted it. Because an Arizona procedural ruling in this context necessarily includes an evaluation of the constitutional stature of the claim, it does not rest on an independent state ground.**

Id. at 1197, n.6. The court thus held that under Rule 32.2(a)(3) claims of "sufficient constitutional magnitude" are an "exception" to preclusion under that Rule. Id. at 1197.

Petitioner contends, however, relying on State v. Espinosa, 29 P.3d 278 (App. 2001), that the Ninth Circuit's analysis of Rule 32.2(a)(3) is erroneous, that the Rule does not contain an exception for claims of "sufficient constitutional magnitude", and that the Rule does not require Arizona courts to determine the "constitutional magnitude" of a claim in order to apply Rule 32.2(a)(3). (Pet. for Cert. at 17-24.) Petitioner contends instead that Rule 32.2(a)(3) contains an exception, not for claims of "sufficient constitutional magnitude", but for a "narrow category of constitutional rights"[16], which are

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[15] See State v. Curtis, 912 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Ariz. App. 1995); State v. French, 7 P.3d 128, 130-131 (Ariz. App. 2000).

[16] Petitioner has placed the phrase "narrow category of constitutional rights" in quotation marks in the Petition, but has not cited what source or authority the phrase comes from. (Pet. for Cert. at 22.) If there is a source for this quoted phrase, Petitioner should provide it to Respondent, since Petitioner is relying on this phrase to support its position.

only those constitutional rights which require a defendant's "personal knowledge" to waive the right, and which the attorney may not waive for the defendant. (Id.) According to Petitioner, therefore, the only claims which are excepted from preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)(3) are those involving the right to counsel, the right to plead not guilty, the right to a trial by jury, and the right to be present at trial, all of which rights can only be waived by the defendant, and not the attorney. (Id.)

Petitioner's interpretation of Rule 32.2(a)(3) is incorrect, and is based entirely upon a misinterpretation of the following sentence in the Comment to the Rule; which Petitioner cites, emphasizes and relies on for its interpretation:

> **[...S]ome issues not raised at trial, on appeal, or in a previous collateral proceeding may be deemed waived without considering the defendant's personal knowledge, unless such knowledge is specifically required to waive the constitutional right involved.**

(Pet. for Cert. at 21, emphasis in original). Based upon this sentence, Petitioner contends that:

> **Read in context, the reference in the Comment to claims of "sufficient constitutional magnitude" does not recognize or establish any general exception to Arizona's rules of preclusion. The Comment merely acknowledges that Arizona's rules of preclusion will not bar a claim involving a narrow category of rights absent an on-the-record personal waiver by the defendant.**

(Id. at 22, emphasis added.) This argument shows that Petitioner has misread the above sentence in the Comment. That sentence does not state, as Petitioner claims, that only constitutional rights requiring a personal waiver by the defendant are excepted from preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)(3). What the sentence actually states that a post-conviction claim which is not of "sufficient constitutional magnitude" may generally be waived by the defendant's counsel without the defendant's knowledge and personal waiver, unless a personal waiver is "specifically required" to waive that specific constitutional right. Petitioner has misread and misconstrued the Comment in contending that all claims except those involving constitutional rights requiring a personal waiver are precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3). Moreover, Petitioner's construction of the Rule and Comment essentially renders the portion of the Comment referring to claims of "sufficient constitutional magnitude" meaningless and superfluous, and the Rule and Comment may not be interpreted in such a manner. The Ninth Circuit's analysis of Rule 32.2(a)(3) is reasonable and correct, and is supported by the Arizona case law relied upon by the court. See State

v. Curtis, supra, 912 P.2d at 1345 ("A claim is precluded that could have been, but was not, raised in a prior appeal or PCR, unless the asserted claim is of sufficient constitutional magnitude" citing Comment). Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner's interpretation is correct, and that only claims involving constitutional rights for which a personal waiver is required are not precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3), the Rule would still not be independent of federal law under Ake v. Oklahoma, supra. To determine whether a claim was subject to preclusion under Petitioner's interpretation of Rule 32.2(a)(3) an Arizona court would be required to make the following determinations before it could decide whether to hear the claim on the merits or preclude the claim under the rule: (i) whether the claim presented involved the violation of a federal constitutional right, (ii) whether the constitutional right was one which requires personal knowledge and waiver by a defendant and (iii) whether the defendant in fact previously made a personal waiver of the constitutional right. All of the above preliminary determinations would be necessary for an Arizona court to be able to apply preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)(3), and all of these determinations are "antecedent ruling[s] on federal law" on which the application of Rule 32.2(a)(3) depends. Ake, supra, 470 U.S. at 75. Thus, even under Petitioner's reading of Rule 32.2(a)(3) and its Comment, preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)(3) would not constitute an independent state ground for denial of a constitutional claim under that Rule. Ake, supra.

Finally, Petitioner's reliance on State v. Espinosa, supra, a decision of Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals, decided after the Ninth Circuit's ruling in this case, is misplaced because that decision conflicts with State v. French, supra, a prior decision of that court. In French, the defendant brought a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his trial counsel's failure to request an alibi instruction. French, supra, 7 P.3d at 129-130. The State argued that the claim was precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3) because the defendant failed to raise the claim in a previous Rule 32 Petition. Id. The defendant argued, however, based on the Comment to Rule 32.2(a)(3), that his claim was of "sufficient constitutional magnitude" to be heard on the merits and not precluded, and that he had not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived the claim. Id. at 130. Relying on State v. Curtis, supra, a decision of Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals, the court held that the ineffectiveness

claim was not of "sufficient constitutional magnitude" to avoid the preclusive effect of Rule 32.2(a)(3), and that the defendant had waived the claim by failing to raise it in his prior Rule 32 Petition. Id. at 130-131.[17] In so holding, the court examined the merits of the claim, and found, in essence, that any error was harmless due to the "ample evidence" supporting the conviction. 7 P.3d at 131.[18] Based on its review of the merits of the claim, therefore, the court held that trial counsel's failure to request an alibi instruction was not "so egregious" that it could not be precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3). Id. at 130.

Thus, State v. French and State v. Curtis both clearly support the Ninth Circuit's conclusion in this case that under Rule 32.2(a)(3), a trial court must examine a post-conviction claim on its merits to determine if it is of "sufficient constitutional magnitude" that it cannot be precluded under that Rule. Inexplicably, however, just over a year after Division Two decided State v. French, it decided State v. Espinosa, supra, which appears to hold that the determination of whether a claim is of "sufficient constitutional magnitude" under the Comment to Rule 32.2(a)(3) is based upon whether the constitutional

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[17] In State v. Curtis, supra, the court held that the defendant's post-conviction claim that an alibi instruction was unconstitutional was not of sufficient constitutional magnitude", within the meaning of that term in the Comment to Rule 32.2(a)(3), and was therefore precluded under that Rule due to his failure to raise it in his appeal and prior Rule 32 Petition. Curtis, 912 P.2d at 1344-1345. The court held that:

> **A claim is precluded that could have been, but was not, raised in a prior appeal or PCR, unless the "asserted claim is of sufficient constitutional magnitude." Comment to Rule 32.2(a)(3)(Supp. 1994). We need not examine whether the standard alibi instruction could be better worded. At the time of the first appeal, the court not only reviewed the issues petitioner had raised, but also reviewed for fundamental error and found none. This review necessarily extended to the jury instructions. Petitioner's belated focus on the alibi instruction lacks sufficient constitutional magnitude to review an issue that he had two full opportunities to raise before. The trial court properly found this issue precluded by Rule 32.2(a)(3).**

Id. at 1344.

[18] The court relied on the victim's identification of the defendant, and a witness who saw part of the attack on the victim and provided a description of the car and license plate number of the car driven by the perpetrator which matched the defendant's car. 7 P.3d at 131.

right on which the claim is based is a right which must be "personally and expressly waived" by a defendant in order for waiver to occur. Espinosa, 29 P.3d at 280. The court stated that such rights would include the right to a jury trial and right to counsel. Id. Based upon this standard, the court held that the defendant's post-conviction claim that a plea agreement was unconstitutionally withdrawn by the State was not of "sufficient constitutional magnitude" to avoid preclusion because it was not:

> **such "'an inherently personal right of fundamental importance'" that it must be personally and expressly waived.**

Id. citing State v. Smith, 4 P.3d 388, 393 (Ariz. App. 1999) quoting Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 1973).

Contrary to Petitioner's contention, State v. Espinosa is not a valid basis for questioning the decision of the Ninth Circuit in this case. First, and for the reasons stated previously, Espinosa's reading of Rule 32.2(a)(3) and its Comment is unreasonable and incorrect, as there is nothing in either Rule 32.2(a)(3) or its Comment which supports its conclusion that the standard for preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)(3) is whether a constitutional right can be personally waived. Second, Espinosa does not even mention, much less follow, State v. Curtis, and State v. French, supra, the latter of which was a case from its own Division, and relies on cases which have nothing to do with preclusion. A decision concerning a state procedural rule which disregards and ignores prior relevant and applicable case law concerning the rule cannot be used as a basis for a procedural default, as procedural default can only be justified when the State court correctly follows an established state procedural rule which is consistently and regularly applied and enforced. Rule 32.2(a)(3), as unreasonably and incorrectly interpreted by State v. Espinosa, is not the procedural rule applicable to this case. Rule 32.2(a)(3), as explained in its Comment, State v. Curtis and State v. French, is the applicable state procedural rule here, and the Ninth Circuit correctly based its decision on that Rule. State v. Espinosa did not establish a procedural rule. It simply failed to follow the procedural rule existing at the time of the decision, and therefore cannot be the basis for a procedural default. Finally, and as stated previously, even if Espinosa were the standard for preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)(3), that would not change the result in this case, as an Arizona court would still be required to make an "antecedent ruling on federal law" in order to apply Rule 32.2(a)(3),

32.2(a)(3), and that Rule would therefore still not constitute an independent state ground under Ake. For all of the above reasons, Petitioner's contention that State v. Espinosa is applicable to this issue is incorrect.

B

The Ninth Circuit Correctly Held That The Arizona Courts Did Not Clearly And Explicitly Rely On A Procedural Bar In Denying Respondent's Ineffectiveness Claim, And That There Was Therefore No Independent State Ground For Denial Of The Claim

In addition to holding that Rule 32.2(a)(3) itself was not an "independent state procedural rule" under Ake, and therefore not an independent state ground for the denial of Respondent's ineffectiveness claim, the Ninth Circuit alternatively held that the Arizona trial court's ruling on the claim was not an independent state ground, because in that ruling the court did not "clearly and explicitly" rely on a state procedural rule in denying the claim. Smith, supra, 241 F.3d at 1197. Petitioner contends, however, that the Arizona trial court clearly relied on a procedural bar in its ruling denying the claim, and that the Ninth Circuit erred in holding therefore that the ruling was not an independent state ground for the denial of Respondent's claim. (Pet. for Cert. at 15-16.) Petitioner's contention is incorrect for two reasons.

First, it is not necessary to determine whether the Arizona court relied on a procedural bar in its ruling. As stated previously, if a state procedural rule is not independent of federal law, then a court's ruling based on that Rule can never be independent of federal law assuming that the state court follows the rule, which it must. It was for this reason that this Court held in Ake v. Oklahoma that there was no independent state ground for the Oklahoma court's denial of Ake's claim, "[d]espite the court's state-law ruling", because under the rule the "state court must rule, explicitly or implicitly, on the merits of the constitutional question." Ake, supra, 470 U.S. at 74-75, emphasis added. Thus, since Rule 32.2(a)(3) is not independent of federal law, and since we must assume that the Arizona courts followed that Rule in this case, the trial court's ruling denying Respondent's ineffectiveness claim could never be an independent state ground. Based on Ake it is therefore unnecessary to determine whether the court relied on a procedural bar in its ruling denying the claim.

Second, the Order does not contain an independent state ground under the principles of Coleman, Harris, Long, and Caldwell, supra. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that it was "unclear" from the trial court's last order denying Respondent's claim[19] whether the court was invoking a procedural bar. 243 F.3d at 1195-1197. The Order does not cite Rule 32.2(a)(3) or any of its provisions. (App. H.) Moreover, any procedural ruling is "interwoven " with federal law. Long, supra, 463 U.S. at 1040-1041. The text of the ruling rejects Respondent's argument that the attorneys of the Pima County Public Defender intentionally stayed on the case so that they would not have to allege that one of their attorneys was ineffective. (Appendix H.) Based on this premise, the court's ruling, in essence, was that if Respondent had a colorable claim of ineffectiveness his counsel would have withdrawn from the case so that he could raise it. (Id.) Thus, the gist of the ruling is that Respondent does not have a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id.) The ruling is therefore really a ruling denying Respondent's constitutional claim on the merits. To the extent that any procedural aspects of the case are discussed in the ruling, they are thoroughly "interwoven" with the merits issue of whether Respondent received ineffective assistance of counsel. Long, supra. Since any procedural issue is interwoven with the substantive claim of ineffectiveness, the presumption of Long, Caldwell, Harris and Coleman applies, and it must be presumed that there is no independent state ground for the decision. Since the presumption of "no independent state ground" applies, then the "plain statement" rule applies and the court must find that the ruling is not an independent state ground in the absence of a "plain statement" in the text of the ruling clearly and ambiguously relying on an independent state procedural rule. As stated above, the ruling does not state that the claim is precluded, and does not cite Rule 32.2(a)(3) or any other preclusion or waiver rule. In the absence of a plain statement in the ruling clearly and ambiguously relying on a state procedural rule to deny relief, there is no independent state ground for the Arizona courts denial of Respondent's claim, and the Ninth Circuit correctly held that the claim was not

[19] It is the last reasoned state court decision denying a claim which must be examined in order to determine whether the denial of a claim was based on an independent state ground. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, supra, 501 U.S. at 802-803. Petitioner erroneously focuses on the trial court's first order denying the claim in contending that the trial court relied on a procedural bar.

procedurally defaulted. Id. Petitioner's contention that the Ninth Circuit erred in finding that the state court's ruling on the ineffectiveness claim did not procedurally bar this claim from habeas review is therefore incorrect. Id.

C

The Ninth Circuit Did Not Err In Refusing To Certify A Question Of Arizona Law To The Arizona Supreme Court.

Finally, Petitioner contends that the Ninth Circuit erred in refusing to certify a question of law to the Arizona Supreme Court concerning "any ambiguity or confusion over the meaning of Rule 32.2(a)(3)." (Pet. for Cert. at 25-27.) Petitioner's contention is incorrect. There may be some habeas cases where state law relevant to the case is so unclear or undefined that the certification of a state law question to the state court is necessary in order for constitutional claims to be decided. This case, however, is not one of those cases. The Ninth Circuit in this case examined Rule 32.2(a)(3), its Comment, and Arizona case law relevant to the rule and concluded that the Rule requires an Arizona court to determine whether the claim is of "sufficient constitutional magnitude" to be heard on the merits in post-conviction proceedings and not precluded under the Rule. This conclusion was reasonable and correct. Petitioner does not agree with this conclusion, however, and has reached the opposite conclusion i.e., that an Arizona court is not required to determine whether a claim is of "sufficient constitutional magnitude" in order to apply Rule 32.2(a)(3). Petitioner now requests that a certified question be presented to the Arizona Supreme Court concerning Rule 32.2(a)(3) and that the court's decision on the certified question become the law of this case. Respondent requests this Court to deny this request. Rule 32.2(a)(3) and the Comment to the Rule were issued by the Arizona Supreme Court and it was clear to the Ninth Circuit from the Rule and the Comment that the "constitutional magnitude" of a claim must be determined in order to apply Rule 32.2(a)(3). There is therefore no need for a certified question, as the Ninth Circuit, pursuant to its authority in habeas cases, had addressed the issue and reached a reasonable and correct conclusion concerning Rule 32.2(a)(3). Respondent therefore requests this Court to deny Petitioner's request to have a question certified to the Arizona Supreme Court on the meaning of Rule 32.2(a)(3).

III

Petitioner's Procedural Default Arguments In This Case Contradict The Claim It Is Making In Other Cases That It Has "Opted In" To Chapter 154 of the AEDPA, Which Contains A Statutory Default Rule Under Which Respondent Is Clearly Entitled To Review Of His Federal Constitutional Claims.

Prior to the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), the rule of procedural default in habeas corpus cases was "exclusively a matter of federal common law." Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1123 (1999). See Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, 433 U.S. at 72, 100 n.2 (dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan).[20] "Chapter 154 of AEDPA codified a new default rule, applicable only to states that `establish a mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel in State post-conviction proceedings brought by indigent prisoners whose capital convictions and sentences have ... become final for State law purposes.' 28 U.S.C. § 2261(b)". Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 931. The AEDPA default rule is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2264.

Respondent argued below through an Amicus Brief that the enactment of the AEDPA, and Petitioner's contention that it had "opted in" to AEDPA's Chapter 154, made Petitioner's arguments regarding common law procedural default inapplicable. Instead, Respondent argued, his entitlement to federal review should be measured by the standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2264. Ibid. Petitioner filed an Answering Brief opposing this argument. Under that section, Respondent is plainly entitled to federal review of his ineffective assistance claims, without regard to how, or even whether, those claims were raised in state court. That is because § 2264(a) allows federal review of claims never presented to state court, where "the failure to raise the claim is ... the result of State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States ...." 28 U.S.C. § 2264(a) (emphasis added). Chapter 154 of the AEDPA itself is, of course, a "law of the United States," and one of its provisions is 28 U.S.C. §2261(d), which

[20]From the time of its creation, it has been clear that the doctrine of procedural default is subject to amendment by Congress. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 100 n.2 (1977) (dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan).

provides:

> **No counsel appointed pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) to represent a State prisoner under capital sentence shall have previously represented the prisoner at trial or on direct appeal in the case for which the appointment is made unless the prisoner and counsel expressly request continued representation.**

That provision, and §2261's other requirements for state post-conviction proceedings, were not followed in Respondent's case, as the same office that represented him at trial and an appeal represented him in state and federal post-conviction proceedings, and that resulted directly in the failure to challenge the effectiveness of trial counsel that is at issue here. Since Petitioner claims the benefits of Chapter 154, its failure to follow that provision in Respondent's case violated federal law. See Mississippi Protection and Advocacy System, Inc. v. Cotten, 929 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1991)(where a state accepts federal benefits provided under specified conditions, state rules and regulations which violate those conditions are violative of federal law and invalid).

The Court of Appeals did not address this issue, presumably because it was bound by Circuit precedent holding that common law procedural default continued to apply in Arizona "[b]ecause Arizona ha[d] not finalized its procedures with respect to the appointment and compensation of counsel in post-conviction relief proceedings" and therefore was "not governed by Chapter 154." Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d at 931. However, on September 24, 2001, Petitioner prevailed in its argument to the Ninth Circuit that it has now "opted in" to Chapter 154. Spears v. Stewart, 2001 WL 111968 (9th Cir. filed September 24, 2001.)

That decision effectively moots the questions Petitioner is seeking to have reviewed in this case. At the least, if the decision in Spears stands, it means that any decision in this case will have little if any impact on future Arizona capital cases, which will be governed by §2264 rather than Sykes. In fact, Respondent would submit that it renders the common law default issues irrelevant in his case as well, because by its terms Chapter 154 applies to all cases involving capital sentences from a given state, or none: its applicability turns on whether "a State [has] establishe[d] by statute, rule of its court of last resort, or by another agency authorized by State law, a mechanism for [providing] .... competent counsel

in State post-conviction proceedings" which is available "to all State prisoners under capital sentence ...." 28 U.S.C. § 2261(b) and (c) (emphasis added). A "mechanism" cannot be created, or function, only in a given case.

Nor can a State litigant properly make arguments regarding the nature and application of its laws in one case, and contrary arguments in another. See Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1260 (1991). Arizona cannot have it both ways. It has long claimed to have the "mechanism" required by Chapter 154 in place, and to apply it to "all State prisoners under capital sentence." It has now prevailed on that claim in the Court of Appeals in Spears, supra, entitling it to "special rules favorable to the state party, but applicable only if the State meets certain conditions, including provision for appointment of post-conviction counsel in state proceedings." Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). One of those rules is the default rule of 28 U.S.C. § 2261. Having invoked its benefits, Petitioner should be held to the terms of that rule, which make its arguments here moot and which separately entitle Petitioner to review of the merits of his federal constitutional claims.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Respondent requests this Court to deny the Writ.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of September, 2001.

S. JONATHAN YOUNG
Attorney for Respondent

for ROBERT J. HIRSH
Attorney for Respondent

DATED: September 26, 2001

APPENDIX A

Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2001)

APPENDIX A

[Filed March 6, 2001]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT DOUGLAS SMITH Petitioner-Appellant,	)	
v.	)	
TERRY STEWART, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.	)	Nos. 96-99025, 96-99026 D.C. No. CV-87-234-TUC-RMB
	)	OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona;
Richard M. Bilby, Chief Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-87-234-TUC-RMB.

Argued and Submitted August 17, 2000 -- Pasadena, California

Before: WARREN J. FERGUSON, STEPHEN REINHARDT, DAVID R. THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.

COUNSEL

S. Jonathan Young, Tucson, Arizona; John F. Palumbo, Law Offices Pima County Public Defender, Tucson, Arizona, for the petitioner-appellant.

Scott Bales, Solicitor General, Phoenix, Arizona, for the respondent-appellee.

FERGUSON, Circuit Judge:

Robert Douglas Smith ("Smith") appeals from the district court's dismissal of his habeas corpus petition on the ground of procedural default. He claims that his trial counsel failed to investigate his mental condition or to present adequate mitigating testimony during the sentencing phase of his trial, despite clear indications at the time of the presence of a mental disorder. We reverse the district court's ruling that federal habeas review is barred. Because Smith has made a colorable claim to relief, we order an evidentiary hearing in the district court.

I.

In March of 1982, Smith and accomplice Joe Leonard Lambright were convicted of sexual assault, kidnaping, and first-degree murder. [FN1] The principal witness against them at trial was another accomplice, Kathy Foreman ("Foreman"), who exchanged her testimony on the Government's behalf for freedom from prosecution.

FN1. Because the facts of the offense are set forth in our en banc opinion, we do not repeat them here. *See Lambright v. Stewart*, 191 F.3d 1181, 1182-83 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc).

After the guilt phase of Smith's trial, the prosecution sought the death penalty on the theory that the murder had been committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner under Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13–703(F)(6). The government called Smith's former cellmate to the stand who, in seeking to reduce his own sentence, had told a criminal investigator that Smith laughed while fully confessing to the crime. When the government next called the investigator to testify about the conversation, she confirmed that Smith had described the crime to his cell-mate in exceptional detail, showed no remorse, and snickered throughout. In addition to presenting testimonial evidence, the prosecution displayed photographs of how the crime scene looked at night and during the day so that the court could fully grasp the victim's terror before she died.

Smith's counsel took less than a day to present the mitigating evidence he had gathered in support of sparing his client's life. Despite obvious indications that his client suffered from a mental disorder, the lawyer neither obtained nor presented any evidence of his psychiatric history and continuing mental impairment. He also failed to collect or present records relating to Smith's horrific childhood. Instead, his evidence consisted entirely of the testimony of Smith's mother-in-law and two sisters. Each witness was brief. Each offered only a general characterization of Smith as a nice and generous person who, along with his sisters, had grown up in an unstable household.

In closing argument, Smith's lawyer offered the court some reasons not to impose the death penalty. He opened by saying, "[f]irst of all, the most mitigating factor in the case is the fact that Kathy Foreman wasn't prosecuted at all." He made passing reference to Smith's "abusive childhood." Apparently believing that evidence of Smith's mental disorder might constitute a justification for the death penalty, the lawyer asserted:

> I'm told today by Jim Meyers there is a report from the hospital in Houston, which I haven't seen yet.... The reports I have are that he has problems with depression. He is a person of average intelligence. I don't know, and I'm making the statements on the reports I have seen so far, I would suggest that he doesn't have any major personality disorders and that he is not the type of person that needs to be, quote, eliminated.

***1194** Next, he asked the court to consider the *victim's family's* "great loss" in deciding Smith's punishment. He returned again to the government's failure to prosecute Foreman, spoke abstractly of his personal opposition to the death penalty, and promptly closed by saying, "[f]inally, again, I question how the Court could agree with the government, which is asking for the death penalty for Robert Smith, when it was the same government agency that chose to let Kat Foreman go without any prosecution at all... I don't think that's justice."

The state trial judge sentenced Smith to death. He rejected the lawyer's argument that Foreman's treatment at the government's hands warranted a lesser sentence for Smith because he did not "believe that any of the ramifications of her grant of immunity have diminished the moral, legal or ethical culpability or responsibility of either Mr. Smith or Mr. Lambright by any degree whatsoever." He justified his decision to impose death by stressing that, "I have, in fact, searched the record, the file, the pre-sentence report, my trial notes and recollections for any and all other factors which might conceivably mitigate your culpability for offenses of kidnaping and sexual assault and found none."

II.

The same office that represented Smith at trial continued to represent him unsuccessfully on appeal and in post-conviction proceedings. On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed both Smith's conviction and sentence. *See State v. Smith*, 138 Ariz. 79, 673 P.2d 17 (Ariz.1983). Smith's counsel then filed a series of state and federal post-conviction petitions, none of which included an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and all of which were denied.

After exhausting available state remedies, Smith's lawyer filed an amended federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. Soon after, District Judge Bilby received a letter from Smith himself, complaining that he had instructed his lawyer to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but that his lawyer had failed to do so. In the letter, Smith wrote:

> My attorney says he can't rais[sic] or file the issue of enafective [sic] assistants [sic] of countsaling [sic] cause he is empoleed [sic] by the same office as the attorney that handeled [sic] my trial. I'm under the inpresstion [sic] from him that if all the issue [sic] is denied, that I could then get the courts to apoint [sic] me another attorney to file this issue for me, IS THIS TRUE? To my understandig [sic] from everyone I've ask [sic], wrote [sic] to tells [sic] me diffrant [sic] things. I've written Denise Young and ask [sic her about this, it took her a long time

to respond cause she's so bissy [sic] and still did'nt [sic] answer my questions [sic]. Sorry to have to bother you with this but I feel this is a very inportant [sic] issue, Is'nt [sic] it also true that all issues has [sic] to be rased [sic] and filed at one time acording [sic] to the new apeals [sic] law passed a cuppall [sic] of year [sic] ago? I would like this court to know that I want this issue inclouded [sic] in my apeals [sic]. I would like take this to [sic] time to respectfuly [sic] ask this Honorable Court to apoint [sic] me a new FEDERAL ATTORNEY to work with my attorney Mr. John F. Palumbo at the PIMA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE TUCSON AZ. if this is possible, if not, please apoint [sic] me new Federal Apeal [sic] ATTORNEYS. THANK YOU! very much for your concederation [sic], time and help with this matter.

Smith's counsel confirmed in an affidavit to the court that the cla had not been raised because his employer, a state agency, prohibited lawyers from attacking each other's performance as a matter of polic

In response to Smith's letter, the district court appointed a lawyer private practice to litigate his claim of ineffective assistance of tri counsel. Smith then filed a state post-conviction petition alleging f the first time several instances of ineffective assistance at trial ar sentencing, which the court dismissed as procedurally ***1195** barre The federal district court also refused to adjudicate Smith's ineffectiv assistance of counsel claim on the ground that "the [state] trial cou found the claims precluded as a matter of state law."

III.

[1] We review de novo a district court's decision to deny a petition fo writ of habeas corpus. *See Mayfield v. Calderon*, 229 F.3d 895, 200 WL 1514610, at * 4 (9th Cir. October 13, 2000).

BEST AVAILABLE

IV.

Smith raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for the first time in his third state post-conviction petition. The state court dismissed the claim in October of 1995. Two months later, the state court revisited Smith's claim in an order denying his motion for reconsideration. In the order, the court wrote:

> Counsel's assertion on page 4, line 3 through 6 of his Motion for Rehearing, that "each of the deputies of the Public Defender's Office have been appointed ... to 'conduct the affairs' of the Pima County Public Defender's Office rather than to independently represent Mr. Smith" is either outrageous or ridiculous, whichever adjective is most appropriate. Deputies in the Public Defender's Office do not represent the Public Defender's Office. They are attorneys for and have an attorney-client relationship with the actual defendant charged with the crime. It may, indeed, be correct that it would be inappropriate for a public defender to allege a different public defender was ineffective at trial (although it has been done by this Public Defender's Office in the past). However, this does not absolve an attorney representing a client in an appellate matter from ineffective assistance of counsel. That is an absolute and undelegable duty. Failure to do so is at the very best malpractice and malfeasance. An attorney who discovers a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must immediately withdraw, notify the Court that there is such a claim, and allow the Court to appoint an attorney who has no conflict in representing that client. To suggest that one could wait for ten years, from 1985 to the present, and never even examine the case to see if the client had such a claim is an admission of the grossest malpractice.
>
> It is HEREBY ORDERED Defendant's Motion for Rehearing is denied.
>
> The claims are so old they are (1) precluded by failure to bring them previously, in accordance with Rule 32.2(a) and/or (2) for those claims raised under Rules 32.1(e), 32.1(f) or 32.1(g), are

summarily dismissed due to the petition's failure to set forth the reason for not raising such claims in a previous petition or in a timely manner, in accordance with Rule 32.2(b).

[2][3][4] We must determine whether the state court judgment in Smith's case bars federal review of his Sixth Amendment claim. *See Coleman v. Thompson*, 501 U.S. 722, 736, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). A state court's procedural ruling will bar our review only if its basis is separate and distinct from the federal question. *See Ylst v. Nunnemaker*, 501 U.S. 797, 801, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991); *see also Coleman*, 501 U.S. at 729–30, 111 S.Ct. 2546. [FN2] The State contends that the Arizona court's procedural default ruling in this case constitutes an independent state ground that bars us from reviewing Smith's ineffectiveness claim. [FN3]

FN2. To bar our review, a state's procedural default rule must also be adequate, which means that it is "strictly or regularly" followed. See *Johnson v. Mississippi*, 486 U.S. 578, 587, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988); *see also Hathorn v. Lovorn*, 457 U.S. 255, 263, 102 S.Ct. 2421, 72 L.Ed.2d 824 (1982). We have held that Arizona's procedural default rule is regularly followed in several cases. *See, e.g., Ortiz v. Stewart*, 149 F.3d 923, 931–32 (9th Cir.1998); *Poland v. Stewart*, 117 F.3d 1094, 1106 (9th Cir.1997).

FN3. "In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." *Coleman*, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546. Because we conclude that the state court's ruling did not rest on an independent state ground, we do not address Smith's argument that the policy preventing employees from attacking the competency of any of the agency's lawyers constitutes cause

because it was an "objective factor" that was "external" to the petitioner and that "cannot fairly be attributed to him." *Id.*, 501 U.S. at 753, 111 S.Ct. 2546. We note however, that his argument appears to have merit under our recent decision in *Manning v. Foster*, 224 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir.2000), where we held that "a conflict of interest, independent of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel ... constitute[s] cause where the conflict caused the attorney to interfere with the petitioner's right to pursue his habeas claim."

*1196 In *Ake v. Oklahoma*, 470 U.S. 68, 75, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), the Supreme Court held that when a state's procedural default rule depends on an assessment of a federal claim, federal review is not barred. The state court in that case explicitly held that Ake had waived his federal constitutional claim by omitting it from his motion or a new trial. *Id.* at 74, 105 S.Ct. 1087. That court had ruled in another state case, however, that the waiver rule did not apply in cases of fundamental trial error. *Id.* By creating such an exception, "the State has made application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law, that is, on the determination of whether federal constitutional error has been committed." The Supreme Court concluded that because "resolution of the state procedural law question depends on a federal constitutional ruling, the state- law prong of the court's holding is not independent of federal law, and our jurisdiction is not precluded." *Id.* at 75, 105 S.Ct. 1087.

We have similarly held that federal habeas review is not barred when a state makes the application of its default rule depend on a consideration of federal law. *See, e.g., Park v. California*, 202 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir.2000), *cert. denied*, — U.S. —, 121 S.Ct. 277, 148 L.Ed.2d 202 (2000); *McKenna v. McDaniel*, 65 F.3d 1483 (9th Cir.1995); *Russell v. Rolfs*, 893 F.2d 1033, 1035–36 (9th Cir.1990). In *Park*, 202 F.3d at 1149, the state court refused to consider the petitioner's federal constitutional claim because he had failed to raise it on direct appeal. Despite the state court's explicit reliance on procedural default in its ruling, we held that Park's federal claim was cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings because the California

Supreme Court had held in another case that a petitioner could overcome the procedural bar if he could show a violation of "fundamental constitutional rights." Id. at 1152. As we explained, "in light of [the California Supreme Court's] acknowledgment that the constitutional error exception encompassed consideration by the court of the merits of federal constitutional questions, the California Supreme Court necessarily made an antecedent ruling on federal law before applying the [procedural] bar to any federal constitutional claims raised in Park's state habeas petition." *Id.* at 1153.

We also held in *McKenna v. McDaniel*, 65 F.3d at 1489, that a state court judgment explicitly invoking Nevada's procedural default rule as the basis for dismissing a post-conviction petition did not preclude federal review because the state court had explained in another case that it enjoyed the discretion to address errors of "constitutional dimension." We concluded that the existence of a discretionary exception in cases of constitutional dimension rendered the court's state-law procedural ruling "necessarily intertwined with its analysis of the merits of McKenna's constitutional claims and does not constitute a clear statement of independent and adequate state grounds for the decision." *Id.* at 1489.

It is unclear from the order denying rehearing of Smith's ineffective assistance of counsel claim whether the court invoked a procedural bar as the basis of its ruling. ***1197** The court suggested that Smith's lawyer would have raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if Smith had a colorable one. In other words, the court implied that the record failed to demonstrate that Smith had a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Such a holding does not satisfy the requirement that a state court clearly and explicitly invoke a state procedural rule to bar federal habeas review.

Moreover, it is clear at the time of the state's procedural ruling, Arizona courts were required to consider the merits of a claim. Ariz. R.Crim. Pro. 32.2(a) generally bars a defendant from obtaining relief from his conviction on a ground that he waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding. [FN4] At the time of the state

court's procedural ruling, however, Arizona courts were required to examine the nature of a claim to determine whether the state's procedural default rule applied. *See State v. Curtis*, 185 Ariz. 112, 912 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Ct.App.1995); *see also State v. French*, 198 Ariz. 119, 7 P.3d 128, 130 (Ct.App.2000). Under Arizona's procedural default rule, "[a] claim is precluded that could have been, but was not, raised in a prior appeal or PCR, unless the asserted claim is of sufficient constitutional magnitude." *Curtis*, 912 P.2d at 1344 (internal quotation marks omitted). [FN5] Thus, Rule 32.2's procedural default rule applies where a petitioner's "belated focus" on an alleged error "lacks sufficient constitutional magnitude to revive an issue." *Id.* at 1344. [FN6]

FN4. Since 1992, Rule 32.2 provides, in pertinent part:
a. Preclusion. A defendant shall be precluded from relief under this rule based upon any ground:
(1) Still raisable on direct appeal under Rule 31 or on post-trial motion under Rule 24;
(2) Finally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding;
(3) That has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding.

FN5. Arizona's exception for overcoming procedural default in cases of constitutional dimension or egregiousness remains in effect. *See French*, 7 P.3d at 131 (applying the procedural default rule to petitioner's ineffectiveness claim because "[n]one of these omissions constitutes ineffectiveness so egregious and of such constitutional dimensions that it may not be precluded")

FN6. The Arizona Supreme Court's 1992 comment to rule 32.2(a)(3) makes clear that the application of the amended procedural default rule requires a separate examination of a claim's constitutional magnitude. The comment provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f an asserted claim is of sufficient constitutional magnitude, the state must show that the defendant

'knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' waived the claim." Ariz. R.Crim. Pro. 32.2(a)(3) comment (West 2000). Thus, since 1992, Arizona's procedural default rule applies in two circumstances: first, when a claim is of insufficient constitutional magnitude and was forfeited at trial, on appeal, or in any previous proceeding; second, when a claim is of sufficient constitutional magnitude and the State proves that the person seeking relief knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived it at trial, on appeal, or in any previous proceeding. In both cases, the state court must consider the nature of the claim before finding that the petitioner procedurally defaulted it. Because an Arizona procedural ruling in this context necessarily includes an evaluation of the constitutional stature of the claim, it does not rest on an independent state ground.

Given Arizona's exception for errors of "constitutional magnitude," the state court's finding of procedural default in Smith's case necessarily included an evaluation of the strength of his federal claim. Indeed, like the procedural rulings in *Ake*, *Park*, and *McKenna*, the state court's procedural ruling in this case was necessarily intertwined with its implicit determination that the merits of his claim were of insufficient constitutional magnitude. Thus, federal review is not barred.

V.

[5][6] Smith contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to develop his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. "In a capital case, a habeas petitioner who asserts a colorable claim to relief, and who ***1198** has never been given the opportunity to develop a factual record on that claim, is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in federal court." *Siripongs v. Calderon*, 35 F.3d 1308, 1310 (9th Cir.1994). [FN7] No court has given Smith an opportunity to develop a factual record on his Sixth Amendment claim.

FN7. In *Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes*, 504 U.S. 1, 8-9, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992), the Supreme Court held that petitioners must show cause and prejudice for failing to develop

the material facts relating to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in state court. In his third Rule 32 petition, Smith attempted to develop the theory that his counsel provided ineffective assistance at sentencing. The court refused, however, to appoint a psychological expert to assist Smith in developing his argument. Despite Smith's attempt to have the court "consider his allegations of ineffective assistance," the court dismissed the claims without a hearing. Under these circumstances, Smith has satisfied the cause prong of *Tamayo-Reyes*. *See Jones v. Wood*, 114 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir.1997). The prejudice prong of *Tamayo-Reyes* is "coextensive with the prejudice prong of *Strickland*." *Correll*, 137 F.3d at 1414. For the reasons set forth below, we find that Smith has made a colorable claim of prejudice, and is therefore entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this question.

[7][8] To establish that his counsel was ineffective at sentencing, Smith must satisfy the standard the Supreme Court announced in *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Under *Strickland*, he must show that his counsel's performance was deficient; that is, that it was "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." *Id.* at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Although there is a strong presumption that an attorney's conduct meets the standard for effectiveness, "counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." *Id.* at 691, 104 S. Ct. 2052. In addition to demonstrating counsel's deficient performance, a petitioner must establish a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," where a reasonable probability is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." *Id.* at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052; *see also Williams v. Taylor*, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1511-12, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

[9] "It is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase." *Caro v. Calderon*, 165 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir.1999), *cert. denied*, 527 U.S.

1049, 119 S.Ct. 2414, 144 L.Ed.2d 811 (1999). As the Supreme Court recently made clear, counsel's failure to investigate and present evidence of a person's mental impairment and social history constitutes deficient performance. *See Williams*, 120 S.Ct. at 1513-15 (concluding that counsel was deficient in failing to conduct an investigation that would have uncovered records describing a "nightmarish childhood" and borderline mental retardation); *see also Smith v. Stewart*, 189 F.3d 1004, 1008-09 (9th Cir.1999), *cert. denied*, — U.S. —, 121 S.Ct. 358, 148 L.Ed.2d 288 (2000) (No. 00-110); *Caro*, 165 F.3d at 1225; *Bean v. Calderon*, 163 F.3d 1073, 1080-81 (9th Cir.1998), *cert. denied*, 528 U.S. 922, 120 S.Ct. 285, 145 L.Ed.2d 239 (1999); *Correll v. Stewart*, 137 F.3d 1404, 1412 (9th Cir.1998), *cert. denied*, 525 U.S. 996, 119 S.Ct. 465, 142 L.Ed.2d 418 (1998).

There can be no doubt that Smith has asserted a colorable claim to relief entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. Smith alleges that his lawyer failed to investigate, let alone present evidence of, his miserable childhood, mental disabilities, and mental impairment at the time of the offense. The thin transcript of Smith's sentencing hearing reveals that his lawyer offered only the brief testimony of three lay witnesses who gave merely a vague description of his personality and childhood. When the time came to argue to the court that Smith's life was worth sparing, his lawyer asserted that the best mitigating factor in the case was Foreman's immunity agreement. Inexplicably, he also suggested that the court consider "how *1199 Sandra Owen's [the victim] family has sustained a great loss" in deciding whether Smith deserved to be put to death. The lawyer then offered a rambling explanation of his moral opposition to the death penalty and promptly returned to the State's failure to prosecute Foreman. This was a woefully inadequate presentation in support of saving Smith from a sentence of death.

If Smith's allegations are true, his counsel's failure to conduct any investigation is particularly egregious in light of indications at the time of trial of the presence of a mental disability. We have explained that, "where counsel is on notice that his client may be mentally impaired, counsel's failure to investigate his client's mental condition as a mitigating factor in a penalty phase hearing, without a supporting

strategic reason, constitutes deficient performance." *Hendricks v. Calderon*, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir.1995); *see also Smith v. Stewart*, 140 F.3d 1263, 1269 (9th Cir.1998) (concluding that counsel was deficient for failing to "perform any real investigation into mitigating circumstances, even though that evidence was rather near the surface"), *cert. denied*, 525 U.S. 929, 119 S.Ct. 336, 142 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998). This appears to be the case here. In a report assessing Smith's competency to stand trial, for example, Dr. Martin Levy noted that he had been hospitalized in a psychiatric unit and opined that, "Mr. Smith does have a history of psychiatric difficulties. Those difficulties have been primarily depressive in nature and have involved suicide attempts." Another report examining Smith's competency described him as "significantly anxious and depressed" and recommended further psychiatric evaluation.

The presentence report similarly signaled that Smith might have a mental disability. It noted that, as a child, Smith suffered from polio, a disease which can cause brain damage, and later underwent psychiatric treatment at a youth community mental health agency. It described Smith's numerous attempts to run away from his family beginning at age nine and his history of impulsive behavior. The report also revealed that Smith had used broken glass to cut through his skin and slash his veins in just one of several attempts to end his life. On another occasion, he shot himself in the stomach. Eventually, Smith began to abuse drugs, including LSD, marijuana, cocaine, psilocybin, heroin, PCP, and amphetamines. In conclusion, the report urged the court that, "[m]ental health counseling should be made available in the prison setting, keeping in mind that the defendant seems to be a high suicide risk." Rather than pursue an investigation, Smith's lawyers allegedly failed to develop any of this evidence, and in fact failed to either present argument relating to it or connecting it to any of Arizona's enumerated mitigating factors. We have previously found that the failure to present any argument based on a presentence report remarkably similar to the one in this case constituted deficient performance. *Smith*, 140 F.3d at 1269.

Smith alleges that his counsel would have uncovered substantial mitigating evidence if he had conducted an investigation. Smith has an IQ of 71, which is in the range of mental retardation. In a report prepared just two years after trial, moreover, Dr. David Gurland wrote that, "[i]n reviewing the data with regards to Mr. Smith, it becomes obvious that this is a man who is a marginally functioning individual who has been ever since his childhood." He noted that Smith was raised in a broken home and suffered both psychological and physical abuse. In commenting on his withdrawal from school in the eighth grade, Dr. Gurland wrote that, "[i]t is hard to know just how he managed to stay in school as long as he did." Smith's low I.Q. makes him "more of a follower than a leader. He is also easily influenced by others whom he may feel like him or admire him or want to be with him." Dr. Gurland concluded that the "patient should not, under the law, be given the death penalty as I think there are enough mitigating circumstances to, at worst, give him a life sentence." In addition to presenting ***1200** evidence that he suffered from a mental disorder, Smith also recounted to the district court that four inmates in a county jail took turns gang raping him when he was just eighteen years old. Smith's lawyer presented none of this powerful and potentially life-saving evidence at sentencing.

[10] Apart from allegedly failing to conduct any investigation into Smith's social and mental history, it appears from the transcript that his lawyer also failed to research the law on capital sentencing. In Arizona, a psychological disorder is a specifically enumerated mitigating circumstance. Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-703(G)(1). But when a report hinting at a possible mental impairment surfaced, Smith's lawyer minimized his client's mental disability and told the court, "I would suggest that he doesn't have any major personality disorders and that he is not the type of person that needs to be, quote, eliminated." It appears from this assertion that Smith's lawyer not only failed to recognize that a mental impairment could be mitigating, but also argued against his client's interests under the mistaken belief that the presence of a mental disorder was an aggravating factor. A misapprehension of the law that leads a lawyer to argue against his client's interests during the sentencing phase of a capital trial constitutes an "inadequac[y] in

rudimentary trial preparation and presentation" that falls outside the range of competent assistance. *Bean*, 163 F.3d at 1080; *see also Huynh v. King*, 95 F.3d 1052 (1996); *Scarpa v. DuBois*, 38 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1994); *Morris v. California*, 966 F.2d 448, 454–55 (9th Cir.1991); *Blackburn v. Foltz*, 828 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir.1987). In short, Smith has presented a colorable claim of counsel's deficient performance.

Smith has, moreover, made a "colorable claim" that his counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him. The Supreme Court recently held that an attorney's failure to conduct an investigation into a petitioner's abusive childhood, borderline mental retardation, and prison record satisfied *Strickland*'s prejudice prong. *See Williams*, 120 S.Ct. at 1515. This was because, as the Court explained, "[m]itigating evidence unrelated to dangerousness may alter the jury's selection of penalty, even if it does not undermine or rebut the prosecution's death-eligibility case." *Id.* at 1516; *see also Smith*, 189 F.3d at 1013 ("We previously have found Strickland's prejudice prong met where we concluded that defense counsel effectively presented no mitigating evidence at sentence, despite the presence of aggravating factors."); *Correll*, 137 F.3d at 1413 ("[B]ecause trial counsel failed to represent any evidence of Correll's purported mental illness which may have satisfied Ariz. Rev. St. § 13-703(E), Correll has 'undermined confidence in the outcome' of the sentencing, thereby establishing the requisite Strickland prejudice.") (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 694-95, 104 S. Ct. 2052). Prejudice is especially likely where, as here, "this is not a case in which a death sentence was inevitable because of the enormity of the aggravating circumstances." *Bean* 163 F.3d at 1081; *see also Clabourne v. Lewis*, 64 F.3d 1373, 1387 (9th Cir.1995). In this case, the prosecution argued that only one aggravating factor existed. In response, Smith's lawyer not only allegedly failed to investigate his horrific childhood, mental retardation and possible brain damage, but also failed to do basic legal research. Smith has not only presented abundant evidence of deficient performance, but also of prejudice. There can be no question that he has satisfied the standard for obtaining an evidentiary hearing.

VI.

We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for an evidentiary hearing. We remand so that the district court can determine whether Smith's allegations that his attorney neither investigated his mental condition nor presented adequate mitigating psychiatric testimony during the sentencing phase are true and, if so, *1201 whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel.

Concurrently herewith we file a memorandum disposition in which we affirm the petitioner's conviction and the district court's ruling that the especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravating factor applies in this case for the reasons stated therein. Accordingly, the judgment below is

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

APPENDIX B

Smith v. Lewis, Unpublished Order of District Court filed October 31, 1996 denying Supplemental Petition

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

[Filed Oct. 31, 1996]
Clerk, U.S. District Court
District of Arizona
By SMS Deputy

ROBERT DOUGLAS SMITH,	)	No. CIV 87-234-TUC-RMB
Petitioner,	)	
vs.	)	ORDER
SAMUEL E. LEWIS, et al.,	)	
Respondents.	)	

Before the Court is Petitioner Robert Douglas Smith's Supplemental Habeas Claim and Request For Expert Witness Fees. At issue is whether Smith's ineffective assistance counsel claims are procedurally barred with no exception available. Respondents move to deny the relief sought. After a review of the pleadings and record, the Court concludes that the claims are procedurally defaulted with no cause and prejudice shown. No fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur by the dismissal of this Petition.

Procedural Background

Smith was represented at trial by Thomas Hippert, an assistant public defender. A new assistant public defender, Lawrence Fleischman, represented Smith during his 1982 direct appeal. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Smith's conviction and death sentence. *State v. Smith*, 138 Ariz. 79, 86-87, 673 P.2d 17, 24-25

(1983), *cert. denied*, 465 U.S. 1074 (1984). In 1984, Fleischman field an petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. One ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was raised relating to Hippert's failure to object to the trial court's reliance on hearsay evidence in the presentence report. The trial court found the claim precluded under Rules 32.2(a)(2) and (a)(3), waived for lack of objection at the sentencing hearing and meritless for reasons detailed in its April 17, 1985 Minute Entry. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review without comment.

In 1989, assistant public defender, John Palumbo filed a second Rule 32 petition while simultaneously acting as Smith's attorney in his federal habeas petition. No claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were raised. All claims were found precluded. The Arizona Supreme Court again denied review without comment. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.

While briefing was being completed by Palumbo on Smith's federal habeas petition, the Court received a letter directly from Smith expressing his desire to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Because the Public Defender's Office had represented Smith at all stages of his litigation, the Court determined that this was an issue Arizona should address. Hence, the Court allowed Smith to pursue that claim in state court while simultaneously proceeding with the briefing of his other federal habeas claims before this Court. On September 5, 1996, the Court denied those claims but allowed Smith to supplement his petition with the ineffective assistance of counsel claims presented to the state courts.

The trial court dismissed Smith's third Rule 32 petition on October 24, 1995 and denied a motion for rehearing on December 20, 1995. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review without comment.

Discussion

First, Petitioner asserts his ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not procedurally barred because the state court ruled on the merits. The Court disagrees.

On October 24, 1995, the trial court ruled:

> This is defendant Smith's third Rule 32 petition from a sentence imposed on May 27, 1982 and affirmed by the Supreme Court on September 23, 1983.
>
> The Court has duly reviewed the petition, response, reply, files and records and, disregarding defects of form, it determines that no material issue of fact or law exists which would be served by any further proceedings. Therefore,
>
> IT IS ORDERED dismissing the petition.
>
> This order is based on the following findings:
>
> The suggestion that Lawrence Fleischman (now Judge Fleischman) or John Palumbo of the Public Defender's office failed to consider the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel or considered it, thought counsel was ineffective and failed to allege same to avoid embarrassing a professional colleague in violation of their ethical duties is outrageous.
>
> The claims are so old they are (1) *precluded by failure to bring them previously, in accordance with Rule 32.1(e), 32.1(f) or 32.1(g), are summarily dismissed due to the petition's failure to set forth the reason for not raising such claims in a previous petition or in a timely manner, in accordance with Rule 32.2(b).*

Minute entry dated October 24, 1995 (emphasis added). It is clear that the trial court found the claims precluded as a matter of state law.

Smith subsequently filed a motion for rehearing. It is this second minute entry which Smith asserts the trial court ruled on the merits of his claims thereby preserving them for federal habeas review. In denying the motion for rehearing, the state court found "The suggestion that Lawrence Fleischman (now Judge Fleischman) or John Palumbo of the Public Defender's office failed to consider the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel, or considered it, thought counsel ineffective and failed to allege same to avoid embarrassing a professional colleague in violation of their ethical duties is outrageous." Minute Entry of December 20, 1995. This language does nothing more than track the language of the October 24, 1995 minute entry. The language in both minute entries does nothing more than elaborate, albeit colorfully, why it dismissed Smith's third Rule 32 "due to the petition's failure to set forth the reason for not raising such claims in a previous petition or in a timely manner." Minute Entry of October 24, 1995. Smith's ineffective assistance of counsel claims were dismissed expressly for failing to conform the to the requirements of Arizona procedure. Accordingly, Smith's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are procedurally barred.

The Court may address the merits of the procedurally defaulted claims if Smith can show cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice therefrom. *Bonin v. Calderon*, 77 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 116 S.Ct. 980 (1996); *Coleman v. Thompson*, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2565, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). To demonstrate cause, Smith must show the existence of "some objective factor external to the defense [which] impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." *Murray v. Carrier*, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). A showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel or some interference by officials making counsel's compliance with the state procedural rules impracticable would constitute cause. *Id.* Lacking cause and prejudice, the Court may nonetheless consider procedurally barred claims if failure to do so would result in the conviction or execution of "one who is actually innocent." *Schlup v. Delo*, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S.Ct. 851, 864, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995).

Smith contends that the following supports a finding of cause: (1) the Public Defender's failure or refusal to challenge the conduct of a member of its own staff; (2) the Public Defender's failure to investigate and present psychological evidence; and (3) the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. The Court finds that these allegations do not establish cause. Because Hippert simply chose to pursue evidence that was readily available and did not present an available claim does not establish cause. *Carrier*, 477 U.S. at 486, 106 S.Ct. at 2644 (counsel's failure to recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim or failure to raise the claim despite recognizing it does not constitute cause). Similarly, attorney ignorance or inadvertence in failing to raise certain claims in his state appeal is not "cause". *Id.* at 488. Thus, the mere fact that Fleischman did not raise any ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the direct appeal is not cause. Moreover, in reviewing the merits of Smith's federal habeas petition, this Court found no constitutional error. *See* Amended Order of September 5, 1996. The Public Defender's Office would have had no basis to challenge the conduct of a member of its own staff who applied sound trial strategy or elected to pursue one claim over another.

The record also does not support a finding that Smith's execution would constitute a fundamental miscarriage of justice. To be actually innocent of the death penalty, Smith must show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have found him eligible for the death penalty. *Sawyer v. Whitley*, 505 U.S.333, ___, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2523, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992). The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception applies to the sentencing phase of a capital trial to one who is "actually innocent" of the death penalty. *Smith v. Murray*, 477 U.S. 527, 537-38, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986). A valid claim under this exception, however, is extremely rare. *Schlup*, 513 U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 864.

Today, Smith requests expert witness fees to allow him to be examined by a psychologist in order to demonstrate that he is actually innocent of the death penalty. He hopes to prove that such an examination will establish a single significant mitigating factor justifying the imposition of a life sentence. This request for a favorable hindsight evaluation is speculative. But more importantly, additional

mitigating evidence is not available to prove actual innocence for the death sentence under this exception. The actual innocence requirement focuses on the elements of eligibility, such as the existence of at least one aggravating factor, "and not on additional mitigating evidence which was prevented from being introduced as a result of claimed constitutional error." *Sawyer v. Whitley*, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 2523. Thus, the Court agrees with Respondents that Smith offers nothing to rebut the presumption that he is eligible for Arizona's death penalty beyond a reasonable doubt and that the death sentence is appropriate in his case. *See State v. Smith*, 138 Ariz. 79, 86-86, 673 P.2d 17, 23-24 (1983).

Conclusion

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Robert Douglas Smith's Request for Expert Witness Fees is DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent's Motion to Deny Expert Witness Fees and to Dismiss all Supplemental Habeas Claims is GRANTED and Petitioner Robert Douglas Smith's Petition for Habeas Corpus is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and hereby DISMISSED.

Dated this 30 day of October, 1996.

S/_____
Richard M. Bilby
Senior United States District Judge

APPENDIX C

Smith v. Lewis, Unpublished Decision of District Court of Arizona (No. CIV 87-234 TUC RMB, filed September 5, 1996)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ROBERT DOUGLAS SMITH,

Petitioner,

vs.

SAMUEL E. LEWIS, et al.,

Respondents.

NO. CIV 87-234 TUC RMB

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This order amends the original Order filed on September 4, 1995 to correct two typographical errors.

Petitioner Robert Douglas Smith, under sentence of death, petitions the Court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. For the reasons set forth below, the Court herein denies the petition.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In early 1980, Petitioner Robert Douglas Smith, Joe Lambright, and Lambright's lover, Kathy Foreman, began a cross-country trip, driving from Texas to Florida, then heading for California. En route to California, the trio stopped outside Tucson, Arizona, camping out in a remote area.

During the trip, Lambright and Foreman had been openly having sex in front of Smith. When Smith complained about not having someone to have sex with, Lambright announced that they would find someone for Smith. Lambright also said that he would like to kill someone "just to see if he could do it." (RT. at 698).

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The trio began driving around Tucson, then after some time, picked up Sandra Owen. Ms. Owen explained that she needed a ride to the food stamp office. When the group reached the food stamp office, Lambright got into the back seat with Owen. He told her to "shut up and be quiet and she wouldn't get hurt." (RT. at 703-04). Smith began driving, heading toward Phoenix on Interstate 10.

At some point during the trip, Owen told the trio that she was on medication for a psychological condition, that she had just been released from a mental health treatment facility, and that she wanted to go home. At some other point, Smith got into the back seat and raped Owen.

Later, they turned off the freeway, onto a dirt road. When they could drive no further, they parked the car and walked up the side of a mountain to a level spot. By this time, it was dark and cold. They built a fire and then Lambright and Foreman once again had sex. Smith once again raped Owen.

Smith began choking Owen from behind. Lambright took Foreman's knife and began stabbing Owen in the chest. When Owen fell to the ground, Lambright again stabbed her, and then Smith tried to break her neck by twisting it. Seeing that Smith was not succeeding in killing her, Lambright cut her neck. As Owen struggled to lift herself up on one elbow, Lambright smashed her head with a rock. Lambright and Smith piled rocks on the body, and the three drove onward to California.

About a year later, law enforcement received a tip about the murder. Lambright, Smith and Foreman were each questioned separately. Foreman was given complete immunity from prosecution in exchange for her testimony. Smith and Lambright were returned to Arizona for trial.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Petitioner was tried by jury in Pima County, Arizona and convicted of, inter alia, first degree murder. Pima County Superior Court Judge Michael Brown sentenced Smith to death for the murder. Smith appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction and sentence in *Arizona v. Smith*, 673 P.2d 17 (1983), *cert. denied*, 465 U.S. 1074 (1984).

He sought post-conviction relief in the state trial court pursuant to ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32. This first Rule 32 petition was filed in superior court on April 20, 1984 and was denied a year later. A year after that, on April 25, 1985, Smith sought rehearing, which was denied by the trial court on March 4, 1986. The state supreme denied review and set execution for April 29, 1987.

On April 14, 1987 Smith first filed in this Court an application for stay of execution and petition for writ of habeas corpus. This Court stayed the execution and certified a question to the state supreme court, asking whether Arizona public defenders may represent habeas petitioners in federal court. The supreme court answered in the affirmative in August 1988.

Shortly thereafter, the Respondents moved to dismiss the mixed petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court granted the State's motion on December 14, 1988, but retained jurisdiction pending exhaustion of state remedies and continued the stay of execution, allowing Smith to exhaust his claims in state court. Smith did not return to the state court until December 8, 1989, a year after this Court's Order, when he filed his second Rule 32 petition.

The superior court denied the second Rule 32 petition on August 8, 1991 and denied a motion for rehearing on May 4, 1993. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on October 5, 1993. A year later, on November 21, 1994, Smith filed his amended petition for writ of habeas corpus with this Court. After numerous delays and frustrated efforts to obtain the complete state record, the Court now proceeds to consider Smith's claims.

III. DISCUSSION

Smith presents twenty-eight claims, delineated as thirteen trial claims and fifteen sentencing claims. Each is considered in turn.

A. Trial Claims

1. Lesser-Included Offenses Instructions

Trial claim one alleges that the trial court erred in failing to give a requeste instruction on second degree murder, and in failing to sua sponte instruct on assault. Smith that his statements, which contradicted Foreman's testimony, presented sufficient evidence jury to conclude that Smith committed only the lesser offenses of second degree murder or as This assertion is unsupported in fact and law.

A capital defendant is constitutionally entitled to an instruction on lesser offenses evidence would support a finding of guilt of such offenses. *Beck v. Alabama*, 447 U.S (1980). However, there is no constitutional requirement to instruct upon every possible l offense supported by the evidence. *Schad v. Arizona*, 501 U.S. 624 (1991), and there is cert no constitutional requirement to instruct upon lesser-included offenses that are not supporte the evidence adduced at trial. *Hopper v. Evans*, 456 U.S. 605 (1982).

The evidence Smith looks to in support of this claim is that in his statements to the pol he indicated that he did not want to kill Owen, but rather only began applying pressure to her r so that she would pass out. This, according to Smith, was so that the trio could escape w Owen was unconscious, and to spare her from Lambright and Foreman's intended deviant sex acts. He denied further participation in the killing of Sandy Owen.

Like the trial court and the supreme court, this Court concludes that the kidnaping was in progress at the time of the killing. Smith's act of choking Owen was the first act in the cou of the killing. No evidence supports the claim of lack of premeditation. Trial claim one is den on the merits.

2. Felony Murder Instruction

The Petitioner next challenges the felony murder jury instruction, claiming that improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. That is, the trial court erred

instructing that the "in the course of" and "in furtherance of" elements were proven if the death and the underlying felonies were part of the same series of events. This, Smith posits, completely relieved the State of its burden of proving the "in furtherance of" element. This claim is precluded from federal habeas review.

As fully discussed in *Lambright v. Lewis, et al.*, No. CIV 87-235 TUC RMB, 1996 WL 391848 (D. Ariz. July 9, 1996), which is attached as Exhibit A, where a state court declines to consider a state prisoner's federal claims because he failed to meet a state procedural requirement, the doctrine of procedural default precludes federal habeas review. This is because the state decision denying consideration rests on independent, adequate state procedural grounds. A federal court will not review a state court decision that rests on state law that is independent of federal law and is adequate to sustain the decision. *Coleman v. Thompson*, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991); *Harris v. Reed*, 489 U.S. 255 (1989); *Ulster Count Court v. Allen*, 442 U.S. 140, 148 (1979); *Fox Film Corp. v. Muller*, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935).

In this case, the state law ground is Rule 32.2(a)(3), which provided that a "petitione will not be given relief under this rule based upon any ground . . . [k]nowingly, voluntarily and intelligently not raised at trial on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(a).

When Smith raised this claim for the first time in his second post-conviction petition, Judge Brown ruled that the claim was precluded for failure to raise it on direct appeal or in the previous post-conviction petition. (Pima County Superior Court Minute Entry of Aug. 28, 1991 at 2). The parties agree that Judge Brown ruled that Smith's claim was precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3), but Smith now argues that the rule cannot bar federal habeas review because it is not consistently applied by the state courts. This argument is unavailing.

To constitute an adequate state ground barring federal review, a state rule must be regularly and consistently applied by the state's courts. *Ford v. Georgia*, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1991);

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Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401 (1989); *Hathorn v. Lovorn*, 457 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1982); *Harmon v. Ryan*, 959 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently stated that the

> contention that the Arizona Supreme Court has not regularly and consistently relied on procedural default has no merit. *See Carriger v. Lewis*, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992), *cert. denied*, 507 U.S. 992 (1993) (rejecting argument that Arizona's reliance on procedural default was so unpredictable and irregular that it does not provide an adequate ground for disposing of claims).

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1996) (parallel citation and additional history omitted, style added). There can be no doubt in this circuit that Arizona's Rule 32.2(a) is regularly and consistently applied and thus is an adequate state ground barring federal review.

Nonetheless, Smith points to the ruling of Judge Brown in one of Lambright's post-conviction petitions. Smith notes that when Lambright presented a defaulted claim in his second habeas petition, the Judge determined that because it was a capital case, he was required to reach the merits of the defaulted claim in light of *Arizona v. Carriger*, 692 P.2d 991 (Ariz. 1994). Yet Smith does not note that Judge Brown amended that ruling, providing a clear, express statement that he was relying on Rule 32.2(a) to deny the claim. *See* Pima County Minute Entry of Apr. 9, 1993 at 2 ("he has waived the right to assert this claim in this petition and the claim is precluded"). With the amended minute order, the trial court judge reached the same result in Lambright's second petition that he reached in Smith's second petition, and for the same reason. Smith has procedurally defaulted on this claim.

Notwithstanding Smith's default, the Court would proceed to consider the merits of the claim if he demonstrated cause and prejudice to overcome the default. *Wainwright v. Sykes*, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 (1977). The Court would also reach the merits if the Petitioner made a showing that failure to consider the merits would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. *Murray v. Carrier*, 477 U.S. 478, 494-95 (1986); *Engle v. Isaac*, 456 U.S. 107, 109 (1982). The

Petitioner makes no effort to establish cause and prejudice. He also does not, and could not, show a fundamental miscarriage of justice. As such, trial claim two is denied as precluded.

3. Dual Juries

The trial court granted Smith's motion to sever the trials of Smith and Lambright, but conducted one trial with two separate juries. There were separate opening statements and closing arguments, and when evidence was admissible against only one defendant, the other jury was excused.

The Petitioner contends that the use of dual juries violated his constitutional rights by depriving him of a fair trial. The Court considered this contention when raised in Lambright's petition, and concluded that the dual jury procedure comported with constitutional standards. *Lambright v. Lewis, et al.*, No. CIV 87-235 TUC RMB, 1996 WL 391848 (D. Ariz. July 9, 1996). For the same reasons, the Court rejects the contention that Smith was prejudiced by the use of two juries and denies trial claim three.

4. Recross-examination of Foreman

Smith's statements to police maintained that he only had intercourse with Owen once--at the campsite--and that it was consensual. However, at trial Foreman testified that Smith had forced sex upon Owen in the backseat of the car and again on the mountain where they camped. Smith's counsel cross-examined Foreman on this issue and impeached her with an earlier statement and prior testimony where she indicated that she did not know whether the sex was consensual.

The trial court allowed the prosecutor to reopen his case and ask Foreman additional questions, but refused Smith's requests to re-cross in the absence of "new areas." The prosecutor presented evidence of discrepancies between the tape and the written transcript of an earlier hearing. He was attempting to rehabilitate Foreman by showing that she had not made prior inconsistent statements. He also had Foreman identify Owen's shoe and testify that she had told the police where all the events occurred.

When Smith attempted to ask Foreman about differences in her statements, the court sustained the State's objection because this was "improper recross." Smith stresses that without an opportunity for him to clarify, the jury could have concluded that inconsistencies in two prior statements were the result of transcription errors. In fact, it was only one statement from the preliminary hearing--not the other--that was mistranscribed. The other statement, Smith maintains, was a prior inconsistent statement. Smith submits that this violated the Confrontation Clause because the prosecutor had introduced new matter that Smith was unable to challenge. The Court disagrees.

The trial court directed defense counsel to object should any new matter arise during the second examination of Foreman. No objection was made. Further, counsel refused to tell the court the areas upon which he sought re-cross. More importantly, Smith had already cross-examined Foreman on the prior inconsistent statement. He was allowed effective cross-examination and the court's refusal to allow further, unknown recross-examination did not impair Smith's rights of confrontation. *See Delaware v Van Arsdall*, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). Trial claim four is denied on the merits.

5. County Attorney as Witness

The Petitioner complains that Paul Banales, a county prosecutor, was impermissibly allowed to testify. For the reasons explained in *Lambright*, this claim is precluded.

6. Closing Arguments Comments

In trial claim six, the Petitioner protests that the prosecutor's improper comments during closing argument violated his constitutional rights. Specifically, the prosecutor said

> Mr. Hippert's [Smith's trial counsel] job wast to get his client off. That's it. My job is to produce this evidence and argue from it and ask you to convict for a crime which Mr. Smith should not be let go. Mr. Hippert is asking you to let him go, to let him walk out of the courtroom after being involved in the things he did.

(R.T. at 1383-84). These comments came in rebuttal, after Smith's counsel had said

> Now, Mr.Himelic [the county prosecutor], when he was standing up here, said that your job -- and I think he said something about your only job or your purpose is to apply the law to the case. Well, his job is to make things easy for the government, to grease the wheels or whatever and you have more a job than just to apply the law to the case. Your job is to use your common sense, to use your experience and to think about the facts and consider the facts and apply the law to the facts.

(R.T. at 1360).

This Court certainly would not encourage such conduct by either attorney. However, in determining whether or not the comments are of constitutional magnitude, the Court looks to whether they affected the fundamental fairness of the trial. "[A] criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by doing so can it be determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial." *United States v. Young*, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). There is no constitutional violation unless the improper comments were so prejudicial that they rendered the trial fundamentally unfair within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. To establish such prejudice, a federal habeas petitioner must show that either the misconduct was persistent and pronounced, or that the evidence was so insubstantial that the jury probably would not have convicted in the absence of the misconduct. *Donnelly v. DeChristoforo*, 416 U.S. 637 (1974). Smith has not, and could not, make such a showing.

The prosecutor's comments, while improper, were brief and were not repeated. They did not detract from the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the cruel manner of the murder. The evidence, notwithstanding either lawyer's perceptions of each other's jobs, established without a doubt that Smith was guilty of the murder of Sandy Owen. The jury was properly instructed on the law and told that comments by the attorneys were not evidence. The prosecutor's comments came in response to defense counsel's statement and did not improperly attack the evidence, rather the attack was upon the attorney. The Court finds that this exchange, although distasteful

and inappropriate, did not affect the fundamental fairness of Smith's trial. Accordingly, trial claim six is denied on the merits.

7. Requested Jury Instruction No. 10

The trial court denied a requested jury instruction which would have provided a caution about considering the charges against each defendant separately. As explained in *Lambright*, the cases were tried with two different juries. The proposed instruction was not needed and had the potential to confuse because Smith's juries would not be considering any charge against Lambright, and vice-versa. Only the Smith jury heard evidence admissible only against Smith and vice-versa. For the reasons discussed in *Lambright*, trial claim ten is denied as precluded and alternatively on the merits.

8. Jury Death Qualification

The Petitioner posits in trial claim eight that the voir dire questions designed to "death qualify" the jury violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. This position is untenable. It was considered and rejected in *Lambright*, and for the same reasons, is rejected today. This claim is denied as precluded, due to the Rule 32 court's finding of preclusion based upon Rule 32.2(a)(3). (Pima County Superior Court Minute Entry of Aug. 28, 1991, at 2). It is alternatively denied on the merits as explained in *Lambright*.

9. Voluntariness of Statements Made in Texas

When officers arrested the Petitioner in South Houston, Texas, they provided him *Miranda* warnings. A magistrate also read to Smith *Miranda* warnings after arrival at the police department. When officers began interrogating Smith, he made an inculpatory statement. They talked about Smith's more recent activities, such as his church involvement and his new wife. The police told Smith that his first statement did not "sound right" and asked if he was telling the truth. Smith became emotional and made a second incriminating statement.

At this point, the officers allowed Smith to speak with his wife. Smith's wife and mother-in-law arrived and spoke with him for about 45 minutes. They told him to "trust in God" and to "tell the truth." (R.T. at 188, 212). Smith was visibly distraught and his wife was crying.

Smith told the officers that he had previously attempted suicide because of Owen's killing. He said that he would make a written statement, and later did so after again being read his *Miranda* rights.

Following a hearing, the trial court denied Smith's motion to suppress the statements as involuntary. In the present petition, Smith argues that the trial court erred in admitting the statements because Smith's low intelligence made him particularly susceptible to coercion. With an IQ of 71 and little formal education, he claims that his waiver of his *Miranda* rights was not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Smith also argues that by placing him with his emotional, highly religious relatives, the police schemed to allow compelling influences to elicit harmful statements. This argument is not persuasive on these facts.

A federal court reviews de novo a state court's ultimate finding of voluntariness, but does so with respect for the "considered conclusions of a coequal state judiciary." *Greenawalt v. Ricketts*, 943 F.2d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting *Miller v. Fenton*, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985), *cert. denied*, 506 U.S. 888 (1992). Further, the state judge's decision as to whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent is entitled to a presumption of correctness. *Collazo v. Estelle*, 940 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), *cert. denied*, 112 S. Ct. 870 (1992). In reviewing Judge Brown's findings, this Court concludes that they are supported by the record, and independently determines that Smith's statements were voluntarily given.

Although Mr. Smith apparently possesses a low intelligence quotient and minimal education, these factors did not impact on the voluntariness of his inculpatory statements. A confession or waiver of *Miranda* rights that is prompted by a mental or emotional condition is not involuntary, absent police coercion. *See Colorado v. Connelly*, 479 U.S. 157 (1986); *Arizona v.*

Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987). There are no indicia of police coercion in this record, and Smith makes no such challenge. Unlike the cases cited by the Petitioner, this record shows no external pressure that Smith was forced to attempt to overcome. This Court cannot conclude that a person with an eight grade education and 71 IQ is incapable of acts of free will. While such a person may be vulnerable to psychological coercion, there was no such coercion in this case.

The facts here indicate that Smith did confess of his own free will and comprehended the circumstances. He said that he felt a great deal of guilt and distress and had previously attempted suicide. The officers testified that he was eager to confess and wanted to help locate the body. He spoke in a narrative and was not subjected to a demanding questioning session. He said that he understood his rights and wrote out a detailed statement.

The facts also indicate that Smith's emotional state following his family's arrival was not a result of any police ploy. Quite the opposite, the record suggests that the police were motivated by concerns for Smith and by a desire to obtain a map that Smith's wife was to bring to the police department. No facts reveal that the police knew that Smith's relatives were particularly religious or would urge him to tell the truth. While Smith may have been prompted or influenced, it was by his family, not police officials. In allowing Smith to visit with his family, rather than plotting, the officers were simply submitting to Smith's requests. Any influence on Smith as to his statements was not a result of any police conduct. In sum, trial claim nine is not supported by the record and is denied on the merits.

10. Voluntariness of Statements Made in Arizona

The Petitioner next argues that the incriminatory statement made after his return to Arizona were improper fruit of the Texas statements and were violative of his right to counsel. These arguments are unavailing.

As explained above, the Texas statements were not involuntarily made. Therefore, any subsequent statements are not improper fruit of those statements. As to the right to counsel aspect

of this claim, this Court agrees with the Petitioner that the State violated his right to have counsel present when he reviewed a transcript of his tape-recorded statement.

When Smith was told that he had the right to have his attorney with him when he reviewed the transcript, he said that although his lawyer had instructed him not to talk about the case, he wanted to go through the statement with the officer without counsel. (R.T. at 401-02). Smith wanted to do so, even though he recognized that his attorney "would be mad at him." (R.T. at 402). The officer and Smith then proceeded to make corrections to the statement that was ultimately admitted at trial.

This would appear to show a clear waiver of the right to counsel. However, the Petitioner correctly points out that any waiver of the presence of counsel after a demand is made following a formal charge is invalid. *Michigan v. Long*, 475 U.S. 625, 635-36 (1986). The State may not initiate any interrogation if the accused has invoked his right to counsel, even if it is undeniably clear that the accused wants to speak without his counsel present. Any conversation must be at the accused's initiation.

While it is not factually clear in this case that an interrogation took place, the Court assumes that the detective's presence and discussion with Smith was an interrogation. The State does not argue this point. As such, the detective's presence and discussion after Smith had been formally charged and had invoked his right to counsel, violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

This indicates this Court's disagreement with the Arizona Supreme Court's review of this claim. The supreme court did not have the benefit of *Long*, which was decided three years later. Despite this disagreement on waiver of right to counsel, this Court does agree with the supreme court's conclusion that the statement in question would have been admissible even without Smith's participation in a review of the statement. The statement would have come in to evidence even

if the detective had never met with Smith. Furthermore, this statement was merely cumulative of other valid confessions. Thus, no harm befell Smith and trial claim ten is denied on the merits.

11. Form of Verdict

Smith complains that the form of verdict only allowed a verdict of guilty or not guilty, even though the judge instructed the jury on both felony murder and premeditated murder. Thus, it was possible that the jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict in violation of the Due Process Clause.

Smith acknowledges that *Schad v. Arizona*, 501 U.S. 624 (1991) held that the Constitution does not mandate separate verdicts for felony murder and premeditated murder. As such, trial claim eleven presents no constitutional error and is denied on the merits.

12. Admissibility of Petitioner's Statements

At trial, the Petitioner moved to admit statements made to a detective that he "wished the entire thing were over" and that "I did not kill anybody" and "the only one that did any killing got full immunity out of this." (R.T. at 1201-06). The trial court sustained the State's objection, ruling that the statements were inadmissible hearsay. Smith argues that the exclusion of the statements violated his rights under the Fifth, Six and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This Court disagrees.

It is doubtful that this claim was properly exhausted because it was not presented as a federal claim in state court. It is technically exhausted though, and is, at any rate, denied on the merits. This is because the trial court's exclusion of these statements did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. *See Jeffries v. Bodgett*, 5 F.3d 1180, 1192 (9th Cir. 1993) (a state evidentiary ruling warrants federal habeas relief only when due process is violated by fundamental fairness), *cert. denied*, 114 S. Ct. 1294 (1994). The statements are exculpatory and were not offered by an opponent, and as such do not fall within an exception to the hearsay rule. Even if they were not entirely exculpatory, the trial court did allow substantially the same statements.

when a detective testified that Smith said that he did not do the killing--Lambright and Foreman had. (R.T. at 1222). Failure to allow inadmissible hearsay does not violate due process, especially where substantially the same evidence is properly admitted. *See Estelle v. McGuire*, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (admission of challenged evidence does not rise to the level of due process violation). Trial claim twelve is denied on the merits.

13. Juror Questionnaires

The jurors were given written questionnaires to answer. These completed questionnaires were not made part of the appellate record. Smith contends that the trial court's failure to include the questionnaires in the record denied him meaningful appellate review of the propriety of the questionaires. Smith cannot prevail on this contention. For the reasons explained in *Lambright*, this claim is denied as precluded and is also without merit.

B. Sentencing Claims

1. Construction of Arizona's Death Penalty Statutes

In his first sentencing claim, Smith argues that the imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional in his case because of the presence of significant mitigating evidence and only one aggravating factor. He contends that the Constitution requires a narrowed construction of the death penalty statutes that prevents the imposition of death in such a case. This Court finds no constitutional error.

For the reasons explained in *Lambright*, this Court declines to conclude that the Constitution or the Arizona statute requires life over death when only one aggravating factor exists. Rather, the requirement is for an individualized balancing of aggravating and mitigating evidence in each case.

Such an individualized balancing was performed by both the trial court and supreme court. This Court agrees with the supreme court that Ms. Owen

> was made to suffer great mental anguish and physical pain prior to her death. Defendant Smith shares full responsibility for the cruelty toward Ms. Owen. In fact, he was the one who repeatedly raped the victim prior to murdering her. Cruelty was clearly established.

Arizona v. Smith, 673 P.2d 17, 23 (1983) (en banc), *cert. denied*, 465 U.S. 1074 (1984). The aggravating factor was proven without doubt. Smith argues that despite the existence of this single aggravating factor, the significant mitigating evidence militates toward life.

The supreme court did note that the mitigating evidence presented was significant. Smith had low intelligence, a troubled home life when he was young, and learning difficulties in school. He also lacked a prior record of serious crime, had adjusted well to new marital and parental responsibilities, and experienced remorse following Owen's death. Further, Foreman, a fellow perpetrator and active participant in the crimes was given complete immunity and never spent even one night in jail. While this evidence is significant in mitigation, it will only call for a life sentence if it is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. This Court agrees with the supreme court that this evidence is not sufficiently substantial in light of the cruelty of the crime.

It is true that Lambright repeatedly stabbed Owen and imposed the final blow. The mitigating evidence submitted by Lambright was considerably less, in both force and quantity. However, as explained in *Lambright*, the supreme court exercised its independent judgment in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors in both cases. There is no constitutional error in the weighing process or its results. Sentencing claim one is denied on the merits.

2. "Especially Cruel" Aggravating Factor

The Petitioner next argues that the Arizona courts failed to adhere to a single limiting construction of the "especially cruel factor" or A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6). This argument is rejected for the reasons stated above, as well as those stated in *Lambright*, and because of Smith's attempts to break Owen's neck after she had been stabbed, but while she was still conscious. He initiated the killing by choking her, repeatedly raped her and placed her in great fear. He held her down as she was stabbed and cut. This is precisely the construction of the "especially cruel manner"

factor approved by the United States Supreme Court in *Walton v. Arizona*, 497 U.S. 639, 654 (1990). The Supreme Court had the benefit of the state supreme court's decisions in *Lambright* and *Smith*, as well as numerous others cited by the Petitioner, when it determined that Arizona's construction of § 13-703(F)(6) meets constitutional requirements. Sentencing claim two is denied on the merits.

3. Consideration of Mitigating Factors

As did Lambright, Smith argues that the Arizona courts failed to individually and cumulatively weigh the mitigating evidence proffered. For the reasons discussed in *Lambright*, this claim is denied. The state supreme court affirmatively stated that it had "considered all the mitigation presented." *Smith*, 673 P.2d at 24. Any error at sentencing was cured by the supreme court's independent balancing of all mitigation proffered. Sentencing claim three is denied on the merits.

4. State Supreme Court Review

The Petitioner posits that the supreme court erred by failing to adequately reweigh the aggravation and mitigation evidence and by failing to remand to the sentencing court for resentencing. This position is without merit. For the reasons discussed above and in *Lambright*, the state supreme court reviewed the evidence anew, independently taking into account all mitigation presented, and independently concluding that death was the appropriate sentence. This court finds no constitutional error.

5. Nonstatutory Aggravating Factors

The Petitioner contends that the trial court unconstitutionally relied on nonstatutory aggravating factors in imposing the death penalty. For the reasons stated in *Lambright*, this claim is denied as precluded, and alternatively, is denied on the merits.

6. *Enmund* Finding

Smith argues in sentencing claim six that the trial court's finding that he intende Owen and participated in her killing was contrary to *Enmund v. Florida*, 458 U.S. 782 For the reasons the Court rejected this claim in *Lambright*, it rejects it here as well. Sn a major participant in Owen's murder. The judge made a considered finding comporti *Enmund* without the use of Lambright's statements. This claim is denied on the merits.

7. Statements of Owen's Mother

Smith complains that Judge Brown relied upon the statements of Owen's mother, cor in the presentence report. As explained in *Lambright*, this claim is both precluded and mer The Rule 32 court found the claim precluded under 32.2(a)(3) and Smith has not demons cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural default. Also, the claim is without merit be the sentencing court did not rely on the mother's statements. *See McKenzie v. McCormic* F.3d 1415 (9th Cir. 1994) (uphoiding death sentence because sentencing decision not affecte judge's meeting with prosecutor); *Paradis v. Arave*, 20 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1994) (findin constitutional violation from private letter and in camera statements because there was no shov that the sentencing judge considered them); *Clark v. Ricketts*, 958 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 19 (holding that judge's possession of presentence report during sentencing phase was constitutic because the judge based his findings on the evidence adduced at trial and not on the presente report), *cert. denied*, 506 U.S. 838 (1992). Further, any perceived error was cured on dir appeal. The supreme court did not consider any statement by the victim's mother when independently concluded that death was the proper sentence.

8. Presentence Report

Similarly, the Petitioner claims that other information in the presentence report should n have been considered by the sentencing court. As discussed above and in *Lambright*, th sentencing court did not rely on the presentence report and any potential error was cured by th

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supreme court's independent determination, without the presentence report, that death was the appropriate sentence. Sentencing claim eight is denied on the merits.

9. Right to Jury Trial

The Petitioner asserts that he has a constitutional right to a jury determination of aggravating factors. He does not. He acknowledges that *Walton v. Arizona*, 497 U.S. 639, 647-49 (1990) rejected this claim and upheld Arizona's sentencing scheme with judge determination of aggravating and mitigating factors. *See also Spaziano v. Florida*, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (no constitutional requirement that sentence be imposed by jury); *Carriger v. Lewis*, 971 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1992) (Arizona's judge-only sentencing scheme is constitutional), *cert. denied*, 113 S. Ct. 1600 (1993). Sentencing claim ten is denied on the merits.

10. Burden of Proving Mitigation

Smith next asserts that A.R.S. § 13-703 places an unconstitutional burden of proving mitigation on the defendant. This too was rejected in *Walton*, 497 U.S. at 649-51. The Court declines the Petitioner's invitation to adopt Justice Blackmun's dissent in *Walton* and denies sentencing claim ten on the merits.

11. Presumption of Death

Again, Smith recognizes that his claim that Arizona's death statutes creates a presumption of death is foreclosed by *Walton*, 497 U.S. at 651-52. As such, it is denied on the merits.

12. Prosecutorial Discretion

In sentencing claim twelve, Smith argues that § 13-703 unconstitutionally allows the risk of arbitrary action by failing to guide a prosecutor's discretion in when to seek the death penalty. For the reasons discussed in *Lambright*, this claim is denied.

13. Discrimination in Sentencing

The Petitioner asserts that the death penalty has been discriminatorily imposed upon poor males convicted of killing a Caucasian. For the reasons discussed in *Lambright*, this claim is denied on the merits.

14. Court Determination of Sentence

Smith argues in sentencing claim fourteen that he had a constitutional right to be sentenced by a jury rather than a judge. For the reasons explained in *Lambright* and above with respect to sentencing claim nine, this claim is denied on the merits.

15. Notice of Aggravating Factors

In sentencing claim fifteen, Smith submits that he did not receive adequate notice of the aggravating circumstances the court used in sentencing him to death. For the reasons discussed in *Lambright*, this claim is denied on the merits.

IV. CONCLUSION

After having considered the Parties' excellent briefing and having carefully reviewed the entire state court record, the Court finds no constitutional error entitling Mr. Smith to relief. Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that Robert Douglas Smith's "Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (28 U.S.C. § 2254)" filed November 21, 1994 is **DENIED** and **DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents' "Motion to Strike 'Additional Legal Issues.' Improperly Raised for the First Time in the Reply to Respondents' Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" filed April 25, 1996 is **DENIED**.

On August 23, 1996 the Petitioner submitted ineffective assistance of counsel claims by filing a "Supplement to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" as instructed by the Court. He also filed a "Request for Expert Witness Fees." The Court will proceed to consider those claims.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall respond to the August 23rd filings not later than September 30, 1996. The response shall include a discussion of the State's position

on the issue of procedural default. The Petitioner's reply, if any, shall be filed not later than October 18, 1996. Extensions of time will be granted only upon a showing of extremely good cause.

DATED this 5-4 of ~~August~~ September, 1996.

RICHARD M. BILBY
Senior United States District Judge

APPENDIX D

Ninth Circuit Order in Smith v. Stewart Denying State's Petition For Rehearing And Suggestion For Rehearing En Banc dated May 15, 2001

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FILED

MAY 15 2001

CATHY A. CATTERSON, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

JOE LEONARD LAMBRIGHT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. TERRY STEWART, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.	No. 96-99020 DC# CV-87-00235-TUC-RMB Arizona ORDER
ROBERT DOUGLAS SMITH, Petitioner-Appellant, v. TERRY STEWART, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.	Nos. 96-99025, 96-99026 DC# CV-87-00234-TUC-RMB Arizona ORDER

Before: FERGUSON, REINHARDT, THOMPSON, Circuit Judges

The panel has voted to deny respondent's petition for rehearing.

The full court has been advised of the suggestion for rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote on whether to hear the matter en banc.

The petition for rehearing is DENIED and the suggestion for rehearing en banc is REJECTED.

APPENDIX E

State v. Smith, 138 Ariz. 79, 673 P.2d 17 (1983)

*17 673 P.2d 17

138 Ariz. 79

Supreme Court of Arizona,
In Banc.

STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
v.
Robert Douglas SMITH, Appellant.

No. 5595.
Sept. 28, 1983.

Reconsideration Denied Nov. 8, 1983.

Certiorari Denied Feb. 27, 1984.

See 104 S.Ct. 1429.

Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Pima County, Cause No. CR-05669, Michael J. Brown, J., of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and sexual assault, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, Cameron, J., held that: (1) trial court did not err in limiting defendant's right to recross-examine State's key witness; (2) there was no clear and manifest error in determination that circumstances surrounding defendant's giving of his confessions was not inherently coercive; (3) evidence did not support claim of lack of premeditation so as to require giving of instruction on second-degree murder; and (4) death sentence was properly imposed.

Affirmed.

Feldman, J., filed opinion concurring and dissenting in part.

West Headnotes

[1] Criminal Law ⇐1153(4)

110 ----
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(N) Discretion of Lower Court
110k1153 Reception of Evidence
110k1153(4) Examination of Witnesses.

[See headnote text below]

[1] Witnesses ⇐267

410 ----
410III Examination
410III(B) Cross-Examination
410k267 Control and Discretion of Court.

Control of cross-examination is left to sound discretion of trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal absent showing from record of an abuse of discretion.

[2] Witnesses ⇐291

410 ----
410III Examination
410III(C) Re-Examination
410k291 Recross-Examination.

Where defendant's counsel declined to specify any new areas he wished to inquire into on recross-examination, notwithstanding that judge offered full opportunity to recross-examine State's key witness on any new areas brought out on redirect, and gave him opportunity to conduct recross on any new point opened up on cross-examination by codefendant, trial court did not err in limiting his right to recross-examine that witness.

[3] Criminal Law ⇐519(9)

110 ----
110XVII Evidence
110XVII(T) Confessions
110k519 Voluntary Character in General
110k519(9) Questioning and Soliciting in General.

There was no clear and manifest error in determination that circumstances surrounding giving of defendant's confessions were not inherently coercive; it was not improper for officers, when explaining charges against defendant, to accurately inform him that he had been implicated in the crime by State's witness.

[4] Criminal Law ⇐517.2(1)

110 ----
110XVII Evidence
110XVII(T) Confessions
110k517.2 Absence or Denial of Counsel; Inadequate Representation
110k517.2(1) In General.

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That detective brought transcript of defendant's confession to him for his review, instead of delivering it to his attorney, was not error, where detective fully apprised defendant of his right to have counsel assist him.

[5] Criminal Law ⇐1037.1(4)

110 ----
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in Lower Court of Grounds of Review
110XXIV(E)1 In General
110k1037 Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110k1037.1 In General
110k1037.1(4) Time for Objection.

Opposing counsel must timely object to any erroneous or improper statements made during closing argument or waive his right to the objection, except for fundamental error.

[6] Criminal Law ⇐713

110 ----
110XX Trial
110XX(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel
110k712 Statements as to Facts, Comments, and Arguments
110k713 In General.

Prosecutor's remark in closing argument in regard to role of defense counsel was not fundamental error.

[7] Criminal Law ⇐824(3)

110 ----
110XX Trial
110XX(H) Instructions: Requests
110k824 Necessity in General
110k824(3) Instructions as to Grade or Degree of Offense.

In cases which may result in death penalty, trial judge is required to instruct on lesser included offenses when evidence would have supported such a verdict, regardless of whether requested to do so by defendant.

[8] Homicide ⇐308(3)

203 ----
203VIII Trial
203VIII(C) Instructions
203k306 Grade or Degree of Offense
203k308 Murder
203k308(3) Applicability to Issues and Evidence in General.

To support an instruction for second-degree murder, evidence reasonably construed should tend to show lack of premeditation.

[9] Homicide ⇐308(3)

203 ----
203VIII Trial
203VIII(C) Instructions
203k306 Grade or Degree of Offense
203k308 Murder
203k308(3) Applicability to Issues and Evidence in General.

Evidence, including proof that reason for killing was to prevent victim from pressing charges of kidnapping and rape, that codefendants knew this was the reason when they proceeded to kill her, and that choking of victim by defendant was the first of the acts in a sequence of stabbing, cutting and crushing with a rock that led to her death, was insufficient to support a claim of lack of premeditation on defendant's part so as to require giving of instruction on second-degree murder.

[10] Criminal Law ⇐413(1)

110 ----
110XVII Evidence
110XVII(M) Declarations
110k411 Declarations by Accused
110k413 Self-Serving Declarations
110k413(1) In General.

Exculpatory hearsay statement made by defendant to police officer was not admissible under either of the residual hearsay exceptions. 17 A A.R.S. Rules of Evid., Rules 803(24), 804(b)(5).

[11] Sentencing and Punishment ⇐1669

350H ----
350HVIII The Death Penalty
350HVIII(D) Factors Related to Offense
350Hk1669 Extent of Offender's Personal Participation.

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(Formerly 203k357(12), 203k354)

[11] Sentencing and Punishment ⇐1681

350H ----
350HVIII The Death Penalty
350HVIII(D) Factors Related to Offense
350Hk1681 Killing While Commiting Other Offense or in Course of Criminal Conduct.

(Formerly 203k357(12), 203k354)

Where trial court made specific findings that defendant and codefendant discussed killing victim, that killing commenced when defendant began strangling victim, and that defendant held victim while she was being stabbed, there was a clear finding that defendant both killed and intended to kill, and thus imposition of death penalty was not precluded under rule placing limits on imposition of death penalty based on accomplice or felony-murder theories.

[12] Sentencing and Punishment ⇐1684

350H ----
350HVIII The Death Penalty
350HVIII(D) Factors Related to Offense
350Hk1684 Vileness, Heinousness, or Atrocity.

(Formerly 203k357(11), 203k354)

[12] Sentencing and Punishment ⇐1700

350H ----
350HVIII The Death Penalty
350HVIII(E) Factors Related to Offender
350Hk1700 In General.

(Formerly 203k357(11), 203k354)

Death penalty was properly imposed, as victim's suffering of great mental anguish and physical pain prior to her death established cruelty for purposes of statutory aggravating circumstance, and as mitigation that defendant had low intelligence, lack of prior record of serious crime, evidence suggesting remorse, his favorable adjustment to new marital and parental responsibility, and that State's key witness, who participated in crime, was granted immunity from prosecution, was not sufficiently *17 substantial to call for leniency in light of the extreme cruelty and brutality of the crime. A.R.S. § 13-703, subd. F, par. 6.

[138 Ariz. 80] *18 Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer, III and Barbara A. Jarrett, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.

Frederic J. Dardis, Pima County Public Defender by Lawrence H. Fleischman, Asst. Public Defender, Tucson, for appellant.

CAMERON, Justice.

Defendant, Robert Douglas Smith, was tried before a jury and convicted of first degree murder, A.R.S. § 13-1105, kidnapping, A.R.S. § 13-1304(A)(3), and sexual assault, A.R.S. § 13-1406. In addition, the kidnapping and sexual assault were found to have been dangerous felonies, involving the infliction of serious physical injury, A.R.S. § 13-604. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder, to 21 years imprisonment for the kidnapping, and to 21 years imprisonment for the sexual assault, to be served consecutively to the sentence for kidnapping. The case was automatically appealed to this court pursuant to Rules 26.15, 31.2(b), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S.; we have jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 6, § 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 13-4031 and 13-4035.

The issues we must decide on appeal are:

I. Does the use of a dual jury procedure at trial constitute reversible error?

II. Did the trial court lack venue over the homicide charge?

III. Was it error to allow an official of the Pima County attorney's office to testify regarding the grant of immunity to an accomplice?

IV. Did the trial court err in failing to give one of the defendant's proffered jury instructions?

V. Is the Arizona death penalty statute unconstitutional?

VI. Is the statutory aggravating circumstance of killing in an "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner" unconstitutionally vague?

VII. Is there a right to have a jury participate in

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sentencing where the death penalty is imposable?

VIII. Is it unconstitutional to place the burden of proof of mitigating circumstances on the defendant?

IX. Did the trial court err in placing limits on recross-examination?

[138 Ariz. 81] *19 X. Were defendant's statements voluntary?

XI. Did the prosecutor's closing argument contain fundamental error?

XII. Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury on second degree murder?

XIII. Did the trial court properly exclude from evidence an exculpatory hearsay statement made by the defendant to a police officer?

XIV. Is imposition of the death penalty foreclosed in this case by Enmund v. Florida?

XV. Does the court find in its independent review that the death penalty was appropriate in this case?

XVI. Is the death penalty in this case proportionate to the disposition of other similar cases?

The first eight issues raised in this appeal have been decided and discussed in the companion case of *State v. Lambright,* 138 Ariz. 63, 673 P.2d 1 (1983) . A summary of the facts necessary for the determination of this appeal is also contained in that opinion.

IX. LIMITATION OF RECROSS-EXAMINATION

[1] Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in limiting his right to recross-examine the state's key witness, Kathy Foreman. The control of cross-examination is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing from the record of an abuse of discretion. *State v. Thomas,* 110 Ariz. 106, 109, 515 P.2d 851, 854 (1973). Further,

> The right of confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses is of fundamental importance, but it is not a right without limitation. It is well established in Arizona, as well as in many other jurisdictions, that there is no right to re-cross unless some new issue arises during redirect; otherwise, it is a matter of the trial court's sound discretion. (Citations omitted.) *State v. Jones,* 110 Ariz. 546, 550, 521 P.2d 978, 982, cert. denied 419 U.S. 1004, 95 S.Ct. 324, 42 L.Ed.2d 280 (1974), quoted in *State v. Williams,* 113 Ariz. 14, 16, 545 P.2d 938, 940 (1976).

[2] In the instant case the judge offered the defendant a full opportunity to recross-examine the witness on any new areas brought out on redirect, and because he was tried together with another defendant, he also gave him the opportunity to conduct recross on any new point opened up on cross-examination by the co-defendant. Defendant's counsel declined to specify any new areas he wished to inquire into on recross-examination, so the trial judge did not permit recross-examination to proceed.

> A party has no right to use further cross-examination to repeat or re-emphasize matters already covered on direct or cross-examination. The court may inquire into the nature and purpose of the further cross-examination to determine whether to permit it or limit its scope. *State v. Loftis,* 89 Ariz. 403, 405-06, 363 P.2d 585, 587 (1961).

We find no error.

X. VOLUNTARINESS OF STATEMENTS

[3] Robert Smith was arrested at about 9:00 a.m. on 14 March 1981 at an apartment complex in South Houston, Texas. He was arrested by officer John W. Laird of the Texas Department of Public Safety, who was accompanied by Robert Petty, another Texas DPS officer, and two South Houston policemen. Officer Laird read Smith his Miranda rights, and Smith acknowledged that he understood them. No questions were asked at the time of arrest. Smith was taken to the South Houston Police Department, and a magistrate was summoned. The magistrate advised Smith of the charges against him, and read him his constitutional rights a second time. Defendant then agreed to talk to agents Laird and Petty. The officers told him that Kathy Foreman had admitted her participation in the crimes and had implicated Smith. The officers also explained the nature of the [138 Ariz. 82] *20 charges against Smith. Smith then made his first confession. In this first statement, Smith set forth the basic facts

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surrounding this crime, including his substantial involvement in the incident. In this first statement he told authorities that Kathy Foreman was the person who actually stabbed the victim.

Officer Laird told Smith the story just did not sound right somehow, and asked if he was sure it was the truth. Smith then became somewhat emotional, and said he had lied in order to protect his friend Lambright.

He then made a second statement, which paralleled the first one except that Smith now stated it was Lambright who stabbed the victim, and that both Lambright and Foreman cut the victim's throat. After the second statement Smith asked if he could see his wife. The officers granted the request and arranged for her to come down and see him. He visited with his wife and her mother for approximately an hour. The officers went in and out of the room several times as they got food and beverages for themselves and Smith. The officers testified that while they were in the room the defendant and his wife were talking about religion, and they observed the defendant crying.

After seeing his wife, Smith met with Laird and Petty again, and gave them a third statement which was similar to the second statement, but which was far more detailed. The defendant also expressed a willingness to give a written statement. Two days later he did give a written statement to the Texas authorities, after being given another set of constitutional warnings.

Defendant's final statement was made in Arizona to detective Gary Dhaemers of the Pima County Sheriff's Department. He agreed to answer questions in a taped interview. A transcript was made of the interview, which the defendant was given the opportunity to review, correct, and sign. The trial judge found that each of Smith's confessions was voluntary and admissible.

As we noted in *State v. Lambright,* supra, filed this date,

> The trial court must look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, as presented at "voluntariness" hearings, and decide whether the State has met its burden. However, the trial court's determination of admissibility will not be upset on appeal, absent clear and manifest error. (Citations omitted.) *State v. Arnett,* 119 Ariz. 38, 42, 579 P.2d 542, 546 (1978), quoted in *State v. Osbond,* 128 Ariz. 76, 78, 623 P.2d 1232, 1234 (1981). *Accord State v. Dalglish,* 131 Ariz. 133, 137, 639 P.2d 323, 327 (1982).

No clear and manifest error is present in the instant case. We do not find the circumstances surrounding the giving of these confessions to have been inherently coercive. Nor do we find it was improper, as suggested by defendant, for the officers, when explaining the charges against Smith, to accurately inform him that he had been implicated in the crime by Foreman.

[4] Defendant further alleges as specific error the fact that detective Dhaemers brought the transcript of the last confession directly to Smith for his review, instead of delivering it to his attorney. It is apparent, however, that when Dhaemers delivered the transcript to Smith for his corrections and signature, he fully apprised the defendant of his right to have counsel assist him. In officer Dhaemers' uncontradicted testimony, he stated:

> Well, I had gone through [the transcript] as best I could, and then I took it over to the jail and asked Mr. Smith if he wanted the opportunity to go through the transcript of the tape that he had given to me.
>
> He indicated that he did. He wanted to go through it.
>
> I advised him he had the right to have an attorney with him. He already had an attorney appointed to him and if he wanted that attorney there, he could have him there before we went through the statement and reviewed it.
>
> [138 Ariz. 83] *21 He indicated to me that his attorney said that--had told him not to talk to anybody, but he wanted to talk to us and he wanted to go through his statement, his attorney would be mad at him because he did this, but he wanted to do this anyway.

This is not a case in which the police resorted to subterfuge in an attempt to deprive the defendant of his right to counsel, *See Massiah v. United States,* 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). Here it is clear Smith was offered the assistance of his appointed counsel to review the transcript, and he validly waived it. Nor is this a

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case in which the defendant ever invoked his right to have counsel present during questioning, or expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel. *See Edwards v. Arizona*, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 (1981). In any event, we also note that the defendant made only minor typographical changes to the draft in question, which would have been admissible with or without defendant's corrections and signature, and which was cumulative of numerous other valid confessions. We find no error.

XI. PROSECUTORY CLOSING REMARKS

The defendant raises on appeal the following remark made by the prosecutor in his closing argument, in regard to the role of defense counsel. The prosecutor stated:

> Looking at joos, Mr. Hippert's job was to get his client off. That's it. My job is to produce this evidence and argue from it and ask you to convict for a crime which Mr. Smith should not be let go. Mr. Hippert is asking you to let him go, to let him walk out of the courtroom after being involved in the things he did.

This remark was made in response to the following statement in defense counsel's closing argument:

> Now [the prosecutor], when he was standing up here said that your job or your purpose is to apply the law to the case.
>
> Well, his job is to make things easy for the government, to grease the wheels * * *.

[5] Opposing counsel must timely object to any erroneous or improper statements made during closing argument or waive his right to the objection, except for fundamental error. *State v. Denny*, 119 Ariz. 131, 134, 579 P.2d 1101, 1104 (1978); *accord State v. Young*, 116 Ariz. 385, 386, 569 P.2d 815, 816 (1977) ("failure to object to a closing argument is a waiver of any right to review an appeal unless so prejudicial as to deny the defendant a fair trial.") It is also apparent that any error was invited by defendant. As we said in *State v. Marvin*, 124 Ariz. 555, 558, 606 P.2d 406, 409 (1980),

> We have recognized that improper remarks by the prosecution, if they are provoked by opposing counsel or are in retaliation for certain statements, are not grounds for reversal unless they are so prejudicial as to constitute reversible error. (Citations omitted.)

See also State v. Bowie, 119 Ariz. 336, 343, 580 P.2d 1190, 1197 (1978) ("In this case, the error, if any, in the prosecutor's comments, was invited by the defense counsel's closing argument. The appellant may not benefit from an error which he invited."); *accord, State v. Purcell*, 117 Ariz. 305, 308, 572 P.2d 439, 442 (1977). Thus under both the waiver and invited error doctrines, the above comments of the prosecutor do not require reversal unless they constitute fundamental error.

[6] We are unable to find that the remark by the prosecutor in the instant case constitutes fundamental error. This remark was not of a highly prejudicial nature, so likely to inflame or bias the jury as to deny defendant his right to a fair trial. Even under the higher standard of scrutiny applied in cases where the question of a prosecutor's allegedly improper comment has been properly preserved for appeal, we would be unable to say this comment "probably influenced the jury's verdict." See *State v. Sullivan*, 130 Ariz. 213, 218, 635 P.2d 501, 506 (1981), quoting *State v. Sustaita*, [138 Ariz. 84] *22 119 Ariz. 583, 594, 583 P.2d 239, 250 (1978). We find no reversible error.

XII. FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON SECOND DEGREE MURDER

[7] The defendant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on second degree murder. In cases which may result in the death penalty, the trial judge is required to instruct on lesser included offenses when the evidence would have supported such a verdict, regardless of whether requested to do so by the defendant. *State v. Vickers*, 129 Ariz. 506, 513, 633 P.2d 315, 322 (1981), *citing to Beck v. Alabama*, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). The defendant argues that parts of his confession could have been interpreted to suggest a lack of premeditation by him, and thus the evidence could have supported a verdict of second degree murder. The trial judge apparently felt the confessions fairly read did not tend to negate the element of premeditation, as he rejected this argument and refused the instruction.

[8][9] To support an instruction for second degree murder, the evidence reasonably construed "should tend to show lack of premeditation." *State v. Moreno*, 128 Ariz. 257, 261, 625 P.2d 320, 324 (1981). All of the relevant evidence at trial suggests that the kidnapping was still in progress at the time of the killing; there was no suggestion that Ms. Owen was free to leave at the time Smith began choking her. Furthermore, the uncontradicted evidence before the jury, including Smith's own statements, established that the reason for the killing was to prevent Ms. Owen from pressing charges of kidnapping and rape, and that the co-defendants knew this was the reason when they proceeded to kill her. The choking of Ms. Owen by Smith was the first of the acts in the sequence of stabbing, cutting and crushing with a rock that led to her death. Under these circumstances, we do not believe that the evidence supports a claim of lack of premeditation on Smith's part. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the requested instruction.

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XIII. HEARSAY STATEMENT TO OFFICER

Defendant argues that it was error for the court to refuse to admit into evidence an exculpatory hearsay statement made by the defendant to a police officer. Defendant suggests that the statement is admissible under either of the residual hearsay exceptions, Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), Arizona Rules of Evidence, 17A A.R.S.

[10] Each of those residual exceptions require the out of court statement to have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" as the other stated hearsay exceptions. *Id.* In *State v. Spratt*, 126 Ariz. 184, 187, 613 P.2d 848, 851 (App.1980), our Court of Appeals held that a defendant's out of court assertion of his innocence lacked equivalent sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to make it admissible under the residual exception of Rule 803(24), and therefore the statement was properly excluded. Similarly in *State v. Duffy*, 124 Ariz. 267, 275, 603 P.2d 538, 546 (App.1979), the court held that the trustworthiness of defendant's self-serving out of court statements was "highly suspect," and therefore the trial court properly denied their admissibility. In the instant case the trial judge specifically stated as the reason for his ruling,

> * * * I'm going to deny the admission under either Exception 5 to Rule 804 or Exception 24 to Rule 803 on the grounds that it does not have the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness [or] that it is a statement sufficiently against his interest to bring it within the ambit of the rule.

We find no error.

XIV. PROPRIETY OF SENTENCE UNDER *ENMUND v. FLORIDA*

The defendant claims that the death penalty is impermissible in this case under the rule announced in *Enmund v. Florida*, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), which places limits on the imposition of the death penalty based on accomplice or felony murder theories. The United States [138 Ariz. 85] *23 Supreme Court held in Enmund that imposition of the death penalty would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments where the defendant did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill. Defendant argues that because his case was submitted on both premeditation and felony murder theories, the jury's verdict of guilty of first degree murder does not establish that he killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill.

In *State v. McDaniel*, 136 Ariz. 188, 199, 665 P.2d 70, 81 (1983), we stated,

> We agree with the defendant's claim that in first degree murder cases where the jury is instructed on felony murder as well as premeditated murder, a general verdict finding the defendant guilty of first degree murder does not establish whether the defendant had in fact killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill.

In order to insure compliance with the specific requirements of *Enmund*, we instructed our trial courts,

> * * * that in future cases where the jury might have found the defendant guilty of first degree murder based on a felony-murder theory, the trial judge must determine beyond a reasonable doubt prior to imposing a sentence of death that the defendant killed, attempted to kill or intended to kill. *Id.* at 199, 665 P.2d at 81.

Although the trial in this case took place prior to *State v. McDaniel*, supra, the trial judge made findings in his Special Verdict of the type contemplated in that opinion. The trial judge held,

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THE COURT DOES FIND BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE DEFENDANT, ROBERT DOUGLAS SMITH, COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF MURDER WITH * * * PREMEDITATION.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS while this defendant was legally accountable for the conduct of another under the provisions of A.R.S. 13-303, this defendant's participation was not min[o]r, but was MAJOR and that in addition thereto, that this defendant planned and premeditated the killing and consummated the act. * * *

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that this defendant did foresee that his conduct would cause the death of another person; that he deliberately intended to cause that death. * * * (Emphasis in original.)

[11] The trial court clearly found that defendant both killed and intended to kill. The trial judge made specific findings that Smith and Lambright discussed killing the victim, that the killing commenced when Smith began strangling the victim, and that Smith held the victim while she was being stabbed. We have reviewed the record and find the evidence supports these findings. Because the defendant participated in the killing, and intended to kill, the death penalty is not impermissible under *Enmund v. Florida*, supra.

XV. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

In each death penalty case we conduct an "independent review of the facts that establish the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances [,]" and then "determine for ourselves if the latter outweigh the former when we find both to be present." *State v. Richmond*, 114 Ariz. 186, 196, 560 P.2d 41, 51 (1976) (citations omitted), cert. denied 433 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 2988, 53 L.Ed.2d 1101 (1976).

[12] For the reasons stated today in *State v. Lambright*, we agree with the trial court that the aggravating circumstance set out in A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6) was established, as the offense was committed in an especially cruel manner. The victim was made to suffer great mental anguish and physical pain prior to her death. Defendant Smith shares full responsibility for the cruelty toward Ms. Owen. In fact, he was the one who repeatedly raped the victim prior to murdering her. Cruelty was clearly established.

The evidence suggesting Smith also had a heinous and depraved attitude toward the crime is equivocal. The only evidence of a heinous and depraved attitude on the part of Smith was the uncorroborated testimony of Kathy Foreman that Smith was the person[138 Ariz. 86] *24 who requested that the tape "We Are the Champions" be played. Although admitting much of his participation in the crime, Smith denied this. On the other hand, there is evidence that Robert Smith tried to commit suicide soon after returning to Texas, both as a result of remorse over this crime, and a marital breakup prior to the trip. We find that the evidence presented does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith had a heinous and depraved attitude toward the crime.

The principal mitigation urged by defendant was minor participation in the crime. This assertion was rejected by the trial court, and is also rejected by this court, for the reasons stated in the previous discussion regarding *Enmund v. Florida*. He further argues that the giving of a felony murder instruction in this case should be considered as mitigating. "The giving of a felony murder instruction is a mitigating circumstance only where there is some doubt as to defendant's specific intent to kill the victim. *State v. Schad*, 129 Ariz. 557, 574, 633 P.2d 366, 383 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1492, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982)." *State v. Gillies*, 135 Ariz. 500, 513, 662 P.2d 1007, 1020 (1983). *Accord State v. Zaragoza*, 135 Ariz. 63, 70, 659 P.2d 22, 29 (1983). This asserted mitigation therefore does not apply to this defendant.

There was some testimony from family members that the defendant had polio as a small child which may have caused him some physical and brain damage, although the statutory mitigating circumstance of A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1), substantial impairment of mental capability to appreciate wrongfulness of conduct or to conform conduct to the law, was not established in this case. The court does take notice that the defendant has a low intelligence; the last time his I.Q. was tested before he left school it measured seventy one, or approximately at the second percentile. Some of the testimony also suggested a troubled home life as a youth, and learning difficulties in school.

The court has also considered his lack of prior record of serious crime, the evidence suggesting

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remorse by defendant, his favorable adjustment to a new marital and parental responsibility in the months preceeding his arrest, and the treatment accorded Kathy Foreman as further mitigation.

Having considered all the mitigation presented, we find that although it is significant, it is not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency in light of the extreme cruelty and brutality of the instant crime. The death penalty was properly imposed in this case.

XVI. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

In cases where the death penalty is imposed we also conduct a proportionality review to determine "whether the sentences of death are excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendants." *State v. Richmond*, supra, 114 Ariz. at 196, 560 P.2d at 51.

For the reasons stated in *State v. Lambright*, we find that the disposition accorded Kathy Foreman, although disturbing, is not alone sufficient to require reversal of defendant's sentence.

This court must also look to the disposition of persons involved in other similar crimes. For the reasons stated in *State v. Lambright*, we find the disposition in this case to be proportional to the disposition of the following similar cases in which the death penalty was imposed, *State v. Jeffers*, 135 Ariz. 404, 661 P.2d 1105 (1983); *State v. Bishop*, 127 Ariz. 531, 622 P.2d 478 (1980); *State v. Ceja*, 126 Ariz. 35, 612 P.2d 491 (1980); *State v. Knapp*, 114 Ariz. 531, 562 P.2d 704 (1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 1458, 55 L.Ed.2d 500 (1978); and not inconsistent with the following cases in which leniency was granted, *State v. McDaniel*, 136 Ariz. 188, 665 P.2d 70 (1983); *State v. Graham*, 135 Ariz. 209, 660 P.2d 460 (1983); *State v. Valencia*, 132 Ariz. 248, 645 P.2d 239 (1982); *State v. Watson*, 129 Ariz. 60, 628 P.2d 943 (1981); *State v. Brookover*, 124 Ariz. 38, 601 P.2d 1322 (1979). Again, we believe that overall the penalty imposed in this case is proportional to the penalty imposed in similar crimes.

[138 Ariz. 87] *25 We have reviewed the record for fundamental error pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4035, and find none.

The convictions and sentences are affirmed.

HOLOHAN, C.J., GORDON, V.C.J., and HAYS, J., concur.

FELDMAN, Justice, concurring in part; dissenting in part.

I concur in the portion of the opinion affirming the conviction. My views on the use of dual juries are contained in my concurrence to *State v. Lambright*, 138 Ariz. 63, 673 P.2d 1 (1983).

I dissent from that portion of the opinion affirming defendant's sentence to death. The trial court found that Smith was a participant in the killing. However, the record indicates and the majority acknowledges that it was Lambright who used the knife and it was Lambright who "finished off" the victim by hitting her over the head with a rock. Smith claims that his participation in the act of murder was only minor and that the killing was done by Lambright and Kathy Foreman.

The trial court's findings are contrary to Smith's contentions. The trial court found beyond reasonable doubt that Smith, with premeditation, participated in the killing, that he helped to plan it, and that his participation in the actual act of murder "was MAJOR." (Emphasis in original.) Ordinarily, if the trial judge's findings are supported by the evidence we could affirm or, in a capital case where we are making an independent review, we could agree. I cannot agree in this case. On this record, the trial court's findings are necessarily based upon the testimony of Kathy Foreman. Evidently the trial judge believed her testimony. He certainly had a better opportunity than I to determine the credibility. It may well be that she told the truth. However, her motives for lying are clear. By testifying that both Lambright and Smith planned and took a major part in the crime, she has seen to their conviction and to the imposition of the ultimate sentence. By doing this, she has earned immunity for herself, avoided the death penalty, and has not served even a day in jail.

The trial judge and the members of this court are "disturbed" and "appalled" by the treatment afforded Ms. Foreman. I join them in this. I am also appalled, however, by the fact that in the face of the many mitigating circumstances detailed by the court, including his low I.Q., Smith has been sentenced to death on the uncorroborated testimony of a witness

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whose motive for lying is patent. If the testimony given by Kathy Foreman is true, then Smith merits the death penalty. If, however, Kathy Foreman did not tell the truth, Smith does not merit the death penalty. No member of the majority has ever seen Kathy Foreman, but each member of the majority recognizes her motive to lie and each member of the majority is appalled. In my view, no decision on life or death should be allowed to stand on so frag a foundation. For this reason, I believe that the court should exercise its discretion in performing i duty of independent review by reducing Smith's sentence to life without possibility of parole for 25 years.

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BEST AVAILABLE

APPENDIX F

*1 673 P.2d 1

138 Ariz. 63, 41 A.L.R.4th 1165

Supreme Court of Arizona,
In Banc.

STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
v.
Joe Leonard LAMBRIGHT, Appellant.

No. 5594.
Sept. 28, 1983.

Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Pima County, Cause No. CR-05669, Michael J. Brown, J., of first-degree murder, kidnapping and sexual assault, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, Cameron, J., held that: (1) use of single-trial "dual jury" procedure was not authorized, but was not reversible error; (2) venue was proper, notwithstanding that murder was committed elsewhere; (3) there was no clear and manifest error in deciding that defendant's statements were voluntary and not coerced; (4) it was not error to allow member of prosecutor's office to testify regarding grant of immunity to an accomplice; and (5) imposition of death sentence was proper.

Affirmed.

Feldman, J., filed specially concurring opinion.

West Headnotes

[1] Criminal Law ⇐622

110 ----
110XX Trial
110XX(A) Preliminary Proceedings
110k622 Joint or Separate Trials of Codefendants.

(Formerly 110k618)

[See headnote text below]

[1] Criminal Law ⇐1166(1)

110 ----
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error
110k1166 Preliminary Proceedings
110k1166(1) In General.

Use of single-trial "dual jury" procedure in prosecution of defendant and codefendant, while not authorized by the Supreme Court, was not reversible error, as defendant could point to no specific error occurring at trial, and as such procedure was not inherently prejudicial.

[2] Criminal Law ⇐112(1)

110 ----
110IX Venue
110IX(A) Place of Bringing Prosecution
110k112 Offenses Committed Partly in One County and Partly in Another
110k112(1) In General.

Venue was proper on homicide charge, where underlying felonies of kidnapping and sexual assault were elements of first-degree murder charge, kidnapping of victim originated in county of venue, and evidence supported conclusion that initial sexual assault occurred while defendants were still in that county, notwithstanding that murder occurred elsewhere. A.R.S. §§ 13-109, 13-1105, 13-1301, subd. 2(a).

[3] Criminal Law ⇐412.1(4)

110 ----
110XVII Evidence
110XVII(M) Declarations
110k411 Declarations by Accused
110k412.1 Voluntary Character of Statement
110k412.1(4) Interrogation and Investigatory Questioning.

Trial court was not clearly and manifestly in error in determining that defendant's interviews with police were not inherently coercive, where defendant was not questioned until after he was transported to sheriff's office, he was then booked and permitted to make phone calls, he spoke to two officers for approximately 45 minutes beginning at 10:15 a.m., and then spoke to another officer for another 45 minutes, and during such period defendant was not handcuffed, and was permitted to smoke cigarettes and drink coffee.

[4] Criminal Law ⇐412.1(1)

110 ----
110XVII Evidence

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110XVII(M) Declarations
110k411 Declarations by Accused
110k412.1 Voluntary Character of Statement
110k412.1(1) In General.

There was no clear and manifest error in conclusion that statements made by defendant to police were voluntarily given, in view of specific denial by police officers who rode in car with defendant that one of the officers conspicuously displayed a gun and said that it could make a big hole in a person, denial by arresting officers that they overheard any phone conversation of defendant in which he asked his sister and his boss to arrange to get him a lawyer, denial by officer that at beginning of interview defendant stated that he thought he should talk to an attorney, and denial by officers that they alluded to another case involving multiple defendants and stated that first person to confess got a better deal.

[5] Criminal Law ⇐412.1(1)

110 ----
110XVII Evidence
110XVII(M) Declarations
110k411 Declarations by Accused
110k412.1 Voluntary Character of Statement
110k412.1(1) In General.

Statement by defendant to homicide detective that "I probably owe you a complete confession" was a spontaneous remark which was unsolicited and clearly voluntary, and thus was admissible.

[6] Witnesses ⇐318

410 ----
410IV Credibility and Impeachment
410IV(A) In General
410k318 Corroboration of Unimpeached and Uncontradicted Witness.

Admission of testimony by a member of prosecutor's office who was not prosecuting instant case, that story of State's witness who was granted immunity from prosecution never varied in its particulars before and after she was granted immunity, was not error, as jury was able to place such testimony in context, and to accord it appropriate weight, notwithstanding that State's witness was an interested witness.

[7] Criminal Law ⇐741(1)

110 ----
110XX Trial
110XX(F) Province of Court and Jury in General
110k733 Questions of Law or of Fact
110k741 Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence in General
110k741(1) In General.

[See headnote text below]

[7] Criminal Law ⇐742(1)

110 ----
110XX Trial
110XX(F) Province of Court and Jury in General
110k733 Questions of Law or of Fact
110k742 Credibility of Witnesses
110k742(1) In General.

Credibility of a witness and weight and value to be given her testimony are questions for trier of fact.

[8] Criminal Law ⇐741(1)

110 ----
110XX Trial
110XX(F) Province of Court and Jury in General
110k733 Questions of Law or of Fact
110k741 Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence in General
110k741(1) In General.

[See headnote text below]

[8] Criminal Law ⇐742(1)

110 ----
110XX Trial
110XX(F) Province of Court and Jury in General
110k733 Questions of Law or of Fact
110k742 Credibility of Witnesses
110k742(1) In General.

Weight and credibility to be accorded to witnesses who are involved in upholding the law are jury matters.

[9] Witnesses ⇐70

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410 ----
410II Competency
410II(A) Capacity and Qualifications in General
410k69 Judges, Jurors, and Judicial Officers, as Witnesses as to Proceedings by or Before Them
410k70 In General.

Fact that witness, who testified that story of State's witness, who was granted immunity from prosecution, had not varied in its particulars before and after being granted immunity, was a member of the prosecutor's office did not render that testimony inadmissible, where witness was not the prosecutor who was trying the case.

[10] Criminal Law ⇐770(3)

110 ----
110XX Trial
110XX(G) Instructions: Necessity, Requisites, and Sufficiency
110k770 Issues and Theories of Case in General
110k770(3) Requisites and Sufficiency.

[See headnote text below]

[10] Criminal Law ⇐814(3)

110 ----
110XX Trial
110XX(G) Instructions: Necessity, Requisites, and Sufficiency
110k814 Application of Instructions to Case
110k814(3) Matters Not Sustained by Evidence in General.

Failure to *1 give instructions which are not correct statements of the law or do not fit facts of particular case is not error.

[11] Criminal Law ⇐798(.5)

110 ----
110XX Trial
110XX(G) Instructions: Necessity, Requisites, and Sufficiency
110k798 Manner of Arriving at Verdict
110k798(.5) In General.

(Formerly 110k798)

Defendant's proffered instruction that jury must consider charge against each defendant separately was an incorrect statement of law given single-trial "dual jury" procedure used in case, and therefore was properly refused.

[12] Sentencing and Punishment ⇐1624

350H ----
350HVIII The Death Penalty
350HVIII(A) In General
350Hk1622 Validity of Statute or Regulatory Provision
350Hk1624 Provision Authorizing Death Penalty.

(Formerly 110k1213.2(2))

Arizona death penalty statute is not unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment contrary to Eighth Amendment. A.R.S. § 13-703; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8.

[13] Homicide ⇐341

203 ----
203X Appeal and Error
203k333 Harmless Error
203k341 Failure or Refusal to Give Instructions.

Statutory aggravating circumstance that killing was in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner was not unconstitutionally vague. A.R.S. § 13-703, subd. F, par. 6.

[14] Criminal Law ⇐749

110 ----
110XX Trial
110XX(F) Province of Court and Jury in General
110k733 Questions of Law or of Fact
110k749 Extent of Punishment.

Defendant did not have right to have jury participate in sentencing, notwithstanding that death penalty was a possible outcome.

[15] Constitutional Law ⇐270(1)

92 ----
92XII Due Process of Law

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92k256 Criminal Prosecutions
92k270 Judgment and Sentence
92k270(1) In General.

[See headnote text below]

[15] Sentencing and Punishment ⚖206

350H ----
350HII Sentencing Proceedings in General
350HII(A) In General
350Hk203 Constitutional, Statutory and Other Regulatory Provisions
350Hk206 Validity.

(Formerly 110k1206.1(1))

Placing burden of proof on defendant to prove mitigating circumstances in sentencing determination did not violate due process. A.R.S. § 13-703, subd. C; U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.

[16] Sentencing and Punishment ⚖1684

350H ----
350HVIII The Death Penalty
350HVIII(D) Factors Related to Offense
350Hk1684 Vileness, Heinousness, or Atrocity.

(Formerly 203k357(11), 203k354)

Evidence, including proof that victim was abducted and driven away from city in which she was picked up by her captors, she was described as being scared and trembling as she sat in backseat of car, during drive she was sexually assaulted, she was then taken to an isolated location and placed in obvious fear for her life, as evidenced by her asking her captors if they intended to let her go, and was then sexually assaulted a second time before being killed, supported finding of aggravating circumstance of cruelty, that is, murder was committed in a cruel manner, based on great degree of mental pain inflicted on victim during course of crime. A.R.S. § 13-703, subd. F, par. 6.

[17] Sentencing and Punishment ⚖1684

350H ----
350HVIII The Death Penalty
350HVIII(D) Factors Related to Offense
350Hk1684 Vileness, Heinousness, or Atrocity.

(Formerly 203k357(11), 203k354)

Where victim was choked and then stabbed in chest and abdomen, knife was twisted and turned while it was inside her, her throat was then cut deeply, she remained alive and was still conscious as she raised herself up on one elbow when her assailants turned to leave, and then defendant returned and threw large boulder down on her head, statutory aggravating element of cruelty, for purposes of aggravating circumstance that murder was committed in an especially cruel manner, was established. A.R.S. § 13-703, subd. F, par. 6.

[18] Sentencing and Punishment ⚖1684

350H ----
350HVIII The Death Penalty
350HVIII(D) Factors Related to Offense
350Hk1684 Vileness, Heinousness, or Atrocity.

(Formerly 203k357(11), 203k354)

Concepts of heinous and depraved, for purposes of aggravating circumstance that murder was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, go to mental state and attitude of perpetrator as reflected in his words and actions. A.R.S. § 13-703, subd. F, par. 6.

[19] Sentencing and Punishment ⚖1684

350H ----
350HVIII The Death Penalty
350HVIII(D) Factors Related to Offense
350Hk1684 Vileness, Heinousness, or Atrocity.

(Formerly 203k357(11), 203k354)

Evidence, including proof that when defendant was arrested one year after murder he was wearing a necklace with a charm that had belonged to victim, that when authorities inquired about the charm, defendant told them he kept it as a memento of the trip, plus proof that defendant participated in celebration of killing during which group played song "We Are the Champions," supported finding that defendant had a heinous and depraved attitude during the crime, thereby establishing that

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aggravating circumstance. A.R.S. § 13-703, subd. F, par. 6.

[20] Sentencing and Punishment ⚖1655

350H ----
350HVIII The Death Penalty
350HVIII(C) Factors Affecting Imposition in General
350Hk1655 Sentence or Disposition of Co-Participant or Codefendant.

(Formerly 203k357(4), 203k354)

[20] Sentencing and Punishment ⚖1661

350H ----
350HVIII The Death Penalty
350HVIII(C) Factors Affecting Imposition in General
350Hk1661 Determinations Based on Multiple Factors.

(Formerly 203k357(4), 203k354)

[20] Sentencing and Punishment ⚖1684

350H ----
350HVIII The Death Penalty
350HVIII(D) Factors Related to Offense
350Hk1684 Vileness, Heinousness, or Atrocity.

(Formerly 203k357(4), 203k354)

Where evidence supported aggravating circumstance that murder was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, based on findings of cruelty relative to both great mental pain inflicted on victim during course of murder and victim's suffering of great physical pain during murder itself, and that defendant had a heinous and depraved state of mind, imposition of death penalty was proper, notwithstanding that in mitigation defendant presented a lack of record of prior violent crime, honorable discharge from military, an asserted unsettled family life as a child, and fact that State's witness who purportedly participated in murder was granted immunity for her testimony. A.R.S. § 13-703, subds. E, F, par. 6.

[21] Sentencing and Punishment ⚖1655

350H ----
350HVIII The Death Penalty
350HVIII(C) Factors Affecting Imposition in General
350Hk1655 Sentence or Disposition of Co-Participant or Codefendant.

(Formerly 203k356, 203k354)

That State's witness received immunity in return for her testimony against defendant did not create a disproportionate result so as to preclude imposition of death sentence on defendant for murder, as codefendant received same sentence received by defendant.

[22] Sentencing and Punishment ⚖38

350H ----
350HI Punishment in General
350HI(B) Extent of Punishment in General
350Hk38 Proportionality to Offense.

(Formerly 110k1208.1(2))

While disposition of other persons involved *1 in crime is an important factor in determining proportionality of capital sentence, court must also consider propriety of sentence in relation to disposition of persons involved in other similar crimes.

[23] Sentencing and Punishment ⚖1684

350H ----
350HVIII The Death Penalty
350HVIII(D) Factors Related to Offense
350Hk1684 Vileness, Heinousness, or Atrocity.

(Formerly 203k357(4), 203k354)

Death sentence received by defendant was proportional to disposition of persons involved in crimes involving same aggravating circumstance, that murder was committed in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner, and was not disproportionate to other cases in which it was held that leniency was appropriate in light of the more compelling mitigating circumstances than were present in instant case. A.R.S. § 13-703, subd. F, par. 6.

[24] Sentencing and Punishment ⚖1655

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350H ----
350HVIII The Death Penalty
350HVIII(C) Factors Affecting Imposition in General
350Hk1655 Sentence or Disposition of Co-Participant or Codefendant.

(Formerly 110k983)

Favorable treatment accorded to an accomplice can, under certain circumstances, be given weight in considering proportionality of capital sentence.

[138 Ariz. 65] *3 Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer, III and Barbara A. Jarrett, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.

Thomas G. Martin, Tucson, for appellant.

CAMERON, Justice.

Defendant, Joseph Leonard Lambright, was tried before a jury and convicted of first degree murder, A.R.S. § 13-1105, kidnapping, A.R.S. § 13-1304(A)(3), and sexual assault, A.R.S. § 13-1406. In addition, the kidnapping and sexual assault were found to have been dangerous felonies, involving the infliction of serious physical injury, A.R.S. § 13-604. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder, to 21 years imprisonment for the kidnapping, and to 21 years imprisonment for the sexual assault, to be served consecutively to the sentence for kidnapping. The case was automatically appealed to this court pursuant to Rules 26.15, 31.2(b), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S.; we have jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 6, § 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 13-4031 and 13-4035.

The issues we must decide on appeal are:

I. Does the use of a dual jury procedure at trial constitute reversible error?

[138 Ariz. 66] *4 II. Did the trial court lack venue over the homicide charge?

III. Were defendant's statements voluntary?

IV. Was it error to allow an official of the Pima County attorney's office to testify regarding the grant of immunity to an accomplice?

V. Did the trial court err in failing to give one of the defendant's proffered jury instructions?

VI. Is the Arizona death penalty statute unconstitutional?

VII. Is the statutory aggravating circumstance of killing in an "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner" unconstitutionally vague?

VIII. Is there a right to have a jury participate in sentencing where the death penalty is imposable?

IX. Is it unconstitutional to place the burden of proof of mitigating circumstances on the defendant?

X. Does this court find in its independent review that the death penalty was appropriate in this case?

XI. Is the death penalty in this case proportionate to the disposition of other similar cases?

The facts necessary to a determination of this appeal are as follows. In February and March, 1980, Joseph Lambright, Robert Smith, a friend of Lambright's, and Kathy Foreman, Lambright's girlfriend, took a cross country driving trip. Beginning in Texas, where they resided, they first drove to Florida, returned to Texas, and continued on to Arizona. The trip was financed with muggings or purse-snatching and some occasional work. During the trip Lambright and Foreman were sexually involved, and frequently had intercourse in Smith's presence; sometimes this occurred in the car while Smith was driving.

When the group arrived in Arizona, they camped in the mountains outside Tucson. Lambright and Foreman again engaged in intercourse in the presence of Smith, and Smith became angry. He complained that Lambright had all the sex he wanted. Lambright asked why Smith "didn't go out and find somebody." Smith said it "wasn't so easy" and began walking off. The two men then walked away together and talked for several minutes.

The next day, 11 March 1980, the three went into Tucson and were having coffee at a Hobo Joe's restaurant, when Smith once again indicated he wanted a woman. At this point Foreman left to use the restroom. As she was returning, she testified that she overheard Lambright saying to Smith that Lambright "would like to kill somebody just to see if he could do it." When Foreman inquired moments later what was going on, Lambright told her that they were going to go out and find somebody for Smith.

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Lambright drove the group around Tucson for some time, and at approximately 3:30 p.m. they saw a young woman, the victim Sandy Owen, hitchhiking. They stopped and picked up the victim, who seated herself in the unoccupied back seat and said she wanted a ride to the food stamp office. They drove to the food stamp office, but when they arrived there they did not permit Ms. Owen to leave the car. Instead Lambright drove to the back of the building, got out of the car and jumped into the back seat with Ms. Owen. He told her to "shut up and be quiet and she wouldn't get hurt."

Smith got out of the front passenger's seat and into the driver's seat. He pulled the car away and began looking for the freeway. Foreman turned around and saw that the victim looked frightened, and appeared to be trembling. Foreman asked the victim how to get to the interstate. Smith told the victim to shut up, because she would not tell them the truth. They found Interstate 10, and proceeded northwest toward California. Lambright searched through the victim's purse, found a bottle of pills, and asked what they were for. The victim stated they were part of a mental therapy she was undergoing.

[138 Ariz. 67] *5 At some point Owen stated that she needed to use a restroom. They pulled the car off to the side of the interstate, and told her she could relieve herself behind some trees. Lambright had the victim take her shoes off so she would be unable to get away, and had Kathy Foreman accompany her to make sure she did not try to run. The group got back into the car, now with Lambright driving and Smith in the back seat. Smith put a blanket and some clothes over the rear windows, and proceeded to rape the victim. When he had finished he snickered and said she had small breasts.

The car proceeded through Pinal County, turned off the interstate, and proceeded to some isolated mountains. Ms. Owen asked if her captors were going to release her, and they told her they would take her back and let her go. They left the car at the end of a dirt road and walked part way up one of the mountains to a level area, arriving near dusk. After building a fire, Lambright and Foreman had intercourse, and a few feet away Smith again raped the victim.

Smith then began choking Ms. Owen. She collapsed, and Smith retained his grip on her as she fell. Lambright stated the woman had to be killed, or else she could press charges for kidnapping and rape. Lambright took Foreman's knife out of its sheath and began stabbing the victim in the chest and abdomen, twisting the knife around inside of her. Smith held one of the victim's arms while she was being stabbed, and Foreman held the other arm. Foreman testified that after the stabbing Smith unsuccessfully tried to break Ms. Owen's neck by twisting her head. Then Lambright, Foreman or both began cutting deeply into the victim's neck with the knife; Foreman claimed that only Lambright cut the victim's neck, Smith claimed that it was done by both Lambright and Foreman, and Lambright claimed he could not remember who used the knife during the killing. The victim remained alive, and was at least semi-conscious, as she attempted to raise herself up on one arm. Lambright picked up a large rock and hurled it at her head. Foreman testified that as he threw the rock he yelled "Die, bitch."

Jewelry was taken from the victim's body, and then rocks were piled on top of her. Lambright, Smith, and Foreman returned to the car and washed the blood off their hands. As they got back into the car and began driving to San Diego, the group engaged in a macabre celebration, playing a tape of music entitled "We Are the Champions." When they arrived in San Diego, they pawned a wedding ring belonging to Ms. Foreman. They continued on to Anaheim, California, to Las Vegas, Nevada, and then returned to Texas, where they were apprehended approximately a year later after a tip to police from someone who had been told about the crime. Each of the three persons made statements to the police.

The Pima County Attorney's Office decided to charge Lambright and Smith for their participation in the crimes, and to grant immunity to Foreman in return for her testimony. Lambright and Smith were extradited to Pima County and tried for kidnapping, sexual assault, and first degree murder. The case was assigned to the Honorable Michael V. Brown of the Pima County Superior Court. In light of the defendants' confessions, which were not totally interlocking, and the appearance of potentially antagonistic defenses, Judge Brown severed the cases of Lambright and Smith. Because most of the evidence was relevant to both

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defendants, however, the judge decided to hold a single "dual jury" trial, in which two separate juries were empaneled, each to decide the guilt or innocence of only one defendant, and each permitted to hear only evidence admissible against that one defendant. The defendants were each convicted of first degree murder, kidnapping, and sexual assault, and both appeal their convictions and sentences. We examine Robert Smith's convictions and sentences in *State v. Smith* , filed this day, 137 Ariz. ---, 673 P.2d 17. In the instant case we consider the convictions and sentences of Joseph Lambright.

I. DUAL JURIES

In the pre-trial stages it appeared to the trial judge that this case could present [138 Ariz. 68] *6 problems under the doctrine of *Bruton v. United States*, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). *Bruton* prohibits the introduction of a defendant's statements to incriminate a codefendant in a joint trial, where the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination due to the assertion of his fifth amendment right to silence. In the instant case, the state intended to use statements of both Smith and Lambright at trial, and each of these statements incriminated both the declarant and the codefendant. Moreover, although the statements were substantially "interlocking," which might have allowed their admission under the exception to *Bruton* created in *Parker v. Randolph*, 442 U.S. 62, 99 S.Ct. 2132, 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979), the confessions did not overlap in all respects. After considering the confessions, and finding it impractical to attempt to edit out the portions incriminating the other defendant, the trial judge decided to sever the two cases. *See* Rule 13.4, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. However, because most of the evidence was admissible against both defendants, and because the trial was expected to last over a week and included several out-of-state witnesses, rather than hold separate trials the judge decided to conduct a single trial using two juries.

Under this "dual jury" procedure, two juries were chosen from separate venires, each to decide the guilt or innocence of only one defendant. The trial was held in a courtroom in the federal courthouse in Tucson which was large enough to accommodate both juries. The two juries were kept physically separated, and were carefully instructed not to speak with persons on the other jury. When information relevant to both defendants was being presented, both juries remained in the courtroom. When evidence admissible against only one defendant was being presented, the jury for the other defendant was excused. When both juries were present, one sat in the jury box and the other sat in designated rows of chairs on the other side of the courtroom. The positions of the respective juries were alternated daily. Separate opening and closing arguments were made, each in front of one jury only. The juries were given separate instructions, and then sent to deliberate separately. When the first jury reached a verdict, it was not made public until the deliberations of the other jury had concluded. In the instant case both defendants were convicted on all counts, and each defendant assigns as error the use of the dual jury procedure.

It appears that a number of courts have approved the dual jury procedure. *See, e.g. United States v. Hayes*, 676 F.2d 1359, 1366-67 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1040, 103 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed.2d 608 (1982); *United States v. Rimar*, 558 F.2d 1271 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. *Rimar v. United States*, 435 U.S. 922, 98 S.Ct. 1484, 55 L.Ed.2d 515 (1978); *United States v. Rowan*, 518 F.2d 685, 689-90 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. *Jackson v. United States*, 423 U.S. 949, 96 S.Ct. 368, 46 L.Ed.2d 284 (1975); *People v. Wardlow*, 118 Cal.App.3d 375, 382-387, 173 Cal.Rptr. 500, 502-05 (1981); *People v. Brooks*, 92 Mich.App. 393, 285 N.W.2d 307 (1979). These cases generally find that this procedure satisfies the defendants' constitutional rights as well as the end of judicial economy. *See also United States v. Sidman*, 470 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir.1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1127, 93 S.Ct. 948, 35 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973) (holds procedure satisfies each of defendant's constitutional rights, including rights to impartial jury and due process). In addition to complying with the formal confrontational requirements of *Bruton* , the procedure may effectively avoid the "spectacle" of antagonistic defenses. *People v. Brooks*, supra, 92 Mich.App. at 396, 285 N.W.2d at 308.

Besides the courts which generally approve the dual jury procedure, there are courts which have given limited approval to the procedure, suggesting that appropriate guidelines be developed before the procedure is put into common use. *See, e.g. United States v. Sidman*, 470 F.2d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir.1972); *State v. Watson*, 397 So.2d 1337, 1342 (La.1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 903, 102 S.Ct. 410, 70 L.Ed.2d 222 (1981).

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[138 Ariz. 69] *7 Some other courts have discouraged or disapproved of future use of the procedure, finding the risks of error inherent in the procedure too great. *See, e.g. People v. Williams* (No. 51870, filed 16 April 1982, rev'd on grounds 93 Ill.2d 309, 67 Ill.Dec. 97, 444 N.E.2d 136 (1982); *Scarborough v. State*, 50 Md.App. 276, 278-281, 437 A.2d 672, 674-76 (1981); *State v. Corsi*, 86 N.J. 172, 430 A.2d 210 (1981). The principal risk of this procedure appears to be that while both juries are present, there may be some unintentional disclosure or reference to information admissible against only one defendant which may constitute reversible error. The Illinois Supreme Court stated, "It is the possibility that inadvertent revelations will disclose to the separate juries the inadmissible evidence which concerns us." *People v. Williams*, supra, quoted in *People v. Rainge*, 112 Ill.App.3d 396, 419, 68 Ill.Dec. 87, 102, 445 N.E.2d 535, 550 (1983). This risk is demonstrated by *United States v. Sidman*, supra, in which such an error actually occurred. During trial an inadvertent *Bruton* problem arose when in the presence of both juries the prosecutor was allowed to question a witness regarding a statement of defendant Sidman which incriminated both himself and his co-defendant. Although Sidman's conviction was affirmed, the co-defendant had to be retried.

[1] Although implied authority for a multiple jury procedure has been found under Rule 14, Fed.Rules Crim.P., 18 U.S.C., governing severance of parties and offenses, *United States v. Rowan*, supra, 518 F.2d at 690, and under state rules with similar wording, *People v. Church*, 102 Ill.App.3d 155, 163-165, 57 Ill.Dec. 679, 686-87, 429 N.E.2d 577, 584-85 (1981); *State v. Corsi*, supra, 86 N.J. at 175, 430 A.2d at 212-13, no such authority can be found in the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Specifically, our rule governing severance, Rule 13.4, Ariz.Rules Crim.P., 17 A.R.S., does not contain explicit authority for such a procedure, nor does it provide trial judges the broad discretion to "provide whatever other relief justice requires" as does the federal rule. Furthermore, our rules do not contain a provision analogous to Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which grants broad power to "proceed in any manner not inconsistent with these rules * * *." *Cf. United States v. Sidman*, 470 F.2d at 1170 (suggests district courts have authority to establish guidelines for multiple jury procedure under Federal Rule Crim.P. 57).

In *Hare v. Pima County Superior Ct.*, 133 Ariz. 540, 542, 652 P.2d 1387, 1389 (1982), we recently pointed out,

> Following the adoption of the amended 1960 state constitution, this court was given exclusive power to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court. Ariz. Const., art. 6, § 5, Subsec. 5, added 1960; *State v. Blazak*, 105 Ariz. 216, 462 P.2d 84 (1969). We have held that this rule-making power may not be supplemented or superseded by a Superior Court. *Anderson v. Pickrell*, 115 Ariz. 589, 566 P.2d 1335 (1977). We reenforced this constitutional position when we adopted Rule 36, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. (1973):
>
> "Any court may make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules. No such rule shall become effective until approved in writing by the Supreme Court."

This rule allows adoption of local rules of practice and procedure, but only with our approval. * * *

We further stated:

> * * * Nothing we say here should discourage courts, through the adoption of local rules, to carry out experiments which may improve the judicial process. Indeed, these efforts should be encouraged. But local rules must first be approved by this court * * *. *Id.* at 543, 652 P.2d at 1390.

It is clear that the "experiment" conducted in the instant case was unauthorized by this court. We thus must consider the question of prejudice to the defendant.

The authorities to date, including those cases which disapprove future use of the multiple jury procedure, are unanimous in refusing to reverse a conviction merely based on the use of this procedure, without some specific showing of prejudice. While [138 Ariz. 70] *8 it has been found that this procedure involves an inherent risk that prejudicial error may occur during the trial, the procedure itself has not been found to be prejudicial. Defendant's conviction has been uniformly upheld where the courts are unable to find any specific prejudice to the defendant. *See United States v. Hays* (11th Cir.), supra; *United States v. Rimar* (6th Cir.), supra; *United States v. Rowan* (6th Cir.), supra; *United States v. Sidman* (9th Cir.),

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supra; *People v. Wardlow* (Cal.App.), supra; *People v. Williams* (Ill.), supra; *People v. Rainge* (Ill.App.), supra; *People v. Church* (Ill.App.), supra; *State v. Watson* (La.), supra; *Scarborough v. State* (Md.App.), supra; *People v. Brooks* (Mich.App.), supra; *State v. Corsi* (N.J.), supra; *State v. Hernandez*, 163 N.J.Super. 283, 394 A.2d 883 (App.Div.1978) (involving three juries). *See also People v. Smith*, 94 Ill.App.3d 969, 50 Ill.Dec. 296, 419 N.E.2d 404 (1981) (finds no prejudice resulted from dual jury procedure, but reverses conviction on other grounds).

Defendant in the instant case can point to no specific error occurring at trial. The trial judge was meticulous in explaining the procedure to the jurors, properly admonishing the jurors, keeping the juries separated, and keeping the juries from being exposed to inadmissible material. Defendant argues that the judge erred in giving the jurors the following explanation for the procedure:

> For some legal reasons the evidence that the State will present, some of the evidence is admissible against Mr. Smith and not against Mr. Lambright; some of the evidence is admissible against Mr. Lambright but not against Mr. Smith.
>
> For that reason you are one of two juries that will be chosen this afternoon.

A substantially similar instruction was given to each jury. Defendant claims this instruction may have caused improper speculation on the part of the jurors. We believe that the above explanation of the procedure was more likely to reduce rather than increase speculation by the jurors. *See also State v. Corsi*, supra, 86 N.J. at 178-179, 430 A.2d at 213 (assertion that dual jury procedure causes speculation in the minds of the jurors rejected as a grounds for reversal). Furthermore, to the extent that through this explanation the jury became aware that there is evidence which they will not hear for legal reasons, we note that this occurs numerous times during the usual criminal trial whenever the judge sustains an evidentiary objection.

The main thrust of defendant's argument is that the dual jury procedure is inherently prejudicial, breeding confusion and speculation in the minds of the jury. We join the overwhelming authority to the contrary, however, and find that the procedure is not inherently prejudicial. In light of the severity of the penalty in this case, we have reviewed the trial record with great care. We find no reversible error in the instant case.

We do not intend the current disposition to be taken as an approval of future use of this procedure. As noted above, because this procedure is unauthorized by our rules, trial courts must obtain the approval of the Supreme Court before conducting further trials in this manner. If proposed guidelines are presented for approval, we will then consider whether they successfully minimize the risks of this procedure while maintaining the benefit of conserving judicial resources.

We note that although courts have utilized the dual jury procedure in other murder cases, *see e.g. People v. Church*, supra; *State v. Corsi*, supra, including one in which the death penalty was given and affirmed, *see People v. Williams*, supra, we feel that death penalty cases are inappropriate vehicles for experimentation with new procedures, and the practice should be avoided in the future.

II. VENUE

Article 2, § 24 of the Arizona Constitution provides, "In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right * * * to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed. * * * " This provision is carried into effect by A.R.S. § 13-109 which specifically provides,

> [138 Ariz. 71] *9 § 13-109. Place of trial
>
> A. Criminal prosecutions shall be tried in the county in which conduct constituting *any element* of the offense or a result of such conduct occurred, unless otherwise provided by law.
>
> B. The following special provisions apply:
>
> 1. If conduct constituting *an element* of an offense or a result constituting an element of an offense occurs in two or more counties, trial of the offense may be held in any of the counties concerned; * * *. (Emphasis added.)

[2] It is clear that the actual killing in this case took place in Pinal County. The defendant argues that venue on the homicide charge was improper in Pima County, where the trial was held.

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The murder charge was based on both premeditation and felony murder theories. As to felony murder, our statute provides,

> § 13-1105. First degree murder; classification
>
> A. A person commits first degree murder if: * * *.
>
> 2. Acting either alone or with one or more other persons commits or attempts to commit sexual assault under § 13-1406, * * * [or] kidnapping under § 13-1304 * * *, and in the course of and in furtherance of such offense or immediate flight from such offense, such person or another person causes the death of any person.

Under this felony murder theory, the underlying felonies of kidnapping and sexual assault were elements of the first degree murder charge. It is clear that the kidnapping of Sandra Owen originated in Pima County. The uncontested evidence demonstrates that Sandra Owen was abducted in the parking lot of a food stamp office in Tucson, Pima County. The only counterargument offered is that Ms. Owen voluntarily got into the automobile when she was first picked up hitchhiking. Under our criminal code,

> A person commits kidnapping by knowingly restraining another person with the intent to
>
> * * *
>
> * * *
>
> 3. Inflict death, physical injury or a sexual offense on the victim, * * *. A.R.S. § 13-1304.

Further, our statutes provide that "Restraint is without consent if it is accomplished by: (a) Physical force, intimidation or deception; * * *." A.R.S. § 13-1301(2)(a). The uncontradicted evidence established that when the car reached the parking lot, Ms. Owen was not permitted to leave the car, but was forced to remain when Lambright jumped into the seat next to her, warned her to "shut up and be quiet and she wouldn't get hurt," and the car sped off with Smith at the wheel. Thus, the kidnapping began in Pima County. In addition, the evidence supports the trial judge's conclusion that the initial sexual assault, which took place while the car was in motion on Interstate 10, occurred while the defendants were still in Pima County. Because acts comprising an element of felony murder occurred in Pima County, venue was proper in Pima County under A.R.S. § 13-109, supra.

Because we have decided that venue was proper under a felony murder theory, we need not decide whether the evidence suggesting premeditation in Pima County was also sufficient to establish venue. *See State v. Poland*, 132 Ariz. 269, 275-76, 645 P.2d 784, 790-91 (1982) (evidence of premeditation in Yavapai County sufficient to support venue under A.R.S. § 13-109). *Cf. State v. Cox*, 25 Ariz.App. 328, 331-32, 543 P.2d 449, 452-53 (1975) (forming of intent did not satisfy "overt act" requirement of former venue statute A.R.S. § 13-131).

III. VOLUNTARINESS OF STATEMENTS

Defendant Lambright was arrested at approximately 9:30 a.m. on 14 March 1981 at his place of work, Midway Auto Sales, located on Highway 62 in Orange County, Texas. The officers involved with the arrest were Thomas Latta, Assistant Chief [138 Ariz. 72] *10 Deputy of the Orange County Sheriff's Department, Bruce Simpson, Captain, Deputy Sheriff of the Orange County Sheriff's Department, Winston Padgett, a detective with the Texas Department of Public Safety who had worked on the investigation, and John Hebert, a Louisiana State Police trooper who had also helped in the investigation. Lambright was properly advised of his Miranda warnings at the time of the arrest, and he indicated he understood them. He was not questioned at that time. The officers transported Lambright to the Orange County Sheriff's Office, where he was booked and then permitted to make phone calls. When he had finished his phone calls, he was interviewed beginning around 10:15 a.m. He spoke to officers Padgett and Simpson for approximately forty-five minutes, and then spoke to officer Hebert for another forty-five minutes. During this period defendant was not handcuffed, and was permitted to smoke cigarettes and drink coffee. He gave a detailed account of the crime, including his participation in it, except that he said he "couldn't remember" who actually wielded the knife.

[3] The trial judge held these statements were voluntary. As we said in *State v. Arnett*, 119 Ariz. 38, 42, 579 P.2d 542, 546 (1978), "[T]he State must show 'by a preponderance of the evidence' that the

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confession was freely and voluntarily made. The trial court must look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, as presented at 'voluntariness' hearings, and decide whether the State has met its burden. However, the trial court's determination of admissibility will not be upset on appeal absent clear and manifest error." (Citations omitted.) Quoted in *State v. Osbond*, 128 Ariz. 76, 78, 623 P.2d 1232, 1234 (1981). *Accord State v. Dalglish*, 131 Ariz. 133, 137, 639 P.2d 323, 327 (1982). We are unable to find any clear and manifest error in the instant case. There was nothing inherently coercive regarding these interviews, considering the time of day, duration, number of officers involved, or any other surrounding circumstances.

[4] At the voluntariness hearing Lambright testified that during the drive to the sheriff's office one of the officers conspicuously displayed a gun and said that it could make a big hole in a person. This was specifically denied by each of the police officers who rode in the car with Lambright. Lambright also stated that when he was permitted to telephone his sister and his boss, he asked those persons to arrange to get him a lawyer, and Lambright believed that the officers overheard these requests. Each of the arresting officers denied overhearing any such conversation. Lambright further claimed that at the beginning of the interview he stated that he thought he should talk to an attorney. Officer Padgett, who was the first person to enter the room and began the interview, denied at trial that defendant ever made such a statement. Finally, Lambright claimed that the officers alluded to another case involving multiple defendants and stated that the first person to confess got a better deal. Each of the three officers who interviewed the defendant denied making such a reference or hearing any other officer make such a reference.

After hearing this conflicting testimony the trial judge found these statements were voluntarily given. The trial judge had an opportunity to assess directly the demeanor of the witnesses and determine their credibility. After hearing the witnesses, the trial judge was free to reject the allegations of the defendant in favor of the facts as related by the officers. We are unable to find clear and manifest error in the admission of these oral statements given to the police.

After concluding the oral statements, Lambright was asked if he would make a written statement. He agreed to do so, and was read his rights again. He had just begun to write out a statement when he was interrupted by the arrival of a judge at approximately 12:10 p.m. to secure a waiver of extradition which Lambright had indicated he was willing to give. The judge gave Lambright an additional Miranda warning, and then read him a statement regarding extradition. Lambright then [138 Ariz. 73] *11 asked some complex questions regarding the extradition process. The judge responded that he could not give Lambright legal advice, and without Lambright requesting one, the judge decided to provide Lambright an attorney, and called an attorney on the telephone. After talking with the lawyer, Lambright told the judge and officers present that the attorney had told him not to make any further statements. All questioning ceased, and Lambright was transferred to the County Jail.

[5] After extradition had been arranged, Gary Dhaemers, homicide detective with the Pima County Sheriff's Department, went to Texas in May 1981 to return Lambright to Arizona. Dhaemers told Lambright at the outset that he would not talk to him about the case because Lambright had an attorney. When they arrived in Tucson and were entering the holding area of the court building, Lambright stated to Dhaemers "I probably owe you a complete confession." The trial court properly found this spontaneous remark which was unsolicited and clearly voluntary to be admissible. We find no error in the trial court's determination of the admissibility of his statements to the police.

IV. ASSOCIATE OF PROSECUTOR AS WITNESS

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing a member of the Pima County Attorney's Office to testify. The defendant generally objected to Deputy County Attorney Paul Banales' testimony concerning Kathy Foreman's story of the crime because of "the fear that the jury will consider the testimony of a prosecutor to be more credible than that of the other witness[es]." The context of Banales' testimony here, according to the defendant, renders this fear particularly palpable. Banales testified at trial that Kathy Foreman's story never varied in its particulars before and after he granted her immunity. According to the defendant, Banales' testimony thus had a substantial impact on a key issue in the case--the credibility of the prosecution's eye witness.

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[6][7] The defendant did not object at trial to Banales' specific comment regarding the consistency of Foreman's story, and we do not believe that admitting the comment was error. That Foreman was an interested witness is beyond dispute; her immunity from prosecution was contingent on her testifying against the co-defendants, as the jury was advised. The credibility of a witness and the weight and value to be given her testimony are questions for the trier of fact. *State v. Spoon*, 137 Ariz. 105 at ---, 669 P.2d 83; *State v. Pieck*, 111 Ariz. 318, 529 P.2d 217 (1974). The jury would have considered the conditions under which Foreman testified, as well as Banales' comment, in deciding how much credence to give her testimony. We believe on review of the evidence that Banales' testimony had little impact on a jury that assessed first-hand the credibility of a witness subjected both to direct examination and to searching cross-examination by two defense attorneys. Moreover, the jury knew that Banales was involved in the early stages of the instant proceedings, and had made the offer of immunity. It therefore knew that the "corroboration" implicit in Banales' statement was from a source interested in the outcome of the trial. We believe, therefore, that the jury was able to place Banales' remark in context, and to accord it the appropriate weight.

[8][9] As to the general contention that a prosecutor's testimony is inherently prejudicial to a defendant because of the status of the witness, we have said that the weight and credibility to be accorded to witnesses who are involved in upholding the law are jury matters. *See Baumgartner v. State*, 20 Ariz. 157, 178 P. 30 (1919); *Duff v. State*, 19 Ariz. 361, 171 P. 133 (1918). In the instant case it was not the prosecutor who was trying the case who appeared as a witness, but another person from the same office, who was not participating in the trial. The concerns we have about the county attorney also being a material witness in the crime he is prosecuting do not apply in this case. We find no error.

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*12 V. FAILURE TO GIVE JURY INSTRUCTIONS

The next allegation of error concerns the trial court's failure to give defendant's requested jury instruction no. 10, which read:

> There are two defendants. You must consider the evidence in the case as a whole. However, you must consider the charge against each defendant separately. You must not be prejudiced against one defendant simply because you determine that the State has proved its case against another defendant.

[10][11] The failure to give instructions which are not correct statements of the law or do not fit the facts of a particular case is not error. *State v. Axley*, 132 Ariz. 383, 393, 646 P.2d 268, 278 (1982); *State v. Reinhold*, 123 Ariz. 50, 57, n. 4, 597 P.2d 532, 539, n. 4 (1979); *State v. Rhymes*, 107 Ariz. 12, 14, 480 P.2d 662, 664 (1971). The above instruction to the jury that it "must consider the charge against each defendant separately" was an incorrect statement of the law given the dual jury procedure. The trial judge correctly pointed out that each of the juries in this case were supposed to consider the charges against only one defendant, not to consider the charges against each defendant separately. This instruction was an incorrect statement of the law, had the potential for confusing the jury, and therefore was properly refused.

We also note that the trial judge correctly instructed the jurors,

> The only matter before you for your decision is the guilt or innocence of the particular defendant.

"If the substance of the proposed instruction is adequately covered by instructions actually given by the court, there is no error in their being refused. *State v. Cookus*, 115 Ariz. 99, 563 P.2d 898 (1977)." *State v. Gretzler*, 126 Ariz. 60, 89, 612 P.2d 1023, 1052 (1980). *Accord State v. Melendez*, 121 Ariz. 1, 5, 588 P.2d 294, 298 (1978).

VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARIZONA DEATH PENALTY STATUTE

[12] Defendant claims that the Arizona death penalty statute, A.R.S. § 13-703, is unconstitutional in that it is cruel and unusual punishment contrary to the eighth amendment. This issue has been resolved adversely to defendant's position on numerous occasions. *State v. Gretzler*, 135 Ariz. 42, 53, 659 P.2d 1, 12, cert. denied 461 U.S. 971, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983). *See also State v. Gillies*, 135 Ariz. 500, 507, 662 P.2d 1007, 1014 (1983); *State v. Woratzeck*, 134 Ariz. 452, 456, 657 P.2d 865, 869 (1982).

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VII. VALIDITY OF STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF "HEINOUS, CRUEL OR DEPRAVED"

[13] Defendant also claims that the statutory aggravating circumstance prescribed by A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6), killing in an "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner," is unconstitutionally vague. We have considered and rejected this claim in prior cases. *State v. Gretzler*, supra, 135 Ariz. at 50, 659 P.2d at 9. *See also State v. Jeffers*, 135 Ariz. 404, 430, 661 P.2d 1105, 1131 (1983); *State v. Zaragoza*, 135 Ariz. 63, 68, 659 P.2d 22, 27 (1983).

VIII. RIGHT TO JURY SENTENCING

[14] Defendant asserts that he has a right to have a jury participate in sentencing when the death penalty is a possible outcome. This assertion has also been rejected by the court numerous times. *State v. Gretzler*, supra, 135 Ariz. at 56, 659 P.2d at 15. *See also State v. Richmond*, 136 Ariz. 312, ---, 666 P.2d 57, 61 (1983).

IX. BURDEN OF PROOF ON MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

[15] Defendant also argues that placing the burden of proof on defendant to prove mitigating circumstances, *see* A.R.S. § 13-703(C), violates due process. Several of our cases hold to the contrary. *State v. Richmond*, supra, 136 Ariz. at 316, 666 P.2d at 61; *State v. Blazak*, 131 Ariz. 598, 602, 643 P.2d 694, 698 (1982); *State v. Smith*, 125 Ariz. 412, 416, 610 P.2d 46, 50 (1980).

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*13 X. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

In every case in which the death penalty is imposed we conduct an "independent review of the facts that establish the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances." *State v. Richmond*, 114 Ariz. 186, 196, 560 P.2d 41, 51 (citations omitted), cert. denied 433 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 2988, 53 L.Ed.2d 1101 (1976). We further "determine for ourselves if the latter outweigh the former when we find both to be present." *Id.*

[16] In the instant case the trial judge found the evidence established the aggravating circumstance set out in A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6), that the "defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner." Cruelty has been specifically defined to involve the infliction of pain on the victims. We have also stated that our concept of cruelty involves not only physical pain, but also mental distress visited upon the victims. *State v. Gretzler*, supra, 135 Ariz. at 52, 659 P.2d at 11. In *State v. Tison*, 129 Ariz. 526, 633 P.2d 335 (1981), we found cruelty based on the infliction of such emotional distress. There the victims were held by armed captors for an extended period, forced at gunpoint to move from place to place, and finally compelled to witness other family members being shot to death while awaiting their own executions. In this case the victim was abducted and driven away from the city in which she was picked up by her captors. She was described as being scared and trembling as she sat in the back seat of the car. During the drive she was sexually assaulted. She was then taken to an isolated location, and placed in obvious fear for her life, as evidenced by her asking her captors if they intended to let her go. She was then sexually assaulted a second time before being killed. As was the case in *State v. Tison*, supra, we are able to find cruelty based on the "great degree of mental pain" inflicted on the victim during the course of this crime. 129 Ariz. at 543, 633 P.2d at 352.

[17] In addition to the mental pain involved, the manner of killing was one which was physically painful to the victim. Ms. Owen was choked and then stabbed in the chest and abdomen. The knife was twisted and turned while it was inside her. Her throat was then cut deeply. After these attacks she remained alive and was still conscious, as she raised herself up on one elbow when her assailants turned to leave. Lambright then returned and threw a large boulder down on her head. The victim, who was conscious during this series of violent attacks, must have suffered great physical pain. The statutory element of cruelty is established.

[18][19][20] The statutory concepts of heinous and depraved go to the mental state and attitude of the perpetrator as reflected in his words and actions. *State v. Poland*, supra, 132 Ariz. at 285, 645 P.2d at 800; *State v. Tison*, supra, 129 Ariz. at 543, 633 P.2d at 352. The evidence also supports a finding that Lambright had a heinous and depraved attitude during this crime. In *State v. Gretzler*, supra, 135 Ariz. at 51-53, 659 P.2d at 10-12, we identified specific factors which lead to a finding that the crime was committed in a heinous and depraved

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manner. One of these factors is the relishing of the murder. In *State v. Clark*, 126 Ariz. 428, 437, 616 P.2d 888, 897, cert. denied 449 U.S. 1067, 101 S.Ct. 796, 66 L.Ed.2d 612 (1980), we found the murderer had a depraved state of mind where he "kept a spent bullet-as a grisly souvenir of his crime." In the instant case, when the defendant was arrested one year after the murder he was wearing a necklace with a charm that had belonged to Ms. Owen. When the authorities inquired about the charm, Lambright told them he "kept it as a m[e]mento of the trip." A heinous and depraved state of mind is also demonstrated by Lambright's participation in the macabre celebration of the killing during which the group played the song "We Are the Champions." (FN1) As mitigation the defendant [138 Ariz. 76] *14 presents his lack of a record of prior violent crime, an honorable discharge from the military, an asserted unsettled family life as a child, and the fact that Kathy Foreman was granted immunity for her testimony, which is discussed more fully infra. While we have considered all the mitigation suggested by defendant, we do not find it sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstance and to call for leniency. *See* A.R.S. § 13-703(E). The death penalty was properly imposed in this case.

XI. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

In addition to conducting an independent review of the propriety of each death sentence, we also conduct a proportionality review to determine "whether the sentences of death are excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." *State v. Richmond*, supra, 114 Ariz. at 196, 560 P.2d at 51. *Accord State v. Gretzler*, supra, 135 Ariz. at 58, 659 P.2d at 17.

[21] Our initial inquiry is whether the disposition accorded to Kathy Foreman, who received immunity in return for her testimony against Lambright and Smith creates a disproportionate result. While a more lenient sentence received by an accomplice has been considered along with other mitigating circumstances in determining whether to impose the death penalty, *see State v. Watson*, 129 Ariz. 60, 628 P.2d 943 (1981) (leniency granted to accomplice together with numerous other mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to reduce death sentence to life imprisonment), our cases have held that the mere fact that an accomplice has received leniency does not in itself prevent the imposition of the death penalty.

[22] In *State v. Gillies*, supra, where one defendant was tried and received the death penalty, and his accomplice plead guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment, we noted that, "[a]ny resulting inequity between the two sentences is a consequence induced by our plea-bargaining system." 135 Ariz. at 515, 662 P.2d at 1022. Similarly, in *State v. Gerlaugh*, 135 Ariz. 89, 659 P.2d 642 (1983), in which defendant Gerlaugh was also tried and sentenced to death, it was noted that the charges against an accomplice were disposed of through a comprehensive plea agreement under which he was given life sentences on some of the charges together with a twenty-one year sentence on another charge. 135 Ariz. at 91, n. 1, 659 P.2d at 644, n. 1 (concurring opinion). More directly on point, in *State v. Richmond*, supra, another death penalty case, we specifically considered the fact "that both Rebecca Corella and Faith Erwin were involved in the crime but were never charged." 136 Ariz. at 320, 666 P.2d at 65. In none of the above cases did we find that the prosecutorial discretion exercised toward other participants in the crime rendered improper the particular defendant's death sentence. Although Foreman managed to escape prosecution by offering her testimony in return for immunity, we note that the other person brought to trial in this case, Robert Smith, has been given the same sentence received by Lambright. While the disposition of other persons involved in the crime is an important factor in determining the proportionality of a capital sentence, the court must also consider the propriety of the sentence in relation to the disposition of persons involved in other similar crimes.

[23] Having reviewed other crimes involving the same aggravating circumstance found in the instant case, we find that the death sentence received by defendant Lambright is proportional to the disposition of the persons involved in those crimes. In *State v. Jeffers*, supra, *State v. Bishop*, 127 Ariz. 531, 622 P.2d 478 (1980), *State v. Ceja*, 126 Ariz. 35, 612 P.2d 491 (1980), *State v. Knapp*, 114 Ariz. 531, 562 P.2d 704 (1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 1458, 55 L.Ed.2d 500 (1978), each of the defendants was convicted of a murder in which the sole [138 Ariz. 77] *15 aggravating circumstance was that the crime was found to have been committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6), and each received the death penalty.

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We find also that Lambright's sentence is not disproportionate to other cases in which this court has held that leniency was appropriate in light of more compelling mitigating circumstances than are present here. *See State v. McDaniel,* 136 Ariz. 188, 665 P.2d 70 (1983) (defendant did not intend to kill); *State v. Graham,* 135 Ariz. 209, 660 P.2d 460 (1983) (substantial mental impairment due to medically-induced drug addiction, neurological problems, and brain damage; vulnerability to influence; lack of prior record of violence); *State v. Valencia,* 132 Ariz. 248, 645 P.2d 239 (1982) (extreme youth of defendant--sixteen years old at the time of his crime); *State v. Watson,* 129 Ariz. 60, 628 P.2d 943 (1981) (convincing evidence of change of defendant's character and goals while in prison; youth of defendant; murder occurred as the result of a shootout begun by robbery victim); *State v. Brookover,* 124 Ariz. 38, 601 P.2d 1322 (1979) (substantial mental impairment due to brain lesion).

[24] While we believe that overall considerations of proportionality favor imposition of the death penalty in this case, we are disturbed by the treatment accorded Kathy Foreman. After viewing the evidence and hearing the testimony in this case, the trial judge concluded that Kathy Foreman was "equally guilty" with Smith and Lambright. By her own admission she assisted Smith and Lambright in restraining the victim when the car was stopped briefly, and she held one of the victim's arms while she was being stabbed. Furthermore, it does not appear the information she had to offer was unique or essential. At the time she was granted immunity Lambright and Smith were already in custody for these crimes, and each had confessed. (FN2) Foreman did agree to try to lead authorities to the victim's body, but each of the other participants had already demonstrated a similar willingness by drawing maps for authorities to use in their search. After reviewing the record in this case the trial court stated that the granting of complete immunity to Kathy Foreman was "appalling." We agree. We must remind prosecuting attorneys that the favorable treatment accorded to an accomplice can, under different facts, be given weight in considering the proportionality of a capital sentence.

We have reviewed the record for fundamental error pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4035, and find none.

The convictions and sentences are affirmed.

HOLOHAN, C.J., GORDON, V.C.J., and HAYS, J., concur.

FELDMAN, Justice, specially concurring.

I concur with the result and with much of the reasoning contained in the opinion. I write because I disagree with the court's conclusion that the use of dual juries was equivalent to the adoption of a local rule without sanction of this court.

This record contains no hint that the Superior Court of Pima County has adopted a general procedure to be applied in cases with " *Bruton* problems" or in similar cases where the objective of efficient and prompt administration of justice conflicts with the necessity of providing defendants with a fair trial. The record does indicate that the trial judge correctly concluded that defendant's right to a fair trial required a severance. However, he was informed that if the two cases were severed, each trial would consume approximately three weeks and that the prosecution intended to call several out-of-state witnesses. Thus, successive trials would have resulted in a disproportionate expenditure of court, witness and jury time, with the attendant expense and inconvenience.

[138 Ariz. 78] *16 To handle this problem, the judge decided to sever the cases but to hold both trials at once, with two separate juries in the same courtroom. As the majority correctly indicates, careful precautions were taken and neither defendant was prejudiced in any manner. I see no reason to chastise the trial judge for using the procedure, nor any ground to conclude that he made some special rule of local procedure without sanction of the supreme court. More importantly, I see no reason to inhibit other trial judges from using innovative techniques when required in a particular case in order to meet the ever-growing problems of the system.

Rule 36, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. (1973), should be interpreted to require advance consent by this court only for the adoption of "rules of court" which set standards of procedure to be aplied to all cases or to all cases of certain classes. "A rule of court prescribes a procedural course of conduct that litigants are required to follow, the failure to comply with which may deprive the parties of substantial rights." *Hare v. Superior Court,* 133 Ariz. 540, 542, 652 P.2d 1387, 1389 (1982). What we have here is not a rule of procedure for litigants; it is an order--the exercise of an individual judge's

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discretion to use a particular technique in order to meet a specific problem. In my view, where the trial judge innovates in accommodating the requirements of a particular case, we are dealing with a discretionary function rather than with "rule making." Trial judges have inherent power and discretion to adopt special, individualized procedures designed to promote the ends of justice in each case that comes before them. *Schavey v. Roylston,* 8 Ariz.App. 574, 575, 448 P.2d 418, 419 (1968) (Judge had inherent power to exclude spectators even though the rule permitting this had been repealed.), 20 Am.Jur.2d. Courts § § 79 and 81. Such discretion--and thus the procedure adopted in the case at bench--is expressly recognized by Rule 611, Rules of Evidence, 17A A.R.S., which permits the trial court to "exercise reasonable control over the mode [of] ... presenting evidence so as to ... avoid needless consumption of time ...."

The court of appeals recently considered a procedure followed by a judge who allows jurors to submit questions for witnesses. *State v. LeMaster,* 137 Ariz. 159, 669 P.2d 592 (App.1983). The court approved the procedure--properly in my view--even though it applied to all cases that come before the judge in question and is, therefore, much more of a "rule" than the "one-time" procedure followed in the case at bench. It was not and has never been suggested that a trial judge must get the approval of this court before deciding whether or how to allow jury questions to witnesses. The same may be said of methods of settling jury instructions, handling motions *in limine,* conducting pretrial conferences, holding settlement discussions, regulating argument, handling objections and numerous other aspects of trial procedure. In fact, no procedure exists whereby a trial judge can obtain the opinion of this court, in advance, before using some technique which, although not prohibited, is not expressly permitted by rule.

The inherent discretion of each trial judge to control his or her own courtroom is one of the strong points of the common law. Of course, we must draw the line where a trial judge institutes procedures contrary to the rules or inconsistent with their spirit. At the same time, we must leave the trial judge free to adopt procedures and techniques for individual cases which present problems not specifically covered by the rules. I believe that this court should support such efforts and that the position taken today is a step backward.

(FN1.) Because of the strong evidence cited above reflecting Lambright's heinous and depraved attitude toward the killing, we need not also rely on Foreman's uncorroborated testimony that Lambright stated before the crime he "would like to kill somebody just to see if he could do it," and said "Die, bitch" as he threw the rock on the victim's head.

(FN2.) We are also unable to find circumstances surrounding these confessions which would cause a prosecutor substantial concern over their admissibility.

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APPENDIX G

Order of Pima County Superior Court Denying Third Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Dated October 24, 1995

ARIZONA SUPERIOR COURT, PIMA COUNTY

JUDGE: HON. MICHAEL BROWN CASE NO. CR-05669

Court Rptr: NONE DATE DECEMBER 20, 1995

THE STATE OF ARIZONA

vs.

ROBERT DOUGLAS SMITH

Defendant(s)

EVENT SUMMARY

Type: IN CHAMBERS Result: Defendant's Motion for Rehearing - Denied

MINUTE ENTRY

IN CHAMBERS

Counsel's assertion on page 4, lines 3 through 6 of his Motion for Rehearing, that "each of the deputies of the Public Defender's Office have been appointed . . . to 'conduct the affairs' of the Pima County Public Defender's Office rather than to independently represent Mr. Smith is either outrageous or ridiculous, whichever adjective is most appropriate. Deputies in the Public Defender's Office do not represent the Public Defender's Office. They are attorneys for and have an attorney-client relationship with the actual defendant charged with the crime. It may, indeed, be correct that it would be inappropriate for a public defender to allege a different public defender was ineffective at trial (although it has been done by this Public Defender's Office in the past). However, this does not absolve an attorney representing a client

in an appellate matter from examining in detail whether or not there is a colorable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. That is an absolute and undelegable duty. Failure to do so is at the very best malpractice and malfeasance. An attorney who discovers a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must immediately withdraw, notify the Court that there is such a claim, and allow the Court to appoint an attorney who has no conflict in representing that client. To suggest that one could wait for ten years, from 1985 to the present, and never even examine the case to see if the client had such a claim is an admission of the grossest malpractice.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Defendant's Motion for Rehearing is denied.

Copies to:

Hon. Michael Brown
Criminal Calendar
S. Jonathan Young, Esq.
John Palumbo, Esq., Public Defender's Office
Eric J. Olsson, Asst. Attny. General
Pima County Attorney's Office

Judy Cyr, Deputy Clerk

APPENDIX H

Order of Pima County Superior Court Denying Motion for Rehearing of Denial Of Third Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Dated December 20, 1995

ARIZONA SUPERIOR COURT, PIMA COUNTY

Honorable Michael J. Brown
JUDGE

CASE NO. CR-05669

DATE October 24, 1995

Court Rptr: None

STATE OF ARIZONA

Plaintiff

vs.

ROBERT DOUGLAS SMITH

Defendant

EVENT SUMMARY

Type: in chambers ruling re Rule 32 petition
Result: completed

MINUTE ENTRY

IN CHAMBERS RULING RE RULE 32 PETITION:

Defendant nor counsel are present.

This is defendant Smith's third Rule 32 petition from a sentence imposed on May 27, 1982 and affirmed by the Supreme Court on September 23, 1983.

The Court has duly reviewed the petition, response, reply, files and records and, disregarding defects of form, it determines that no material

issue of fact or law exists which would be served by any further proceedings. Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED dismissing the petition.

This order is based on the following findings:

The suggestion that Lawrence Fleischman (now Judge Fleischman) or John Palumbo of the Public Defender's office failed to consider the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, or considered it, thought counsel was ineffective and failed to allege same to avoid embarrassing a professional colleague in violation of their ethical duties is outrageous.

The claims are so old they are (1) precluded by failure to bring them previously, in accordance with Rule 32.2(a) and/or (2) for those claims raised under Rules 32.1(e), 32.1(f) or 32.1(g), are summarily dismissed due to the petition's failure to set forth the reason for not raising such claims in a previous petition or in a timely manner, in accordance with Rule 32.2(b).

cc:
Hon. Michael J. Brown
Court Adminsitrator
County Atty's Office
S. Jonathan Young, Esq.
Public Defender - John Palumbo
Appeals

L. McCormick, Deputy Clerk